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Some teacher So, how about (4)?
Some student It’s ’ill-formed’.
Same teacher Oh, finally! I was waiting for a wrong answer!
Can you explain this better?
Same student No.
Same teacher Of course not. What you probably wanted to say is that "it’s ’false’".
(4) is a ’perfectly well-formed lie’

CHAPTER 1
Preliminaries
1.1 Introduction
Many Western European languages allow bare singular nouns to appear in predica-
tive position with or without a determiner. An example is given in (1.1 a - 1.1 b),
below.
(1.1) (a) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
avvocato
lawyer
(ita)
"Gianni is a lawyer"
(b) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
un
a
avvocato
lawyer
"Gianni is a lawyer"
This phenomenon is about a meaning difference that in English surfaces slightly
differently. The English counterpart emerges with predicates that refer to unique
roles (1.2 a), but not with the other predicates. This is captured by the contrast
shown in the examples below.
(1.2) (a) Obama is president
(b) ??Obama is politician
(1.3) Obama is a president / a politician
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There are at least two main reasons why we are interested in this phenomenon.
First of all, there is an issue of meaning, and the spontaneous question of the se-
mantic difference between (1.1 a) and (1.1 b). Second, optionality, especially when
not register-dependent, is an indicator of an interaction between syntax and seman-
tics. Essentially, what we are interested in is the syntax and the semantics of bare
predicates. In other words, where and how does language encode what can be de-
scribed as the “ability of some nouns to occur bare in predicative position”? This
question can be restated as “Is the phenomenon of bare predicates a consequence of
the inner architecture of some nouns?”
Answering this latter question has, first of all, major consequences on the assump-
tions that have to be made with respect to the language ontology. Secondly, an-
swering this question equals understanding if the nouns that usually occur as bare
predicates have some particular property that permits them this behavior. If this
is the case, then there one needs to postulate the existence of a lexically defined
sub-class of nouns that are different from the other nouns. This is not a trivial as-
sumption. In the literature (discussed in the next chapter), there is a very pervasive
type of approaches which propose that the fundamental distinction needed to ex-
plain the distribution of bare predicates is between classes of predicates with have
different lexical properties. In other words, predicates differ in terms of some internal
property that allows or disallow their occurrence as bare predicates. This is the kind
of approach that, in this thesis, we want to reject. Adopting such lexicalist view
of the bare predicate phenomenon has four main consequences. First of all, these
predicates have to be defined in some way that ultimately predicts their syntactic be-
havior (i.e. their bareness). Secondly, the way these nouns are different must capture
the semantic difference that sets them apart from the other nouns, or else, the lexical
distinction would not have a reason to exist. Thirdly, this difference should predict
the different interpretation of the same predicate when it appears bare and with a
determiner. Finally, any analysis that successfully accounts for this first three points
should also explain why, if certain contextual requirements are met, every noun can
appear in predicative position, without a determiner. This last point relies on an
observation which is often glossed over in the discussions about bare predicates.
The traditional way in which bare predicates are discussed is by beginning with
the descriptive generalization that the nouns that refer to professions, roles, social
positions, etc. can appear in predicative position without a determiner. These are
nouns that generally ascribe properties to humans, e.g. professore ’professor’, avvo-
cato ’lawyer’, studente ’student’, presidente ’president’, dentista ’dentist’, and so on.
These nouns contrast with the other nouns, those that do not refer to professions
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and roles, such as uomo ’man’, bambino ’child’, eroe ’hero’, profeta ’prophet’, etc.
because the latter group occurs bare with more difficulties. In the picture obtained
this way, there is a first divide between human and non-human properties, in that
non-human nouns are, in most of the languages that we consider, never allowed as
bare predicates. Then there is a second divide that sets apart those nouns that refer
to professions and roles, and those that refer to other (human) properties. Having
said this, it would seem intuitive to group the profession-like nouns in one sub-class
and try to capture their similarities in some way.
Many accounts vary with respect to how this lexical class is defined. The summary
and discussion of these accounts is the object of Chapter [2]’s [II] Part.
The most immediate problem with the picture we have sketched above arises when
sentences like (1.4) need to be accounted for.
(1.4) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
gatto
cat
(nel
(in the
film
movie
/
/
nel
in the
gioco
game
/
/
nello
in the
spettacolo)
play)
"Gianni is a cat (in the move / in the game / in the play)"
Given a lexical approach, cases like (1.4) are accounted for in terms of coercion
of the noun, or of a reanalysis of some sort. However, there is a different way to
approach the problem. Earlier we said that the issue of meaning could be expressed
as accounting for the semantic difference between (1.1 a) and (1.1 b). When the
meaning differences between bare and determined predicates have become clear, we
will understand what kind of properties are expressed by the same noun, when it
occurs as a bare or a determined predicate.
The main reason for choosing a non-lexical approach is grounded on reasons of
interpretability. We already said that interpreting a bare noun in predicative position
is always possible, but it is absolutely crucial to understand what is the meaning
alternation between the bare and the determined predicate. The difficulty here lies
in the fact that often, in spontaneous speech, there is no relevant difference in the
way the bare and the determined predicate are used. This depends on the fact that
there is no difference truth-value difference between a sentence containing P and one
containing aP . Clearly, cases in which no contrast is registered are not particularly
useful. We will show cases in which, given the right context, the bare predicate is
the only acceptable way to express a given concept. Interestingly, this holds not only
with the predicates that are already expected to occur bare, but also with predicates
that, according to the lexicalist view, should be not included in the lexical class, e.g.
uomo ’man’ and donna ’woman’.
16 1.1. Introduction
A remark worth stressing concerns grammaticality judgments. We disagree with
assigning straightforward ungrammaticality to sentences like (1.5).
(1.5) ??Gianni
Gianni
è
is
bambino
child
/
/
spia
spy
/
/
eroe
hero
"Gianni is a child / spy / hero"
We will argue at length why it is crucial to understand that sentences like (1.5)
are not ungrammatical. The problem is not a problem of grammaticality but one of
interpretability. For simplicity’s sake, we will mark sentences like (1.5) with a double
question mark. Note, however, that the problematic aspect of (1.5) is again different
from the one of (1.6).1
(1.6) ??/*Ciò
That
su
on
cui
that
sto
am
scrivendo
writing
è
is
quaderno
notebook
"[intended] What I am writing on is a notebook"
The contrast between (1.5) and (1.6) is clearly related to what we mentioned above,
namely the fact that bare predication is more pervasive when the predicates ascribe
properties to humans, rather than inanimate objects. To elaborate on this issue,
Norwegian is crucial because, in this language, bare predicates are more pervasive in
than in the other languages; also, because Norwegian allows some non-human bare
predicates, such as the one in (1.7).
(1.7) Dette
this
teltet
tentdef
er
is
sykehus
hospital
(nor)
"This tent is a hospital"
What this Norwegian phenomenon shows is that some non-human bare predicates
are allowed. Not only, it also shows that when they are allowed, the meaning vari-
ation between bare and determined predicates can be described in the same way in
which we describe the variation that, in the other languages, we observe for human
predicates.
The direction that we will pursue is one in which the phenomenon of bare pred-
icates reveals the interaction between the syntactic component and the semantic
1To be precise, the sentence in (1.6) is still interpretable, but only with a massified reading of
quaderno, i.e. applying Pelletier’s Universal Grinder. The mechanisms that allow the interpretation
of (1.6), as opposed to the one allowing the interpretation (1.5), yield two different semantic effects.
The possible correlation between the two mechanisms is a line we did not pursue in this thesis, but
is definitely worth investigating.
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component of grammar. Once the contrast in meaning is clearly defined, two differ-
ent semantic representations will be shown to correspond to two different syntactic
structures so, resorting to a lexical class of nouns with some specific properties will
not be necessary.
1.2 Bare Arguments and Bare Predicates
We see the phenomenon of bare arguments and the phenomenon of bare predicates
as two distinct phenomena that should not be combined, since they have a distinct
comparative and interpretative dimension. However, treating argumental determin-
erless nouns as a distinct phenomenon from the predicative ones is not the only
approach (cf. Munn and Schmitt for a unified approach), but it is the stand taken
in this thesis. The reason is essentially that, even within one language, predica-
tive and argumental determinerlesshood are not parallel phenomena. Italian is a
language that shows subject-object asymmetry, and determinerless nominals in ar-
gument position must be governed (e.g. appear in post-verbal position). However,
Italian determinerless predicates are extremely more frequent than English ones,
which undergo the uniqueness restriction we mentioned earlier. In English, in turn,
argumental determinerless nouns can occur also in subject position. We agree with
Zamparelli (2005) who treats bare arguments and bare predicates as, substantially
different phenomena. He points out that argumental nouns increase their acceptabil-
ity when modified and are register-sensitive while predicative nouns have restrictions
on the way they can be modified, and they are not register-sensitive. Clearly, this is
not a definitive argument for claiming that these two are indeed two entirely distinct
phenomena, so it is important not to overlook possible connections and to start off
from a general background of the much better known universe of determinerless
arguments.
Terminological distinctions The terminology changes from account to account.
This is what the reader should keep in mind: “bare nouns” (BNs), “bare arguments”
(BAs) and, originally, “bare plurals” (bare predicates) are terms that are standardly
used to refer to the same phenomenon, i.e. the occurrence of bare nouns (singular
or plural) in argumental position. “Bare predicates” is the way we usually refer to
the bare nouns in predicative position. However, some accounts (e.g. Munn and
Schmitt, 2005) are worked-out under the assumption that the same analysis should
encompass both the phenomenon of bare arguments and the one of bare predicates;
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for this reason, everyone who adopts the same view does not mark a terminological
distinction.
In this thesis we tried to respect the original terminology of the accounts that we
discuss. Everywhere else, we distinguish between “bare arguments” and “bare pred-
icates” (which are both “bare nouns”). We distinguish between “bare singular” and
“bare plural” only when it is important to highlight a contrast.
The grammaticality judgement used in this thesis are the following:
? hard to interpret
?? harder/impossible to interpret
* ungrammatical
# interpretable but odd
% register or dialect
All the languages in the examples are coded according to the Ethnologue system.
CHAPTER 2
Background on Bare Nouns
This chapter is devoted to the discussion of the background literature on the topic
of bare predicates. However, before discussing bare predicates, we will provide some
background information on bare arguments. The reason is that, since in this thesis,
bare arguments and bare predicates are seen as two distinct phenomena, in what
follows will be provided a summary of the information necessary to distinguish the
two planes. Part [I] of this chapter begins with a brief overview of the seminal work
of Carlson (1977), followed by two prominent analyses of bare arguments (or simply
bare nouns, BNs), also from a cross-linguistic perspective. The first is a so-called
neo-Carlsonian account, namely the system presented in Chierchia (1998). Then,
we will discuss the account presented in Longobardi (2001). This chapter’s Part [II]
is dedicated to the discussion of the literature on bare predicates.
Part overview
Part [I] of this chapter, is devoted to the discussion of bare nouns is argument po-
sition. We start by introducing the work of Carlson (1977). Then, we will review
two of the two important studies on bare arguments. In Section [2.3], we introduce
Chierchia’s (especially 1998) idea, which is based on the concept of semantic varia-
tion. According to Chierchia, such variation is to be encoded by means of a system
of semantic parameters. In a nutshell, all the differences depend on differences in
the denotation of nouns. In this account, the view of the syntax-semantics interface
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is rather flexible, in that the category D is not projected. All the variation happens
in the semantics. This way of approaching the issue stands opposite to the one put
forth by Longobardi, and that we discuss in Section [2.4]. Longobardi (especially
2001) presents a system where the variation is seen as a syntactic phenomenon and
claims that yet another locus of variation is not needed.
Part I
Bare Nouns in argument position
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2.1 Bare Arguments
In many languages that have articles, nouns can appear in argument position without
overt determiners, with various degrees of pervasion. Consider, for instance dogs or
boys in the examples below.
(2.1) Dogs bark
(2.2) Dogs are in the garden
(2.3) Mary likes boys
(2.4) Mary talked to boys from that school
Most of the constraints that seem to regulate their distribution, as well as their
semantic properties, have been observed and studied thoroughly in the latest decades
and several things are well known about these nominals. Languages vary in the
amount of nouns they allow in such positions (e.g. in French, they are essentially
banned; Spanish and Italian allow them less than English, and Norwegian seems to
allow them more than English, French, and Italian).
These nominals are more easily allowed in object position than in subject position.
Italian is a typical language that shows this so-called “subject-object asymmetry”,
and it is shown in the contrasting examples (2.5 a) and (2.5 b).
(2.5) (a) Ho
have
mangiato
eaten
carote
carrots
(ita)
"I ate carrots"
(b) *Carote
carrots
erano
were
nel
in the
piatto
plate
"[intended] There were carrots on the plate"
When in argument position, nouns with a mass reading (2.6 a and 2.7 a) and plurals
(2.6 b and 2.7 b) occur determinerless more easily than singular count nouns (2.6 c
and 2.7 c), as shown by the examples below.
(2.6) (a) I ate bread
(b) I ate carrots
(c) *I ate carrot
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(2.7) (a) Water damaged the carpet
(b) Cats damaged the carpet
(c) *Cat damaged the carpet
2.2 Carlson’s Analysis
The first analysis, and the necessary background to this topic is Carlson (1977).
Carlson shows that the semantics of English determinerless plural nouns (bare plu-
rals) is crucially different from the semantics of other quantified expressions. Carlson
shows that it cannot be argued that bare plurals contain an implicit quantifier that
is ambiguous between the existential quantification (e.g. quantified with some) and
the universal quantification (e.g. with all), whose interpretation is decided contex-
tually. The reason is that the range of the possible readings of the bare plural,
in a sentence like (2.8)1, is not a subset of the readings obtainable via the use of
quantified expressions.
(2.8) Dogs are common
(2.8) does not mean that “some dogs are common”, nor does it mean that “all dogs
are common”. We can observe the same phenomenon happening in (2.9).
(2.9) John didn’t watch movies this week
(2.9) can only mean that “John hasn’t seen any movie at all, this week” but not that
“this week, there are some movies that John saw (and some others that he missed)”.
On the other hand, this latter reading is available when movie is existentially quan-
tified.
At a deeper level of analysis, the connection between bare plurals and the important
distinction between a “generic reading” and an “episodic reading” becomes crucial.
This can be shown in (2.10).
(2.10) Firemen are brave
Carlson uses (2.10) to point out that, pragmatically, the sentence should be inter-
preted existentially (i.e. “Some firemen are brave”), but it is, in fact, interpreted
universally (i.e. “All firemen are brave”). The ambiguity between the universal and
1(2.8) and the following examples are from Carlson (1977).
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the existential reading is allowed or ruled out by properties of the predicate (e.g.
meaning, verbal aspect, etc.).2
Finally, Carlson establishes that (most) bare plurals refer to “kinds”. The reason why
it was impossible to translate (2.8), repeated below, with any quantified expression
lies in the fact that the denotation of the bare plural is not the same as the denotation
of any quantified expression.
(2.11) Dogs are common
“Kinds” are inherently plural objects constituted by a particular sort of individuals
that are parallel to the type of objects that normally embody the references of pro-
nouns and names. The ontological nature of the “kinds” that Carlson discusses, is not
made particularly explicit but, roughly, they correspond to “regularities occurring
in the world”. They can be “natural” (e.g. rocks, plants, animals, etc.), “artificial”
(e.g. bottles, houses, lipsticks, etc.), or expressed by modified nominals (thus corre-
sponding to some sort of complex object, like three-headed dogs); also, kind-referring
nouns are shown to display regularities in the way they behave syntactically.
As we mentioned already, the alternation between the universal and the existential
reading depends on which predicate the bare noun combines with. Predicates can
denote properties that are “stable” (“Individual level”, or “I-level”) or “transient”
(“Stage level”, or “S-level”). A way of understanding the “slicing” of a property is to
visualize a “kind” such as an umbrella under which lie all those “stable” properties
that are normally associated with it. Examples of an I-level property could be,
for instance, the property of having wings, for airplanes. Underneath each I-level
property, as spatial-temporal fragments, we encounter those properties that hold
true of an entity, at a specific time or space, but not necessarily throughout its entire
existence. An example of an S-level property could be, for instance, the property of
being delayed because of a snowstorm.
This is represented in the classic scheme, reported below, where a “kind” is linked
to each I-level property and to each S-level property. Each S-level property is also
independently linked to the S-level properties below them, in a cascade-like fashion.
2There are several other reasons for which Carlson argues that the interpretative properties of
bare plurals cannot be subsumed under those of the indefinites (e.g. bare plurals and indefinites
show different behaviors in the contexts of “deletion”, “pronominalization”, etc.), which we will not
discuss here.
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To see how this works, we need to imagine a “kind” (musician, for instance) and
three entities that are contained in such “kind”, say 1, 2 and 3. Now 1, 2 and 3
are all linked to the kind-musician but each of the three can have different “stages”
(pertinent to their belonging to the kind): they can all perform, compose music and
sign autographs. These activities can be proper of the above-mentioned individuals
and of the kind-musician, hence the double connection in the scheme.
For Carlson it is possible to produce an interpretable sentence where a bare plural
is interpreted as a “kind”, at the same time generically and existentially, as shown
in (2.12).
(2.12) Musicians are everywhere, are poor, and have been performing last night
Even though sentence (2.12) is slightly marked, musicians in (2.12) receives the
“kind” interpretation (the class of musicians), a “generic” reading (most musicians
are poor) and the stage-level reading (some musicians performed last night).
There is one direct consequence to the introduction of kinds: the ontology of our
semantics is enriched with another type variables and constants ranging over them.
So, formally, this indicates a shift towards a two-sorted logical language.
2.3 A semantic account of Bare Nouns
Chierchia’s (1998) goal is to create a system able to capture the ways in which lan-
guages refer to kinds, proceeding from Carlson’s proposal that kinds are denoted by
bare plurals. Creating such a system thus essentially amounts to defining a theory of
the cross-linguistic variation of bare nouns. This influential account has a very spe-
cific (and not uncontroversial) ontology since its grounding assumptions are rooted
in the concept of, and a mechanism of, semantic parametrization.
This overview will proceed as follows: first, we will present the preliminary bases of
the system, such as the assumptions about mass and count nouns and how these
relate to the concept of a semantic parameter in Chierchia’s analysis. Next, we
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address the kind-property distinction together with the technical machinery to turn
a kind into a property and the other way around. Subsequently, we will discuss
in detail some of aspects of the model presented by Chierchia. The reader who is
familiar with this account can continue reading from Section [2.4].
2.3.1 Basics
Mass and Count Plural forms of count nouns denote pluralities. The difference
between a plural noun and a mass noun is that the latter has a built-in plurality.
Mass nouns denote all the individuals of a set and all the pluralities, but their atomic
components are uncountable.
The definite article The definite article is treated as the Frege-Russell iota op-
erator , which is a maximality operator. Chierchia outlines the functioning of  with
the use of a lattice-theoretic approach where the set of individuals is a complete free-
join semilattice3 generated by its atoms. When applied to a set,  returns the largest
member of that set (i.e TABLES= the largest plurality of tables, and TABLE
= the only table). Such semantics can apply to masses in the same way.
Properties and Kinds Kinds are seen as spatiotemporally discontinuous regu-
larities that occur in nature. Yet, it needs to be noticed that being a ’natural kind’
does not necessarily mean to be ’biologically’ defined: kinds can be also human ar-
tifacts (e.g. chair) and other types of ’well established’ properties (e.g. associate
professor) as long as they consistently show regular behavior. Type-theoretically,
kinds are analyzed as being elements of type e, derived from properties of type
he; hs; tii. Being entities, kinds can be used as syntactic arguments in the same way
that proper names can. NPs can denote either properties or kinds, and it is a se-
mantic parameter that defines whether a language’s NPs denote one, the other, or
both. For Chierchia, if a language allows NPs to denote kinds, then these NPs can
be used directly as arguments of verbs, without the projection of a full DP.
The correspondence between kinds and properties is dealt with by the “up” operator
([) and the “down” operator (\). [ maps kinds onto predicates (predicativization),
and \ maps properties onto kinds (nominalization); these operators apply before
kinds or properties apply to theirs arguments.
3A semilattice is a partially ordered set of elements and an ordering A;. Given that the supre-
mum of any elements {a,b} exists, the properties of a join semilattice are reflexivity, antisymmetry
and transitivity.
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[, or the predicativization of kinds When [ is applied to a kind, it yields the
set of all singular and plural individuals satisfying that property. If [ is applied to
a kind which is not instantiated in the world of evaluation, its application will yield
falsehood/undefinedness.
\, or the nominalization of properties \ is a partial function that applies to
properties: a kind can be created from a property by taking the largest member of
the extension of the property. If \ is applied to a property that fails to identify a
class with a sufficiently regular behavior, \P is undefined.
2.3.2 The Nominal Mapping Parameter
The Nominal Mapping Parameter (NPI) is the essential characteristic of Chierchia’s
account: the way of capturing the way languages refer to kinds. The basis is a flexible
parametrization in order to account for the way the interpretations of nominals are
mapped onto the syntactic category N, and N’s phrasal projection. The parametriza-
tion involves two binary features: [arg] and [pred]. Iff, in a language, elements of
category N are [+arg; pred], they can function as arguments, i.e. they are elements
of type e (objects or kinds). Iff elements of category N are [ arg;+pred] they can
function as predicates, thus elements of type he; ti (sets). If elements of category N
are [+arg;+pred] they can be either one or the other. In no language can elements
of category N be [ arg; pred], because they would not be able to realize either as
arguments nor as predicates.
[+arg; pred] languages These are languages in which N/NPs are [+arg; pred],
bare NPs can be arguments of verbs; when D (e.g. a quantifier) combines with a
NP, it must resort to a silent [ to be able to apply to a kind. The application of
[ will give a ’mass’ denotation: a direct consequence is that all nouns will be mass,
hence no makers of plurality are predicted, nor will such nouns be countable, unless
quantized by means of some classifier-like element. This does not entail that in such
languages there is no mass/count distinction, indeed sometimes this emerges in the
choice of the classifier. Examples of languages belonging to this group are Chinese
and Japanese.
[ arg;+pred] languages These are languages in which N/NPs are [ arg;+pred],
every noun is a predicate, hence bare NPs can never be arguments of verbs but deter-
miners can combine with NPs directly. A morphological distinction for singulars and
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plurals is predicted to exist, as well as a mass/count distinction; count nouns in such
languages can be counted without resorting to classifiers. Examples of languages of
this sort are French and Italian. However, the two diverge because in French, bare
plural nouns are strictly prohibited, whereas in Italian bare plurals can occur in
object position. Assuming that in [ arg;+pred] languages an NP cannot be used as
an argument without projecting D, Chierchia postulates that languages like Italian
can project a phonologically null D () that needs to be licensed by a close, suitable
head.
[+arg;+pred] languages These are languages in which N/NPs are [+arg;+pred],
nouns can freely be arguments or predicates, that is to say that they can either
denote kinds or predicates. As kinds, nouns can freely occur bare. However, two
scenarios are to be distinguished: when a noun is a kind, it must be predicativized
by [ (i.e. it will have a mass denotation); when a noun is predicative, D can di-
rectly combine with it; and if it is a mass or a plural, it can be turned into a kind
via \ application. Languages of this sort are English (as most Germanic languages)
and Slavic languages. However, English and Slavic languages diverge in that Slavic
languages lack articles. For this latter family, the predictions are that, unlike what
happens in English, there is no article which could block the available type-shifting
operations.
TheNominalMapping Parameter (NMP ) : N )[pred;arg]
[ pred;+arg] every (lexical)noun ismass ) e:g: Chinese
[+pred;+arg] bare arguments allowed
(
no articles ) e:g: Slavic
articles ) e:g:Germanic
[+pred; arg] bare arguments disallowed
(
 ) e:g: Italian
no  ) e:g: French
At this point, a natural question to ask is “What are the type-shifting operations
and how do articles block each of them?”
2.3.3 Type Shifting and Blocking Principle
Chierchia adds some extra operations (i.e. [ and \ ) to the basic set of type-shifting
operations designed by Partee (1987). The operations shifting to and from the two
argumental elements types e and Generalized Quantifiers (GQs) are:
Lift: e! GQ and Lower: GQ! e.
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The operations shifting GQs to and from predicates (types e,t and e,e,t) are:
BE: GQ!he; ti and 9: he; ti ! GQ
Finally there are four types of operations shifting elements of type e to and from
predicates:
ID: e!he; ti (the identity function)
[: e! e; t (from kinds to predicates)
\: he; ti ! e (from predicates to kinds)
: he; ti ! e (from a set to one of its elements)
Chierchia introduces the Blocking Principle in order to account for the cross- linguis-
tically attested fact that some language-specific device takes precedence over more
general devices. Essentially, a language that has overt (in)definite articles cannot
use covert operators that mean  and 9. English, for example, can only resort to [
and \ because there is no corresponding overt element. Slavic languages can resort
to the full set of covert operations, because they do not have articles blocking them.
The Blocking Principle is replicated in (2.13):
(2.13) Blocking Principle (“Type shifting as last resort”)
For any type-shifting operation  and any X:
* (X)
if there is a determiner D such that for any set X in its domain,
D (X) =  (X)
2.3.4 Kind derivation or ambiguity
Let us first see the mechanisms through which Chierchia derives kinds from proper-
ties; then, in the second part, we will present the discussion of some scopal effects,
and see how some additional data coming from Romance languages can be accounted
for.
How to derive a Kind Chierchia assumes the existence of an operator that turns
an object-denoting expression from kind-denoting one, if an object-taking predicate
requires it. This is stated in (2.14):
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(2.14) Derived Kind Predication (DKP)
If P applies to objects and k denotes a kind, then:
P (k) = 9x [[k (x) ^ P (x)]
There are two components to the DKP: the introduction of the [-operator, and the
introduction of 9, which can be substituted by alternative means of quantification
over the property, if elsewhere available. This mechanism applies to kinds as well,
giving (2.15 b) as the interpretation of (2.15 a):
(2.15) (a) Lions are ruining my garden
(b) ruining my garden (\lions) , (via DKP)
9x [[\lions (x) ^ ruining my garden (x)]
Note that the crucially ’lions’ is initially introduced as a property and then con-
verted into a kind (\lions) to fit the argumental position. This point is particularly
important. Subsequently it is turned back into a property via the application of [
(i.e. [\lions).
DKP or ambiguity In Characterizing Sentences (CS) Chierchia adopts Chierchia
(1995) and Krifka et al. (1995)’s analysis of the generic operator Gn.4
(2.16) (a) That kind suckles its young
(b) Gnx; s [[\that kind (x) ^ C (x; s)] [suckles its young (x; s)]
C is a context-dependent variable that essentially restricts the domain of Gn to
appropriate individuals and situations.
One argument in favor of the DKP is that assuming such mechanism makes un-
necessary the assumption that BNs are ambiguous between a kind reading and an
indefinite object-level reading. The indefinite object-level reading is the reading of
certain types of constructions (episodic, or characterizing) and the kind reading is
the one that is restricted to kind-selecting predicates.
4This is one of the cases where the insertion of 9 is unnecessary since Gn is a binder, and only
[ is needed to yield a property.
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Scope effects Kind referring BNs have different scopal properties from non-kind-
referring ones in that the BN always takes the narrowest scope under intensional
verbs, negation, differentiated scope and anaphora.
(2.17) Miles wants to meet policemen (only opaque)
Miles doesn’t want to meet policemen (only opaque)
Miles killed rabbits repeatedly (wide scope for repeatedly)
(2.18) (a) John is trying to find some policemen and Mary is trying to find them
too (them scopes over try since it is interpreted as “some men”)
(b) John is trying to find policemen and Mary is trying to find them too
(them cannot scope over try because of its bare referent)
Moreover, as already pointed out by Carlson, if a BN contains a specific reference
to objects, time or space, they cannot be kind-referring, and they are not restricted
to the narrowest scope reading (i.e. they behave like overt indefinites). Indeed the
NP people in the next room in (2.19) scopes out of the intensionality of believe.
(2.19) John believes that [people in the next room] are stupid
Essentially, Chierchia tries to obtain the “narrowest scope” indefinite reading via
DKP, in order to block the kind meaning and escape the narrow-scope requirement.
The assumption behind this is that, if BNs were to be ambiguous between the
indefinite and the kind reading, blocking the kind reading would not mean blocking
the indefinite reading. The DKP can thus derive the scopelessness of the BN.
Romance Chierchia’s working hypothesis is that elements of category N in Ro-
mance languages are [ arg;+pred]. These languages show the mass/count distinc-
tion and morphologically realized plurals. Italian and French are the cases put under
scrutiny in more detail. Essentially, French fits ad literam the parameter in that it
disallows any type of bare arguments. Italian, on the other hand, allows post-verbal
bare plural arguments. For Chierchia’s system, bare plurals occurring only in post-
verbal position is a crucial element. He explains it by assuming that Italian object
nouns can project a DP headed by a phonological null D (). Since, notably, null
elements needs licensing, in this case  is allowed, since it is m-commanded by a
head governor.5
5See also Rizzi (1990)’s Relativized Minimality.
33
Furthermore, another crucial observation in favor of Chierchia’s general account
is that, when syntactically possible, BNs in Romance have an existential reading;
according to his account, such reading is derived from a kind reading. These should
be cases like (2.21):6
(2.21) Qui,
here,
[ragazze
[girls
in
in
minigonna]
miniskirt]
sono
are
rare
rare
(ita)
"Here, girls in a miniskirt are rare"
LF Although the authors has introduced parameters in the semantic system, he
also suggests that the conception of LF does not necessarily need to change, since
the interpretation depends on how speakers make certain linguistic distinctions.
2.4 A syntactic account of Bare Nouns
The analysis presented in Longobardi (2001) moves from Longobardi (1991, 1994),
and its general goal is to show that the BNs in most Romance languages are a type
of indefinites. The readings of these determinerless nouns are distributed between
“generic” and “existential” just like the readings of the overt indefinites. However,
BNs in English are different because they are always ambiguous between a quantifi-
cational and a referential interpretation. Longobardi tries to show a different way
of looking at syntactic cross-linguistic variation, claiming that the interpretation of
nominals does not depend on whether they are common nouns or proper names
(henceforth PNs). Instead, he proposes an account in which the difference in be-
havior between PNs and BNs is connected to the different semantics of BNs. The
two-fold question that he tries to answer is: “Can semantics be the locus of variation
in a (parametrizable) way, formalizable similarly to syntax? and how dependent is
such semantic variation from the variation in the morphosyntax?”
This overview proceeds as follows. First we will present some preliminaries, concern-
ing the behavior of BNs in relation to their possible interpretation. Then we will
zoom onto the various ways in which Romance BNs pattern with indefinites, and
6Concerning example (2.21), Longobardi (2001) points out that examples containing frequency
are not a satisfying test for kindhood; he bases his observation on the following type of examples
(2.20) Nelle bozze, tre errori per riga non sono infrequenti (ita)
in the drafts, [three mistakes per line] not are infrequent
“In the drafts, three mistakes per line are not infrequent”
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review how that is different from English BNs. Next, we will sum up some consid-
erations about proper names, and show in which way this kind of data is relevant.
Finally some remarks about the architecture of the syntax-semantics interface will
be made. The reader who is familiar with this account can continue reading from
this Chapter’s Part [II].
2.4.1 Core Proposal
Building on the proposals put forth in Longobardi (1991, and subsequent work),
Longobardi (2001) notices that in English neither proper names nor common nouns
undergo N-to-D movement, while Italian displays a split: proper names undergo the
movement, whereas common nouns do not. Rephrasing the generalization already
presented in previous work (cf. Longobardi 1994, 1996), Longobardi observes that
if, in a given language, common nouns have a semantics of the English type, then,
in that language, the syntax of PNs must be of the English type as well. This is
reported in (2.22).
(2.22) Object-referring nouns may occur without a phonetically filled D iff
kind-referring nouns can.
The common feature of common nouns (BNs henceforth) and PNs is thus referen-
tiality. Languages resort to one strategy to refer to nominal structures and the locus
of cross-linguistic variation is precisely in the way such strategy is parametrized.
The source of this variation is thus whether the referential properties of D are weak
or strong, that is to say if the (constant or variable) status of D needs a PF en-
coding or not. So, if two languages differ in the possibility for their BNs to act
(kind)-referentially, the language in which BNs can be are referential (e.g. English)
will have a has a similar syntax for PNs. The language in which a BNs cannot be
referential (e.g. Italian) will not have this parallelism.
2.4.2 Bare nouns
Morphologically-singular nouns can have either a mass or a count interpretation. To-
gether with proper names, in Germanic and Romance languages, these three types
of nouns can occur bare or introduced by determiners. Bare non-mass singulars in
argument position denote a unique and definite entity with the widest possible scope
(and, following Longobardi (1996), they are analyzed as lexically defined and coex-
tensive to the class of proper names). Following Carlson (1977), Longobardi suggests
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that bare mass nouns and bare plurals cannot denote a specific entity and cannot
take wide scope. Assuming Carlson’s division of entities into objects and kinds,
Longobardi proposes that determinerless arguments with singular non-mass read-
ing are object-naming items (i.e. they can refer to objects) whereas determinerless
arguments with mass or plural reading are kind-naming items.7
A further distinction is assumed: all nominal arguments are either quantificational
or referential: for instance, nouns with a determiner denote thanks to their quan-
tificational structure (variable interpretation) while proper names, which have an
object-naming nature, are object-referential expressions (constant interpretation).
Unlike other previous accounts (particularly Chierchia, 19988), Longobardi high-
lights a clear difference between Italian and English distribution of the two readings
for BNs (existential, “Ex”, and generic, “Gen”), pointing out that the interpretation
of Italian BN coincides with that of overt indefinites (be they English or Italian), but
it differs from that of English BNs. The reason for this is that, in Italian, BNs are
generic in independent quantificational environments only. On the other hand, the
counterpart of generically interpreted English BNs are the Italian overt definites. In
other words, English, BNs are kind-referring, whereas in Italian to achieve the same
interpretation, overt indefinites are needed.
Bare Nouns and Stage-, Individual-, and Kind-level predicates
Longobardi distinguishes three sub-cases of S(tage)-level predicates: when they oc-
cur in episodic sentences, when they occur in characterizing sentences, and when
they occur in episodic sentences modified by a generalizing adverb. He shows that
generic readings can arise even from sentences containing BNs and stage-level pred-
icates. Such generic readings are however triggered by the presence of an habitual
verb or an adverb, that provide an external operator of genericity. On the other
hand, when it comes to I(individual)-Level predicates, a BN subject should always
be characterizable by Gen and its genericity should be derivable as a direct conse-
quence of a lexical property of I-level predicates (i.a. Chierchia, 1995). Nevertheless,
Longobardi points out that it is possible to create counterexamples by changing the
tense from a habitual to an episodic. Furthermore, Longobardi claims that examples
like (2.23 a-2.23 b) show that I-level predicates need a split as well, this time into
two sub-cases. The reason of this split is the different acceptability of (2.23 a) as
7This view is extended to phrasal constituents, not just head nouns.
8In Longobardi (2001) the reference is to Chierchia (1996), but it is the same article we refer
to as Chierchia (1998).
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opposed to (2.23 b).9
(2.23) (a) Stati
states
di
of
grandi
large
dimensioni
sizes
sono
are
pericolosi
dangerous
"Large states are dangerous."
(b) ??Stati
states
di
of
grandi
large
dimensioni
sizes
sono
are
prosperi
prosperous
"Large states are prosperous."
Finally, Longobardi highlights how neither Gen nor Ex are possible readings for
Italian BNs, with Carlsons K(ind)-level predicates,.
(2.24) *Elefanti
elephants
di
of
colore
color
bianco
white
sono
are
estinti
extinct
"White elephants are extinct"
*Elefanti
elephants
di
of
colore
color
bianco
white
diventano
become
sempre
always
più
more
grandi
large
man
as
mano
che
that
si
SIimprs
va
goes
a
to
nord
north
"White elephants grow larger as one goes north"
*Elefanti
elephants
di
of
colore
color
bianco
white
sono
are
così
so
chiamati
called
per
for
la
the
pigmentazione
pigmentation
della
of the
loro
their
pelle
skin
"White elephants are so-called because of the pigmentation of their skin"
Contrasting Chierchia’s (1998) predictions, with three types of predicates discussed
so far (K-level, episodic S-level, and I-level predicates) it is impossible to obtain a
generic reading, even when in English it is straightforward. Furthermore, English
and Italian/Romance vary with respect to allowing their BNs to be kind-referring.
Some examples of K-level predicates and anaphora show that Italian BNs cannot
yield a generic reading if the nominal denotes a kind. When a generic reading is
not possible for a BN, such reading is accessible with the definite DP. Still, English
and Italian definite DPs in anaphoric environment give rise to ambiguity between
the “species” and the “distributive” 10 reading, as shown by (2.25), where themselves
refers to each individual cat or the specie.
9The crucial junction of the argument is this: “to be dangerous” is more eventive than to “to be
prosperous”. The eventivity of “to be dangerous” can yield a “habitual” (hence a Generic reading)
but the stativity of “to be prosperous” cannot.
10In Longobardi’s terms.
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(2.25) Cats think very highly of themselves
BNs in Romance seem to be always quantificational variables that are existentially
or generically bound.
Indefinite and Definite Generics
Further similarities between BNs in Romance and overt indefinites are also that, in
the (logical) representation of Romance BNs a variable is introduced. Such variable
needs independent binding (i.e. Romance BNs are interpreted as Ex or Gen just like
Romance and English overt indefinites, plus the Ex or Gen operators comes from the
sentence), and it ranges over tokens of the kind the noun refers to. So, unlike subjects
of K-level predicates and similarly to indefinites, BNs do not denote kinds. Again
similarly to indefinites, BNs can only give rise to the distributive reading in anaphoric
structures. So, Longobardi suggests that BNs are said to denote what is denoted
by (the values of) the variable and, similarly to what happens to quantificational
Ds, the kind is the predicate of the restrictor. Since a generic reading is obtained
either via quantificational generalization over tokens of a kind, or via a direct kind
denotation, Romance BNs cannot be referential (they cannot yield a Gen Reading
via kind denotation), but only quantificational.
Romance BNs pattern with the indefinites because plural and mass definite gener-
ics behave similarly to singular count definite generics: they all can subject K-level
predicates, be antecedents of anaphors, and occur in episodic sentences. For Lon-
gobardi, kind denotation might be yielded by the ability of the nominal argument
to act also referentially, as a kind name. This is because, the genericity of definite
generics seems to be DP-internal (because definite generics are not restricted to
characterizing environments11), but at the same time, they denote kinds and not
objects.
Summing up, Romance definites can denote kinds, but not BNs nor indefinites. In
order for a BN in Romance to be interpretable, an existential or a generic quantifi-
cation is needed (they both introduce of an object variable): a kind-denoting generic
needs an definite DP (i.e. a referential argument), whereas an object-denoting generic
11Longobardi calls “characterizing” the following environments:
 S-level predicates with habitual aspect
 I-level predicates with habitual aspect
 Adverbs of generalizing quantification
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can denote a kind via an indefinite DP (i.e. a quantificational argument) bound by
a generic operator. Such operators are provided by an habitual aspect, adverbs (e.g.
always), and some predicates (e.g. be widespread).
2.4.3 The cross-linguistic analysis
Longobardi shows that, in English, genericity can also occur with episodic predi-
cates, with non-eventive I-level predicates and with K-level predicates, and, unlike
in Romance, kind anaphora is possible.
Descriptively:
 Romance BNs behave like Romance and English overt indefinites
 English BNs and some overt definite singulars behave like Romance overt
definite nominals.
According to Longobardi, for the correct interpretation of overt indefinites, the
generic reading related to characterizing environments must be universal. At this
point, if English BNs are just another option to achieve genericity, their genericity
must be DP-internal for the following reason: if a DP can denote a kind, then any
BN, which is even more unlikely to have any quantificational structure, should be
able do the same. The consequence Longobardi draws is that English BNs must be
kind-referring, i.e. they are proper names of kinds. This could be indicated by the
semantic ambiguity of English BNs between names of kinds and existentially- or
generically-bound variables (See. Carlson and Pelletier, 1995).
Summing up, in Romance languages, BNs are limited to being quantificational ex-
pressions, whereas in English they can also be referential. That is why, in Romance,
BNs pattern with overt indefinites (and not with proper names), whereas in English,
they pattern with proper names (and not with indefinites). The scheme summarizing
the parametrization proposed in Longobardi (2001) is replicated below.
EnglishBNs :
( referential Gen (in all environments)
quantificational
(
Gen (in characterizing environments)
EX (in S   Level environments)
RomanceBNs : quantificational
(
Gen (in characterizing environments)
EX (in S   Level environments)
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Compare the following English/Italian pairs. Note that, in English, the ambiguity
is expected in both cases while, in Italian, the ambiguity is predicted to occur only
in (2.27 b).
(2.26) (a) White-colored elephants will undergo the Final Judgment tomorrow at 5
(Ex/Gen)
(b) Elefanti di colore bianco passeranno il Giudizio Universale domani alle 5
(Ex)
(2.27) (a) In such cases, firemen of great experience run to the rescue of the
victims of the accident (Ex/Gen)
(b) In questi casi, pompieri di grande esperienza intervengono in soccorso
delle vittime dellincidente (Ex/Gen)
2.4.4 Conclusions
This account discusses the interpretations of English and Romance overt indefinites
and BNs, and the latter’s relation with the syntactic behavior of proper names,
also presenting a cross-linguistic level generalization. Longobardi preserves Carlson’s
intuitions about English BNs and kinds, and distinguishes between two types of
genericity: quantificational and referential. The overarching conclusion is that what
regulates the interpretation of (both proper and common) bare nouns depends on the
mapping between syntax and semantics. Cross-linguistic variation is parametrizable
in terms of (independent) morphosyntactic differences, such the need of a functional
head to be (overtly) targeted by movement. Finally, Longobardi concludes that the
need for semantic parameters, like the ones proposed by Chierchia, and discussed in
the previous section, still needs to be proven.
2.5 Summary
In the first part of this chapter we discussed the general topic of bare nouns by
providing a detailed overview of two central and diverse accounts. The first account
discussed is a semantic account of Chierchia (1998). The second account we discussed
is the syntactic alternative of Longobardi (2001). In the following part, we will
present and discuss four different accounts that specifically target the phenomenon
of bare predicates, in the attempt of gaining a preliminary understanding of the
phenomenon.

Part II
Bare Nouns in predicative position
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2.6 Part overview
In the second part of this Chapter, we will focus on the specific studies dedicated
to the bare predicates. There are several ways of looking at the phenomenon, and
we will overview four radically different ones. As we already introduced in Section
[1.1], the general tendency is to build an account by individuating a link between
the bare predicates and some other language-specific feature.
First we will discuss the account of Matushansky and Spector (2005). The focus of
this article is on French bare predicates, but some consideration can be extended
over the boundaries of one language and tested cross-linguistically. The basic claim
is that the phenomenon of bare predication can be accounted for in terms of the in-
teraction between two features that post-copular nouns must have: [+SENTIENT ]
and [ SCALAR]. We discuss it in Section [2.7].
The second account is built around the NUMBER projection. Munn and Schmitt
(2005) claim that the basic difference that sets Romance languages apart from En-
glish is that the projections of Agreement and Number can be realized separately
in Romance, but in English they are always “fused”. So, Romance predicates lack
the Number Projection, but in English, said projection must always be there. As a
consequence, the article can be omitted in Romance but not in English. We discuss
it in Section [2.8].
A third account is presented in Zamparelli (2005). In his view, bare predicates are
dependent on a different linguistic aspect, namely GENDER. The nouns that can
occur as bare predicates lack the gender feature. Stipulating that the presence of the
article is merely a reflection of gender, the author argues that its absence is expected
in constructions involving gender-defective nouns. We discuss it in Section [2.9].
Finally, in Section [2.10], we will present the system presented in De Swart, Winter
and Zwarts (2005-2007) and slightly modified by LeBruyn (2010). This Carlson-
inspired system accounts for the existence and the behavior of the bare predicates in
terms of reference to CAPACITIES, an addition to the language ontology, similar
in some ways to the pre-existing one of kinds, but ontologically (and sortally) distinct
from it.
Summing up, a direct comparison of the points in which all these accounts vary is
provided in Section [2.11], and Section [2.12] concludes this overview with some final
remarks.
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2.7 An account in terms of Scalarity
The account put forth in Matushansky and Spector (2005) mainly focuses on bare
predicates in French, trying to provide an answer to the question “What are the con-
ditions regulating the presence and the absence of the determiner preceding a noun
in predicative position?” The proposal is that bare predicates have the feature com-
bination [+SENTIENT; SCALAR], and the presence of the article is the sign of
the saturation of one or some NP-internal argument slots. Cross-linguistic variation
originates from how different languages may vary in the way they treat the argu-
ment slots of their nominals, and it is hinted that Russian Nominative/Instrumental
predicate case marking governed by the same principle that regulates the insertion
of the article in French. The reader who is familiar with this account can continue
reading from the commentary Section [2.7.2].
2.7.1 Basics
Matushansky and Spector show several contrasts between the occurrence of deter-
mined or bare post-copular noun phrases in the singular (xNPs, in their terms). For
example, the different contexts are shown in (2.28 a-2.28 b).
(2.28) (a) Qui
who
est
is
Cyntia?
Cynthia
Une
a
physicienne
physicist
/
/
*Physicienne
physicist
(fra)
"Who is Cyntia? A physicist"
(b) Qu’
who
est
is
Cyntia?
Cynthia
(Une)
(a)
physicienne
physicist
"What is Cyntia? A physicist"
The different truth values or the two versions of (2.29) indicate the restrictions that
limit the use of the bare predicate, when its time argument slot is not bound by
that of the main verb.
(2.29) Bush
Bush
est
is
(un)
a
governeur
governeur
"Bush is a governor"
Sentence (2.30) results odd if uttered by someone outside that fictional world (e.g.
Harry Potter’s world), shows the restrictions that limit the use of the bare predicate
if the world of evaluation of the predicate is independent to that of the main verb.
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(2.30) Harry
Harry
Potter
Potter
est
is
magicien
wizard
"Harry Potter is a wizard"
Animacy and Scalarity
Matushansky and Spector define the nouns that can be used as bare predicates as
[+SENTIENT; SCALAR]: according to the authors, this specification is what
allows for the omission of the article. The specification [+SENTIENT ] is motivated
by the fact that, in French, bare predicates can occur with human subjects, or with
“anthropomorphized” entities (2.31 a), but nothing else.
(2.31) (a) Fido
Fido
est
is
chien
dog
d’
of
aveugle
blind
"Fido is a seeing eye dog"
They assume that predicative copulas are based on small clauses, so structures
containing small clauses can be used to test the acceptability of the predicates.
In this perspective, (2.32 a) and (2.32 b) show that [+SCALAR] nouns require an
article,12 whereas (2.32 c) and (2.32 d) show that [+SENTIENT ] nouns allow the
article omission.
(2.32) (a) ?Cette
this
maison,
house
je
I
la
it
crois
believe
une
a
affaire
bargain
(b) *Cette
this
maison,
house
je
I
la
it
crois
believe
affaire
bargain
(c) * ?Cet
this
animal,
animal
je
I
le
it
crois
believe
un
a
mammifère
mammal
(d) *Cet
this
animal,
animal
je
I
le
it
crois
believe
mammifère
mammal
12The classical diagnostics for scalarity is based on the empirical observations that [ SCALAR]
nouns cannot:
 be used as epithets
 occur as the complement of seem
 occur in the N of an N constructions
 occur with a degree modifier (such, utter, etc.)
The way of capturing the non-scalarity of this class of nouns is by assuming that these nouns do
not have a degree argument slot.
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Semantically, the small clause denotes a proposition (type hs; ti), and its predicate a
propositional function (type he; hs; tii) that has the argument slot, phi-features and
the [SENTIENT ]-feature are abstracted away. The article insertion in (2.33 b)
causes a type clash and hence the ungrammaticality. According to the authors,
the presence of the article merely signals the saturation of an argument slot of a
[+SENTIENT ] noun.
(2.33) (a) Pierre
Pierre
croit
believes
Marie
Marie
physicienne
physicist
"Pierre believes that Marie is a physicist"
(b) *Pierre
Pierre
croit
believes
Marie
Marie
une
a
physicienne
physicist
In conclusion, scalar nouns require an article since its presence is a signal of the
saturation of the degree argument slot (or they would not be able to combine with
the subject of the predication). On the other hand, in the same small clause contexts,
determined non-scalar nouns (e.g. physicienne) cause a type clash.13
The remaining issue is the case in which a non scalar noun (e.g. genie ’genius’) occur
with an article. These cases are treated by Matushansky and Spector as involving
the equative verb to be. In other words, all instances of non-bare predication with
a non-scalar predicate are understood as equative sentences, and the authors show
that there is a clear symmetry between these constructions (a, b) and (unambiguous)
equative sentences (c, d).
(2.34) Qui
who
est
is
Cicéron?
Cicero
"Who is Cicero?"
a. Cicéron
Cicero
(c’)
(it)
est
is
Marcus
Marcus
Tullius
Tullius
"Cicero is Marcus Tullius"
b. *Cicéron,
Cicero,
il
he
est
is
Marcus
Marcus
Tullius
Tullius
"Cicero, he is Marcus Tullius"
c. Cicéron
Cicero
(c’)
(it)
est
is
un
an
orateur
orateur
"Cicero is un orateur"
13For the details of how this is implemented, see refs.
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d. *Cicéron,
Cicero,
il
he
est
is
un
an
orateur
orator
"Cicero, he is an orator"
To account for the fact that some predicates occur more easily in bare predicate con-
structions, the authors suggest that what sets apart professions, roles, etc. from the
other predicates is that all such predicates are stage-level properties that, according
to their account, they should always occur as bare predicates. However, when the
interpretation of such predicates needs to be temporally independent of the main
verb, the relevant argument slot of the predicate needs to be saturated, the article
is inserted, and the identity copula is used to avoid a type clash.
2.7.2 Comments
Several points are interesting to discuss. First of all, all cases of predication involving
a predicate and a determiner are equative sentences, since the equative version of
the copula is needed, in order to avoid type clash (between the determined predicate
and the subject of the predication). This is interesting, but difficult to disprove. The
consequence of this claim is far more pervasive than what is discussed in the article,
because when every instance of x is a Y is an equative sentence, it must be so,
even when there is no contrast to account for (e.g. with non-sentient, or non-human
nouns). We do not disagree on the fact that sentences of the type x is a Y have are
equatives in French, but even if the presence of the equative reading is undeniable, in
every language that shows this alternation, it is impossible to claim that the equative
is the only option for every language that does not show the same restrictions as
French. In other words, it is difficult to extend thsi account in a straight-forward
way. Consider the following italian example:
(2.35) Marco
Marco
Tullio
Tullio
è
is
un
an
oratore
orator
(ita)
"Marcus Tullius is an orator"
It is possible to distinguish three readings for this sentence:
1. The specific reading is the traditional equative reading;
2. The non-specific reading is a reading that resembles the partitive reading;
3. The predicational reading (MT really has those oratorial properties).
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We can disambiguate the readings as shown by the following examples:
1. Marco
Marcus
Tullio
Tullius
è
is
un
an
oratore,
orator,
ossia
namley
Cicerone
Cicero
(specific)
"Marcus Tullius is an orator, namely Cicero"
2. Marco
Marcus
Tullio
Tullius
è
is
un
an
oratore,
orator,
ma
but
non
not
so
know
quale
which
(non-specific)
"Marcus Tullius is an orator, but I don’t know which one"
3. Marco
Marco
Tullio
Tullio
è
is
davvero
really
un
an
oratore
orator
(predicational)
"Marcus Tullius is really an orator"
We believe that given the account of Matushansky and Spector, cannot account for
this contrast.14 On the other hand, we definitely agree that the interpretation of the
indefinite article is not necessarily 9 (the generalized quantifier XY:X \ Y 6= Ø).
Another interesting aspect to discuss concerns the extension of Matushansky and
Spector’s account to any language, other than French (or even to dialect (i))15.
The type-clash between the determined predicate and the subject of the predication
should happen all the times and in every language, but if it gets resolved by using
the equative version of the copula (instead of the predicative one), why cannot
French resort to the equative copula all the times? And why do the other languages
do? Quoting Boone (1987), the authors acknowledge the fact that the determined
predicate has a different meaning than the bare predicate.
(2.37) Après
after
avoir
to have
effectué
done
cette
this
opération,
surgery,
(fra)
"After having performed this surgery,
(2.38) Max
Max
est
is
devenu
become
un
a
médecin
doctor
Max has become a doctor"
The authors claim such contrast can be accounted for in terms of coercion. The
meaning of the noun shifts from namely non-scalar to a scalar, hence, the NP gains
14Also note that the oddity of (2.36).
(2.36) ?Marco Tullio è davvero un oratore, ossia Cicerone
Marcus Tullius is really an orator, namely Cicero
15Original section [1.3]
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a degree argument slot (and the insertion of the article follows by hypothesis).
Essentially, this last point boils down to having the difference between (2.39 a) and
(2.39 b) accounted for in terms of (2.39 a) being non scalar and (2.39 b) being scalar.
(2.39) (a) Être
to be
médecin
doctor
"Being a doctor"
(b) Être
to be
un
a
médecin
doctor
"Being a doctor"
2.8 An account in terms of (lack of) Number
The main topic discussed in Munn and Schmitt (2005) is that Romance languages
allow bare singulars more freely than English and, according to the authors, this
fact reflects the way (semantic) Number is realized. They propose an extension to
the nominal projection of Bobaljik’s (1995) “Free Agr Parameter” where Romance
languages realize two separate heads for Number and Agreement, while in English
these two heads are always fused. Next to the Free Agr Parameter, the authors
assume Longobardi’s “strong/weak D Parameter” to account for the cross-linguistic
variation in Romance and English.
This summary proceeds as follows: first an overview of the relevant technical aspects
is presented, then some more details are given on the so-called as-constructions, as
well as on the discussion on role nouns. The reader who is familiar with this proposal
can continue reading from the commentary section [2.8.3].
2.8.1 Basics
Munn and Schmitt try to embed predicative bare singulars in a theory that accounts
for the behavior of argumental bare nouns. In doing so the authors try to preserve
Williams’ (1983) intuition that nominals have a uniform syntax and different seman-
tics. So, the differences between bare predicates and bare arguments depend on the
interaction between such uniform syntax and either an argumental or a predicative
semantics.
The authors try to explain the different behaviors of Brazilian Portuguese16, English,
16In this thesis, all the examples marked with the Ethnologue code por are Brazilian Portuguese
examples. As of when this thesis has being compiled, there exist no independent ISO-SIL code to
distinguish Brazilian Portuguese from European Portuguese.
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and the Romance languages. These three pattern differently in two respects: English
and Brazilian Portuguese show an unrestricted distribution of the bare plurals, which
are not allowed in the same way in Romance. On the other Brazilian Portuguese
and the other Romance languages allow bare singulars in predicative position, but
English does not.
The first difference is explained in terms of of some properties of D0, i.e. Longobardi’s
(1994, 2001) strong/weak D parameter. Following Longobardi, the authors maintain
that Italian has a strong D, whereas in English is weak. So, Brazilian Portuguese is
argued to have, like English, a weak D.
The second difference, namely the lack of bare singulars in predicative position, in
English, is accounted for in terms of another parameter, the Free Agr Parameter
(Bobalijk, 1995), which the authors claims needs to be extended to the DP domain.
The authors assume that, in all languages, D must select some functional element
via the intermediation of Num or Agr (mirroring what happens, at the clausal level,
between C and VP) and the spell-out of singular Num is the indefinite article. If D
is missing or null, Num must be overt.
Stipulating the Free Agr Parameter (presumed active in all Romance languages),
bare singulars in Brazilian Portuguese and Romance can essentially be seen as DPs
with an empty determiner and no Number projection. In English, on the other
hand, bare singulars are not predicted to exist, since the two heads are fused and
Agreement can never surface without Number. Furthermore, since D must select
some functional element via the intermediation of Num or Agr, the straightforward
prediction about English is that Num always lexicalizes (with plurals or indefinite
articles).
2.8.2 Predication and Number
Munn and Schmitt discuss several types of constructions to show how the Free Agr
parameter helps producing the correct generalizations. The main point is that some
types of constructions require Number, whereas others do not.
The authors assume the three-layer DP. When a DP has one argument, there are
three options: either the argument is an NP (i.e. a theta marking configuration,
where the DP is within the lexical domain), or the argument is a NumP (i.e. a
predication configuration) and an identification configuration (i.e. the argument is
a also a DP, and both DPs are saturated by their determiners).
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Munn and Schmitt see predication as necessarily involving the relation between a
NumP and a DP, in which the DP subject theta-binds the open position of the
nominal. The authors specify that only thematic argument of the noun merge lower
than NumP. This explain why generally, nominal predication requires number. There
are some cases, however, in which Number is not required, and it will surface only
if the Free Agr parameter is not active, and Agreement and Number are fused
(e.g. in English). In particular, they discuss two types of post-copular predicational
constructions and claim that Number is not needed only with a specific class of
nouns, namely role nouns, because these nouns have a specific structure (i.e. they
are eventive), which ultimately requires the absence of Number. They compare post-
copular predication with as-constructions, and show that as-constructions are such
that require Number pattern with the predicational cases involving role nouns.
Roles nouns and predicative as-constructions These two types of predication
are the two environments in which the different setting of the Free Agr parameter
derives the different behavior of English and Romance. First of all, role nouns can
occur as bare predicates in Romance but not in English, as shown by (2.40 a-2.40 b).
(2.40) (a) Jean
Jean
est
is
médecin
doctor
(fra)
"Jean is a doctor"
(b) *John is doctor (eng)
Secondly, bare singulars can occur embedded under the preposition as in Romance,
but again, not in English (where the nominal must agree in number with the subject
of which the predicate as-phrase). Both contrasts are shown in the examples below.
(2.41) (a) *Nobody will be able to use us as witness
(b) *Nobody will be able to use him as witness
(c) Nobody will be able to use us as witnesses
(d) Nobody will be able to use him as a witness
(2.42) (a) Personne
nobody
ne
not
nous
usplur
pourra
canfut
prendre
takeinf
comme
as
témoin
witnesssing
(fra)
"Nobody will be able to use us as witnesses"
(b) Nadie
nobody
podrá
canfut
usarnos
useinf usclit, plur
como
as
testigo
witnesssing
(spa)
"Nobody will be able to use us as witnesses"
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(c) Ninguém
nobody
poderá
canfut
nos
usplur
usar
useinf
como
as
testemunha
witnesssing
(por)
"Nobody will be able to use us as witnesses"
In the first case, the nouns that show this behavior are only the role nouns. Accord-
ing to Munn and Schmitt, these nouns are different from the other nouns because,
instead of denoting natural subsets of individuals, they denote socio-culturally de-
fined concepts. Furthermore, role nouns do not behave as I-level predicates but as
S-level predicates. For these reasons, the authors suggest that the nouns in this class
are eventive. This particular characterization predicts the fact that they can freely
occur bare, in predicative position because, instead of having a referential argument
bound by D, the nouns in this class have an event argument that must be bound by
Tense.
In the second case, for the argumental as-constructions, the authors suggest that
Romance languages allow bare singulars after as in predicative position because the
particle as acts like Num in standard predication: as shields the subject from being
the theta-marking by the noun. For this reason the absence of Agreement is not
only not expected but necessary.17 In English, on the other hand, shows Agreement
effects. The reason that Munn and Schmitt suggest is that English cannot license a
predicate without interpretable Number, and therefore, it must match the number
on the subject.
2.8.3 Comments
In what follows we will discuss three aspects of Munn and Schmitt’s analysis.
First, the relevant data in Italian seems difficult to account for, simply given the
strong/weak D and the Free Agr parameters. Secondly, the issue of plurals in French.
Finally, we will briefly discuss the meaning alternation.
A note on plurals in French The Free Agr Parameter should hold in every
Romance Language, and its very existence is motivated by the presence or absence
of Agreement in some configuration (e.g. as-constructions). However if one compares
17The authors point out that as-constructions require agreement if in adjunct position because
as-phrase must agree (via PRO) with the subject of the main clause.
(2.43) *Como abogado, sabín qué hacer (spa)
as lawyer, we knew what to do
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French (2.42 a, here repeated as 2.44 a), a singular predicate can be predicated of
plural subjects.
(2.44) (a) Personne
nobody
ne
not
nous
usplur
pourra
canfut
prendre
takeinf
comme
as
témoin
witnesssing
(fra)
"Nobody will be able to use us as witnesses"
With témoin ’witness’ and many other predicates, the trouble is that the plural form
is phonologically indistinguishable from the singular form. With a modified predi-
cate, the liaison - or the pronunciation of word-final consonant before a following
vowel sound - makes the plural audible. As we have seen in many occasions, bare
predicates cannot be modified unless the result of the modification yields a well es-
tablished property. One predicate that can be tested is professeur associé ’associate
professor’, which has a modifier that can trigger the liaison, and is allowed as bare
predicate, as shown by (2.45).
(2.45) Jean
Jean
est
is
professeur
professor
associé
associated
"Jean is an associate professor"
When tested with plural forms, it is possible to show that these predicates have (or
at least can have) Number.18
(2.46) (a) Ils
they
nous
us
ont
have
choisi
chosen
comme
as
professeurs
professorsplur
associés
assciatedplur
"They chose us as associate professors"
(b) *Ils
they
nous
us
ont
have
choisi
chosen
comme
as
professeur
professorssing
associé
assciatedsing
Italian data The active status of the Free Agr parameter in Romance, and the
possibility for the Agr head to occur without Number, are the central claims of
Munn and Schmitt (2005). The Free Agr is supposed to be active in every Romance
language, and there are some clear predictions that such parametrization makes. For
instance, in (arugmental) as-constructions the hiatus between English and Romance
is quite clear. In Romance, Number is supposed to lack (unless needed for semantic
18My informants only accept the plural form. However, it might be possible that some speakers
would to omit the liaison, hence resulting in a plural predicate sounding like a singular predicate.
The omission of the liaison however is a phenomenon of informal registers (cf. van Oostendorp
1997), so dependent on different factors.
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reasons) while in English, Number cannot lack, as illustrated by the examples (2.41 a-
2.41 d) above.
It is interesting that, in Italian (a Romance language), we can observe that number
cannot lack, and the nominal embedded under the preposition come ’as’ necessarily
agrees with the plural subject of the predication.
(2.47) (a) *Nessuno
nobody
ci
usplur
potrà
canfut
usare
useinf
come
as
testimone
witnesssing
(ita)
(b) Nessuno
nobody
ci
usplur
potrà
canfut
usare
useinf
come
as
testimoni
witnessplur
"Nobody will be able to use us as witnesses"
In this respect, Italian patterns similarly to English. However, it is hard to tell if
Italian is just an exception, within the Romance languages, which might simply have
the same parametrization as English. Clearly, Italian patterns with the rest of the
Romance languages in that role nouns occur as bare predicates, in the same type
of environments. One possibility to explain the behavior of Italian with respect to
Number could be that the lack of Number (that the authors claim for Romance lan-
guages) depends on some alternative reason. For instance, if we consider a different
type of predicate, e.g. tavolo ’table’, we can notice an interesting phenomenon (cf.
Section [6.1.2], example (6.12 a) and following).
(2.48) (a) Voi
youplur
potete
can
usare
use
questi
these
cinque
five
tronchi
trunks
come
as
tavolo
table
(ita)
"You can use these five trunks as a table"
(b) You can use these five trunks as a table
Both these sentences have two different readings: they either mean that the people
end up with five tables, or that they all combine the five trunks to build one table.
Note that in the reading in which there are five tables, there is no semantic num-
ber agreement between the predicate and the subject about which the as-phrase is
a predicate. In Italian, the number mismatch in the sentences containing the bare
singular embedded under come are possible only with non-human predicates. What
is interesting is that, it appears clear that the article must be present in English.
However, semantically there is a number mismatch. We will discuss these types of
sentence in Section [6.1.2], but this phenomenon might be relatable to a collec-
tive/distributive reading contrast. In appears that, in some languages, there is a
constraint limiting the collective reading of as-phrase, depending on the features of
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the noun thereby contained, so that it cannot be interpreted as distributed over a
plural subject.
2.9 An account in terms of (lack of) Gender
In his 2005 article, Zamparelli approaches the issue of bare predication in Romance
languages. Unlike others (e.g. Munn and Schmitt, 2005), in this article the phe-
nomenon of bare predicates is seen as having a different root than bare arguments,
essentially because there is no one-to-one correlation between the two phenomena
across languages. For example, as already discussed in several occasions, English
has very restricted possibilities of the occurrence of bare predicates, but allows bare
arguments quite freely, while in French bare arguments are practically non-existing,
but bare predicates are permitted. This paper is, to my knowledge, the only one
where a unified account of bare predicates based on lexical generalizations that go
beyond the class of roles and professions is proposed. Zamparelli points out that, for
instance in Italian, not only role nouns can occur as bare predicates but also many
relational nouns and many kinship nouns.
This overview will proceeds as follows, first we will present the account on which
Zamparelli is building, namely Heycock and Zamparelli (2005), in which it is pro-
posed that the nouns that can occur as bare predicates have an impoverished set
of features, and licensing takes place via an agreement operation between the pred-
icate itself and the subject of the predication. Then, we will see how this bears on
Zamparelli’s account of bare predicates, that are seen as nouns that are defective
of the gender feature, and discuss how this can be motivated. Finally we will see
how Zamparelli accounts for the English data, and what is the semantics of bare
predicates. The reader who is familiar with this proposal can continue reading from
the commentary section [2.9.2].
2.9.1 Basics
Similarities between bare predicates and relational nouns Zamparelli points
out that there is a striking similarity between role nouns, in (2.49 a) and Italian re-
lational nouns in (2.49 b):
(2.49) (a) Carlo
Carlo
è
is
(un)
a
insegnante
teacher
"Carlo is a teacher"
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(b) Marta
Marta
è
is
(una)
a
parente
relative
/
/
cugina
cousin
di
of
Marco
Marco
"Marta is a relative / cousin of Marco(’s)" or " Marta is Marco’s r. / c."
Zamparelli highlights how any account of bare predicates should try to understand
the following points: first, why bare predicates cannot be modified by adjectives,
PPs or relative clauses19, as shown by the examples in (2.50) and (2.51).
(2.50) *Gianni
Gianni
è
is
bravo
good
medico
doctor
"Gianni is a good doctor"
(2.51) *Gianni
Gianni
è
is
medico
doctor
che
who
capisce
understands
i
the
pazienti
patients
"Gianni is adoctor who understands the patients"
Secondly, which predicates can be bare, and why is it difficult to use bare predicates
with non-human subjects, as shown by the examples in (2.52).
(2.52) *Fido
Fido
è
is
cane
dog
guida
guide
"Fido is a sight-seeing dog"
Finally, why do bare predicates have a more restricted interpretation than de-
termined predicates. That is to say, for instance, why is it impossible to obtain
metaphorical readings with bare predicates, as shown by the contrast in (2.53 a -
2.53 b) in Italian.20
(2.53) (a) Il
the
mio
my
dentista
dentist
è
is
un
an
artista
artist
"My dentist is an artist"
(b) Il
the
mio
my
dentista
dentist
è
is
artista
artist
"My dentist is an artist"
Note that in (2.53 a), it is possible to interpret the determined predicate an artist
as “a dentistry artist”. On the other hand, the bare predicate in (2.53 b) can only be
read literally: the dentist happens to be an artist, as well as a dentist.
19With two exceptions: some complements (e.g. religion teacher), and the modification by certain
adjectives or nouns, when these help define the subject of the predication. In this light, he assumes
that Adj.+N combinations are compounds.
20This example is not the original example appearing in Zamparelli (2005).
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(Against) the adjectival hypothesis Zamparelli argues against the adjectival
hypothesis of bare predicates, i.e. the idea that bare predicates have an adjectival
syntax (as proposed i.a. by Pollock, 1983). The adjectival analysis is based on the
empirical observation that, just like adjectives, bare predicates cannot be modified
by other adjectives or relative clauses. Also, just like adjectives, when the lexicon
permits it, bare predicates normally agree in gender with their subjects. However,
the absence of an extended reading does not follow from an adjectival analysis and
there are other reasons to agree on the fact that such an analysis is unappealing (see
also Kupferman (1991) for tests in French). For instance, bare predicates cannot
occur in somebody-partitive constructions.
(2.54) (a) Qualcuno
somebody
di
of
malato
sick
"Somebody sick"
(b) *Qualcuno
somebody
di
of
professore
professor
Zamparelli further reports from Kupferman that when bare predicates pattern with
some adjectives, they pattern with stage-level adjectives, rather than individual-level
ones. Even as the continuation of the “here’s what happens” remark.
[Ce qui se passe ’This occurs’:]
(2.55) (a) Luc
Luc
est
is
malade
sick
/
/
ivre
drunk
/
/
furieux
furious
/
/
absent
absent
"Luc is sick / drunk / furious / absent"
(b) Luc
Luc
est
is
médecin
doctor
/
/
président
president
/
/
père
father
de
of
huit
eight
enfants
children
"Luc is a doctor / president / father of eight children"
Building on Heycock and Zamparelli (2005), Zamparelli (2005) maintains that the
common mass/count distinction can be described in terms of the semantic property
of cumulative/divisive reference which is associated to a semilattice. Such lattice
structure is generated inside the DP, where either one of two operators (one for
Mass and one for Count) apply to the denotation of the noun. These operators are
located in a functional projection (PlP), higher than NP. Modifiers (e.g. numerals,
etc.) need this structure (to acquire meaning) and are, in turn, located higher than
the projection that hosts the semilattice. Pl has a LATT(ice denotation) feature that
is positive when pluralization takes place, negative when it does not. N is unvalued
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for the feature [LATT ] but gets its value (via percolation) from Pl. Essentially, this
is a way of capturing the generalization that when no semantic pluralization takes
place, N cannot get a value for [LATT ] . The [LATT ]-feature can be located in
any functional projection as long as there is a trace of grammatical agreement, since
Zamparelli notes that predication itself is not enough to justify morphological agree-
ment. Consider what happens with what Zamparelli refers to as collective predicates
(i.e. un problema ’a problem’, below).
(2.56) (a) Quelle
thoseplur, fem
donne
womenplur, fem
sono
are
un
asing, masc
problema
problemsing, masc
"Those women are a problem"
(b) *Quelle
thoseplur, fem
donne
womenplur, fem
sono
are
problematico
problematicsing, masc
"Those women are problematic"
The contrast is between the collective predicate, whose gender mismatch in unprob-
lematic and the adjective which must agree in gender. For Zamparelli, it is crucial
that role nouns have no inherent specification for gender (i.e. have no gender fea-
ture), and that can follow from the intuition that they can apply to both men and
women. The contrast between the gender-related behavior of bare predicates and
the behavior of the determined predicates further emerges when the following is
observed: the gender of the determined predicate follows the gender of the referent
of the subject, whereas the gender of the bare predicate depends on syntax. The
main evidence in favor of the lack of a gender feature is provided by examples in
which the noun has two gender forms that are morphologically realized as -o/-a or
-e/-essa, respectively for masculine and feminine. In such cases, Zamparelli points
out that the absence of the determiner leaves the gender dependent on syntax and
the realization of the feminine is impossible: when the predicate is a noun with no
lexicalized feminine form (e.g. ministro ’minister’), the mismatch between a feminine
subject and a masculine bare predicate is unproblematic.21
(2.57) (a) La
thefem
cugina
cousinfem
di
of
Carla
Carla
è
is
ministro
ministermasc
"Carla’s cousin is a minister"
(b) Il
themasc
ministro
ministermasc
è
is
una
afem
cugina
cousinfem
di
of
Carla
Carla
/
/
una
Ph.Dfem
dottoressa
of
in
sciences
scienze
poltical
politiche
"The minister is Carla’s cousin / a Ph.D in political science"
21The glosses, “fem” or “masc”, always report the surfacing morphological gender.
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Zamparelli claims that if the same noun is put in subject position, it mismatches with
a feminine bare predicate (e.g. cugino/cugina ’cousin’, dottore/dottoressa ’doctor’):
(2.58) *Il
themasc
ministro
ministermasc
è
is
cugina
cousinfem
di
of
Carla
Carla
/
/
dottoressa
Ph.Dfem
in
of
scienze
sciences
politiche
poltical
The proposal that Zamparelli puts forth is that the subjects of the bare predicates
are generated in a position close to NP (probably an NP-Adjunct position) from
where they can trigger agreement. From that position, the [LATT ] feature can be
transmitted from the DP to the (bare) predicate. Subjects can be close to predicates
only when it is necessary to transmit agreement information. In the case of a pred-
icate with a determiner, the [LATT ] feature is provided by the article/determiner.
The nouns that allow close subjects are, as we said, those nouns which need some
agreement information. He identifies three classes of role nouns: pure relational (fam-
ily and social relations), unique descriptions and professions. The first differentiates
from the other because 1) the arguments of the relation must be overtly saturated;
2) they are not restricted to [+HUMAN ] subjects; 3) they are not stage-level nor
eventive (and they are restricted or impossible in some languages). These nouns
are virtually ambiguous: they can either denote activities or classes of human be-
ings.22 So, when they occur bare they denote activities that define natural and
well-established classes of individuals (and they have no gender feature). When they
need to denote classes of human beings (they have a gender feature), they need the
determiner to deliver the lattice denotation.
2.9.2 Comments
We agree with Zamparelli in trying to account for the similarities in behavior and
distribution of all the bare predicates (role nouns, relational nouns, etc.). It is an
undeniable empirical fact that, in Italian and other Romance languages, not only role
nouns occur easily as bare predicates. Let us see what is of difficult understanding in
the tests proposed by Zamparelli. We will conclude this section with a brief comment
about English.
On gender tests
22For Zamparelli bare predicates need to denote “stable” classes of individuals expressing an
important classification; this rules out tenant or walker ; for identical reasons some human subkinds
can only refer to stages of someone’s life (e.g. boy, kid, etc.) hence they are ruled out.
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Recall that Zamparelli claims that, since role nouns are not specified for gender, so
nouns like ministro, even if lacking a grammaticalized feminine form, are unprob-
lematic in constructions like (2.59)23.
(2.59) Tina
Tinafem
è
is
ministro
ministermasc
"Tina is a minister"
However, some points are not entirely clear. In Italian there are many nouns (mainly
ending in -e, and some ending in -a) which show no gender inflection on the noun
itself, but do so on the article.24 In other words, nouns like collega ’colleague’ get the
masculine article when it refers to a man. It is unclear if, in Zamparelli’s idiolect,
the indefinite article matching ministro should be the feminine una or the masculine
un, since, for some speakers of Italian, the preferred choice is (2.62 a) and for other
is (2.62 b).25
(2.62) (a) Tina
Tinafem
è
is
un
amasc
ministro
ministermasc
(b) Tina
Tinafem
è
is
una
afem
ministro
ministermasc
"Tina is a minister"
23This example, and all of the following are calqued onto Zamparelli original (42), but slightly
adapted for legibility reasons.
24The following are cases of nouns in which the ending does not change as a consequence of
agreement, but the article does:
(2.60) un/una cantante ’a singer’
un/una presidente ’a president’
un/un’insegnante ’a teacher’
un/una collega ’a colleague’
un/una turista ’a tourist’
un/una pirata ’a pirate’
25There is a further problem, specific to the nouns that refer to some types of professions. For
some of these nouns, the feminine form has never been needed until approximately fifty years ago
(there were no minister women before Tina Anselmi, in 1976, and no so many women who were
lawyers, surgeons etc.); however, the morphology of ministro ’minister’, avvocato ’lawyer’, chirurgo
’surgeon’, medico ’medical doctor’ could allow a straight-forward femininization (replacing the
ending -o with -a). The following forms are all attested feminine forms of a minister :
(2.61) Tina è (un) ministro
Tina è (una) ministro
Tina è (una) ministra
Tina è un ministro donna (a minister woman)
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With this in mind, let us discuss the argument. Zamparelli wants to show that there
is a difference between those (role) nouns that have the double form and the ones
which do not. His point is that with role nouns that have the double form, if the
article is present, the predicate agrees in gender with the referent, but without the
article, the gender becomes sensitive to syntax, and a mismatch is not tolerated.
(2.63) *Il
Themasc
ministro
ministermasc
è
is
dottoressa
Ph.Dfem
"The minister is a Ph.D"
However, given what we said earlier, when confronted with (2.63), the question that
arises is if the ungrammaticality that Zamparelli assigns to the sentence derives from
DP il ministro being expected to pick up a female referent, or from a general gender
mismatch between the subject and the predicate. In other words, the problematic
point is that, for the speakers who accept (2.62 a), (2.63) is grammatical; on the
other hand, for the speakers that only accept (2.62 b), (2.63) is ungrammatical. But
if the latter is the case, such ungrammaticality would not be different from the
ungrammaticality of (2.64).
(2.64) *Il
Themasc
sole
sunmasc
è
is
rossa
redfem
"The sun is red"
Zamparelli furthermore points out that it is still possible to say (2.65), where the
mismatch is avoided by the presence of the article. The difficulty here is that it is
unclear if this example is a case of an equative sentence.
(2.65) Il
Themasc
ministro
ministermasc
è
is
una
a
dottoressa
Ph.Dfem
"The minister is a Ph.D"
Note that (2.66) is grammatical (under the equative reading), even though there is
mismatch in gender, number, and animacy.
(2.66) Il
Thesing, masc
ministro
ministersing, masc
è
is
/
/
sono
are
due
two
sedie
chairsplur, fem
"The minister is / are two chairs"
To conclude, consider a noun like (una) guardia ’ (a) watch’ that belongs to a class of
nouns where both the noun and the article show feminine morphology, even though
the role the noun refers to is traditionally covered by men.26 When no agreement
26Some of the nouns in this class are reported in (2.67).
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is possible, not contrast emerges and no ungrammaticality arises. This is shown in
(2.68 b).
(2.68) (a) Gianni
Giannimasc
/
/
Maria
Mariafem
è
is
sentinella
watchfem
"Gianni / Maria is a watch"
(b) La
Thefem
sentinella
guardfem
è
is
dottore
Ph.Dmasc
/
/
dottoressa
Ph.Dfem
"The watch is a Ph.D"
On predictions about English The last comment concerns the prediction that
this account makes about English. Zamparelli’s idea is that with bare predicates,
English does not have the same freedom that other languages have, because English
lacks grammatical gender. But it is observed that English’s dramatically different
behavior is such that bare predicates are possible only if they refer to a unique
position (even contextually unique). What also also Le Bruyn (2010) points out is
that, once the indefinite article functions only a number marker, it is impossible to
derive the fact that English bare predicates have a presupposition of uniqueness.
2.10 An account in terms of Capacities
In this section we will discuss the account put forth in De Swart et al. (2005), De
Swart et al. (2007), and the refinements presented in Le Bruyn’s (2010). These papers
are dedicated to the construction of a model that can account for the behavior of
unmarked nominals (i.e. non-determined and non-plural) in Dutch. At the base of
the proposal is the assumption of a new semantic category that enriches the list of
the e types: “capacities”. The idea is that unmarked nominals refer to capacities,
“kind-like” entities which, instead of being natural, are socially defined.
This overview will proceed as follows: first we will present the concept of “capacities”
as well as the theoretical motivations underlying its assumption and briefly overview
the bare predicate environments. Finally, we will present the actual analysis and its
type-shifting components (as refined in Le Bruyn, 2010). The reader who is familiar
with this proposal can continue reading from the commentary section [2.10.4].
(2.67) una guardia ’the guard’
una recluta ’the recruit’
una sentinella ’the watch’
una spia ’the spy’
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2.10.1 Capacities
That of “capacities” is a semantic category that reunites the terms that refer to
“professions” and “social roles”, “religions”, and “nationalities”. Capacities are similar
to “kinds” (both are of type e), but what descriptively sets them apart is that capac-
ities are culturally defined and kinds are not. According to the authors, capacities
cannot be assimilated to either properties or kinds. The first case can be illustrated
by examples like the following.
(2.69) (a) Jean
Jean
travaille
works
comme
as
professeur
professor
dans
in
un
a
collège
high school
(fra)
"Jean works as professor in a high school"
(b) Jean
Jean
travaille
works
comme
as
prêtre
priest
dans
in
un
a
collège
high school
"Jean works as priest in a high school"
The authors suggest that the if set of the professors equates the set of the priests,
and if Jean does not e.g. teach religion at that high school, we would encounter an
extensional identity problem: (2.69 a) would be true, and (2.69 b) false. This shows
that if the meaning of the capacity equated its extension (like it is for properties),
we could have substitutio of the two capacities salva veritate, and the truth values
of the two sentences would not change.
On the other hand, even being both of type e, capacities are distinct from kinds.
According to the authors, this can be shown, for instance, by the fact that kinds
can be referred to using a bare plural, in(2.70 a), or a definite singular, in (2.70 b).
(2.70) (a) Dinosaurussen
dinosaurs
zijn
are
uitgestorven
extinct
(nld)
"Dinosaurs are extinct"
(b) De
the
dinosaurus
dinosaur
is
is
uitgestorven
extinct
"The dinosaur is extinct"
The same is not possible with capacity nominals (2.71 a-2.71 b), and it can only be
done with a bare singular (2.71 c).27
27To some of my informants, leraar ’teacher’ in (2.71 c) is marked; instead some informants
prefer leraarschap ’teaching’.
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(2.71) (a) *Leraren
professors
is
is
/
/
zijn
are
een
a
mooi
nice
beroep
profession
"Professors is / are a nice profession"
(b) *Een
a
/
/
*de
the
leraar
professor
is
is
een
a
mooi
nice
beroep
profession
"A / the professor is a nice profession"
(c) Leraar
professor
is
is
een
a
mooi
nice
beroep
profession
"The professor is a nice profession"
2.10.2 Environments and contrasts
De Swart et al. discuss several types of contrasts that distinguish the use and mean-
ing of bare predicates and determined predicates. Next to the classic basic contrast,
they notice that modified predication is possible but restricted to some adjectives.28
Then, they notice that unmarked (bare) predicates always receive a “strict” or “lit-
eral” interpretation, whereas (determined/plural) predicates receive some sort of
“metaphorical” or “figurative” interpretation.
(2.72) (a) Jan
Jan
sprak
spoke
als
as
dominee
vicar
"Jan spoke in his capacity as vicar"
(b) Jan
Jan
sprak
spoke
als
as
een
a
dominee
vicar
"Jan spoke like a vicar"
(c) Jan
Jan
en
and
Karel
Karel
spraken
spoke
als
as
dominee
vicar
"Jan and Karel spoke in their capacity of vicar"
(d) Jan
Jan
en
and
Karel
Karel
spraken
spoke
als
as
dominees
vicars
"Jan and Karel spoke as vicars"
28The authors discuss a very interesting pattern of Dutch, language in which adjectives are in-
flected with the ending -e, if they modify a masculine or feminine noun. When an adjective modifies
a bare predicate, however, it does not inflect (even if it would inflect, in normal environments): Jan
is werkloos visser ’Jan is unemployed fisherman’ Vs. *Jan is werkloze visser. This kind of examples
“materialize” the intuition that modified bare predicates must be “well-established” properties and
not properties that get modified syntactically. In a sense, the adjective and the noun are combined
at an earlier stage.
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Furthermore, unmarked nominals/capacities can be embedded under phrases as the
role of, the function of, the profession of, etc., and, can be the complement of verbs
like elect, appoint, vote for, etc.
Finally, in some languages, unmarked nominals/capacities can subject higher-order
predication, as shown in (2.71 c).
2.10.3 Type-shifting operations
The basic assumption about the DP structure is that it has the following layered
structure [DPD [NumPNum [NPN ]]]. Syntactically, a bare predicate is an NP without
functional projections, so the presence of the article entails, at least, the projection
of NumP (cf. Munn and Schmitt, 2005). Predication, for cases of the shape of “x is
P”, is understood in the following way: the entity x, denoted by x, is a member of
the set P, denoted by P: x 2 P . So, when P is an NP, NumP or DP, the membership
relation involves the denotation of x, and the set of entities obtained by mapping
the denotation of the noun contained in P to a set of entities of type he; ti. 29 In
order to be able to occur in predicative position, they must undergo type-shifting
and become of type he; ti. The operation that turns kinds into sets is REL and the
similar operation that turns capacities into sets is called CAP . They assume that
the “sign” of the realization of REL is the projection of NumP. On the other hand,
there is no overt sign of the realization of CAP , which can occur freely within the
NP. The system is also endowed to a mechanism to coerce capacity e-type elements
to kinds e-type elements. This operation is called “kind coercion”, and it takes place
every time a capacity noun occurs with a determiner. Le Bruyn (2010) adds to this
model another coercion operation, which is essentially the counterpart of the “kind
coercion”, namely the “cap coercion”. This operation is the one that can account for
the cases where a kind noun (such as man, or wolf ) occurs as a bare predicate. With
this addition, the system can also account for cases like (2.73 a), where the way to
interpret the two predicates rat and raaf is to refer to the players in the game “Rats
and Ravens”. These nouns are thus interpreted, respectively, as the capacity-rat and
the capacity-raven (and not the kind-rat and the kind-raven).
(2.73) (a) Één
a
kind
child
van
of
het
the
tweetal
couple
is
is
rat,
rat,
de
the
andere
other
raaf
raven
"One child of the couple is the rat, the other is the raven"
29Recall that for De Swart et al. kinds and capacities are both of type e.
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Le Bruyn also modifies the assumption about the presence of the article which
occurs with the kind-reading of a predicate. According to him, the realization oper-
ation REL is linked to the presence of the indefinite article, rather than to NumP.
Simplifying the reasoning, Le Bruyn’s idea is the following: first, the indefinite used
to be a marker for non-uniqueness only; at the point when REL and CAP needed
to be distinguished, it was the indefinite which took over the function of marking
REL because: 1) REL needed to be marked more than CAP ; and 2) because the
indefinite marked non-uniqueness30, and non-uniqueness is necessary for a kind to
be a kind (See. Le Bruyn (2010) for details).
2.10.4 Comments
In the following two paragraphs, we will discuss first the as-constructions as a
reliable test for capacity/kind readings, then we will raise some questions about the
ontological status of capacity, and the consequences for our understanding of the
linguistic ontology.
Testing as-constructions Recall that, in discussing the as-constructions exam-
ples, the authors point out that bare predicates are always interpreted literally,
whereas determined or plural predicates can be interpreted “metaphorically”. It is,
however, difficult to understand, given these types of constructions, if the “metaphor-
ical” reading arises from the markedness of the predicate or from the type of construc-
tion. Note that it still possible to observe identical effects also in Italian, language in
which capacity nominals show no number neutrality, and must agree in number with
their subjects. Indeed, the sentence containing a bare plural (2.74 a) is ambiguous
between the two readings (“literal” and “metaphorical”), whereas the one with the
plural indefinite, in (2.74 b), is only interpreted in a “metaphorical” way.
The difficulties with the kind of sentences containing the determined predicate is
to tell them apart from elliptical comparatives. If such sentences are comparatives,
and we will discuss more examples like these in Section [6.1], then the “metaphoric”
reading is just a “comparative” reading (See. Lechner, 2004).
(2.74) (a) Gianni
Gianni
e
and
Carlo
Carlo
parlano
speak
come
as
vicari
vicars
(ita)
"Gianni and Carlo speak as vicars" or "Gianni and Carlo speak like
vicars (do)"
30As opposed to the definite article that marked uniqueness.
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(b) Gianni
Gianni
e
and
Carlo
Carlo
parlano
speak
come
like
dei
partitive plural
vicari
vicars
"Gianni and Carlo speak like vicars (do)"
The lexical distinction and the ontological nature of Capacities Another
difficulty arises when discussing the ontological nature and the expectations that
follow from the assumption of the existence of capacities in the linguistic ontology.
We know that capacities are formally very similar to kinds, yet “sortally” distinct
from them. We also know that, that in the model of De Swart et al., a type shifting
operation can turn a capacity into a kind (and Le Bruyn’s extension indicates the
way to turn a kind into a capacity). In these terms, capacities and kinds are the two
sides of a coin: the natural side, that is kinds, and the social/cultural side, that is
capacities. Recall that De Swart et al. suggest that capacities need to be distinct
from kinds because they show a different distribution. We have seen in (2.70 a -
2.71 c), here adapted in (2.75) and (2.76).31
(2.75) De
the
dinosaurus
dinosaur
is
is
uitgestorven
extinct
(nld)
"The dinosaur is extinct"
*Dinosaurus
dinosaur
is
is
uitgestorven
extinct
(2.76) *De
the
leraar
professor
is
is
een
a
mooi
nice
beroep
profession
Leraar
professor
is
is
een
a
mooi
nice
beroep
profession
"The professor / Teaching is a nice profession"
The difficulty in following this argument is that these examples are artificially dis-
similar. However, two contrasts hold: first of all that the Romance counterpart of
2.76 would have opposite grammatical judgements, as shown by the Italian examples
below.
(2.77) Il
the
professore
professor
è
is
un
a
bel
nice
mestiere
job
(ita)
"Teaching is a nice profession"
31Examples (2.75) and (2.76) are from De Swart et al. (2007), whereas all the other ones, in this
section, are mine.
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*Professore
professor
è
is
un
a
bel
nice
mestiere
job
Secondly, there is an unquestionable contrast, that is specific to Dutch, shown again
by (2.78 a-2.78 b).
(2.78) (a) (*De)
(the)
leraar
professor
is
is
een
a
mooi
nice
beroep
profession
(nld)
(b) *(De)
(the)
tijger
tiger
is
is
een
a
prachtige
beautiful
diersoort
specie
"The tiger is a beautiful specie"
The conclusion that the authors draw from the examples above is that capacities (e.g.
leraar) cannot be equated to kinds. However, there is little evidence to understand
if such behavior is not simply showing that leraar behaves like a proper name (of
job), just like rood and (with some variation) Oncidium.32
(2.80) (*De)
(the)
rood
red
is
is
een
a
prachtige
beautiful
kleur
color
"Red is a beautiful color"
(2.81) %(De)
(the)
Oncidium
Oncidium
is
is
een
a
prachtige
beautiful
soort
genus
"Oncidium is a beautiful genus"
Clearly, it might be that capacities cannot be equated to kinds. Yet, if we are to
introduce, in our linguistic ontology, a new semantic category, it is probably com-
mendable to produce more evidence in support of this hypothesis.since as soon as we
start introducing new elements in the linguistic ontology, and we start postulating
the existence of some lexical class, there are many consequences that have to be
taken into account. For instance, a topic that is interesting to investigate is the flex-
ibility of any lexical class. We know that some elements contained in lexical classes
may be different across languages (e.g. grooming verbs, see also Section [2.12]). So,
32Note that, coherently, in Italian/Romance the following forms are grammatical, and the de-
terminers cannot be omitted:
(2.79) Il professore / La tigre / L’ Oncidium / Il rosso è un X interessante
the professor / the tiger / the Oncidium / the red / is an interesting X
“Teaching / The tiger / Oncidium / Red is an interesting X”
69
in the case of capacities, the question that naturally arises is the following “Does
the occurrence of a nominal as a bare predicate (in a given language) entail that
the nominal refers to a capacity (or that it has been cap-coerced)?” If we accept
capacities as a semantic category, it is interesting to wonder if they are to be seen as
a universal. If that is the case, what does it mean, for our linguistic ontology, to have
a socio-cultural universal? Overall, we should try to compare this option against the
one in which a deeper universal constraint, maybe independent on socio-cultural
aspects, can be instantiated in various ways. One of these ways could then be what
we can perceive as the kind/capacity contrast.
One of the reasons why we suggest this theoretical option is that it is difficult to
conclude, for Italian/Romance that nominals like amico (di) ’friend (of)’, which can
occur as bare predicates, can refer to a capacity. On the other hand, if the occurrence
of a bare predicate (in a given language) does not entail that that nominal refers to a
capacity, or that it has been cap-coerced, then the occurrence of amico (di) as a bare
predicate is a different phenomenon, and it is unrelated to capacity-referentiality.
But if that is the case, then the similarities in meaning contrasts between un amico
and un dottore and amico and dottore are lost (cf. Section [2.9]). We will discuss
this in the next chapters.
2.11 A direct comparison
There are several main points in which various accounts of bare predicates may be
different. We will list the aspects and provide examples from the literature discussed
in the previous part of the chapter. If the account presents a lexical analysis, the
first point is the specification of the lexical class, i.e. how are the nouns that occur
as bare predicates different. Then, they can vary with respect to the role of the
article. The (in)definite article can have semantic content or not. If the latter is the
case, the article can be the reflex of a syntactic operation or of a semantic opera-
tion. Furthermore, interwoven with what we already mentioned is the treatment of
cross-linguistic variation as well as the treatment of the English and its uniqueness
condition. One final point, that we consider very important, is the discussion about
the similarity between the effects on the meaning of the presence/absence of the
article with other lexical items. In other words, the similarity with count and mass
predicates.
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2.11.1 The specification of the lexical class
As we already mentioned in several different parts, all the accounts that we discussed
have a lexicalist approach to the phenomenon of bare predicates. Necessarily, every
lexical account is constructed around some specification of this lexical class.
For Matushansky and Spector, who discuss the phenomenon only for French,
the generalization is the following:
Generalization
Only nouns that are [+SENTIENT; SCALAR] allow article omission
in French.33
For Munn and Schmitt, bare predicates are eventive and behave like stage-level
properties. They contrast with determined predicates which behave like individual-
level properties. The relevant passage is reported below.
[T ]he class of nominals that can appear bare is semantically restricted.
More specifically, roles and professions are acceptable, while inherent cat-
egories or classes are not. According to Kupferman (1991), the nominals
allowed cannot denote inherent or natural subsets of individuals; rather
they must denote socio-cultural sets and therefore these sets are contin-
gent and transitory. 34
For Zamparelli, the crucial intuition is that the nouns that can form bare predicates
are not specified for gender.
Pre-theoretically, role nouns seem to refer to roles which can be acted or
taken up by human beings [...]. Due to this semantics, they don’t seem
to be lexically specified for abstract gender [...]; rather, they adopt the
syntactic gender specification of the noun they apply to.35
More specifically, he claims that, of the three sub-classes of bare predicates that he
identifies (in Italian), namely “pure relational”, “unique descriptions” and “profes-
sions”, the latter denote:
33p. 243
34p. 846
35p. 14, emphasis mine.
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[P ]roperties which define well-established kinds [...]. [A]ctivities which
are typical of natural classes of entities could also be used to individuate
them (let’s call them well-established activities), and [...] the third class
of bare predicate nominals (thus excluding “pure relational” and “unique
description” cases like fratello ’brother’ and re ’king’) can denote such
activities.36
The crucial aspect of having profession-bare predicates refer to activities (typical
of well-established kinds) is that it allows to exclude “achievements”, “states” and
“primary occupations”. Also, said activities cannot access metaphorical/extended
interpretations.
For De Swart, Winter, and Zwarts the class of the nouns that form bare pred-
icates is defined as including three categories of roles: professions, religions and
nationalities.
The class of nominals in Germanic and Romance languages that can
occur bare [...] is quite restricted. [...] The nominals in bare construc-
tions are often simple expressions that resist modification. They usually
have human referents, and denote specific roles in society: professions,
religions or nationalities. Other nominals (non-human or human) that
are not related to such roles generally resist taking up a bare nominal
position[.]37
These three groups of roles are what these authors call “capacities”, an addition to
the language ontology.
The interpretation of BNs in Romance and Germanic languages involves
reference to semantic entities which we refer to as capacities. [C ]apacity
interpretations of nominals should be distinguished from property inter-
pretations [...], and from ordinary reference to kinds in the sense of Carl-
son (1980) [...]. Capacities are treated as type e entities, but they are
sortally distinguished from kinds. 38
We also show some patterns [...] that provide further cross-linguistic sup-
port for the postulation of capacities as a separate ontological category,
specific to a low position within the DP.39
36p. 20, emphasis mine.
372007, p. 3
382007, p. 3-4
392007, p. 1
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Le Bruyn, further elaborates the analysis presented by De Swart et al. According
to him, capacities are the opposite of kinds: if the latter are naturally defined, the
former are socially defined.
Capacity is a cover term for professions, nationalities and religions. The
link licensing this cover term is that professions, nationalities and reli-
gions all stand for the position of an individual in society, be it at a
professional, civil or religious level. They all specify what an individual
stands for [.]
[C ]apacities [...] are culturally defined [hence they reflect] no inherent
property of an individual [. They] exist by virtue of a cultural decision
and need not reflect the position of any existing individual.40
2.11.2 How meaning variation is understood
In what follows is summarized the treatment of the meaning alternation between
the bare and the determined predicate.
For Matushansky and Spector, the meaning of the determined predicate is re-
ported below.
This interpretation is that of “a typical doctor”, “a real doctor” a meaning
shift typical of scalarity coercion (P ! “having properties stereotypically
associated with being P ”), which takes place when a non-scalar predicate
appears in a scalar context.41
On the other hand, this is how Zamparelli distinguishes the meaning of determined
predicates from that of bare predicates as reported below.
[T ]he profession nominals that can make up bare predicates are ambigu-
ous: they can denote classes of human beings, or they can denote the
abstract well-established activities which identify those classes. [T ]hey
are just like all other nouns [...], the copular construction is simply in-
terpreted as membership (arguably the default value for copular predica-
tion):
Ada è una dottoressa
Ada is a doctor
Ada 2 (doctor0 \ female0)
40p. 141
41p. 253
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[T ]he role nominal denotes an activity (an abstract notion), which in
turn defines a natural/well-established class of people. [T]he noun has
no gender value of its own, and assigns a theta role to the subject of
the predication in the NP-adjunct position. The theta-marked argument
is identified with the agent that participates in the activity (indicated as
acting-as-N in a Parsons-style semantics).42
Ada è una dottoressa
Ada is a doctorfem
9e[acting   as  doctor0 (e) ^ Subj (e; Ada)]
De Swart, Winter, and Zwarts contrast generally the meaning of modified nouns
(MNs) and that of bare nouns (BNs) bare as reported below. The former include
the determined predicates, and the latter includes the bare predicates.
Where both MNs [marked nominals, including determined predicates,
MC] and BNs [bare nominals, including bare predicates, MC] are possi-
ble, their meanings tend to be different. [I ]t has been observed that BNs
have more literal and stereotypical meanings than the marked singular
indefinites, which may typically receive figurative or approximative in-
terpretations.43
For the authors, bare predicates refer to capacities, a different semantic entity, for-
mally similar to kinds yet distinct. They are the socio-cultural counterparts of kinds.
Le Bruyn builds on this account and is more specific about the difference between
bare and modified predicates.
Crucial for capacities is that they are culturally defined. This has two
consequences. The first is that there is no inherent property of an indi-
vidual that makes it into a doctor, American or muslim. [T ]he second
consequence is that capacities exist by virtue of a cultural decision and
need not reflect the position of any existing individual. One could e.g. es-
tablish the capacity king of the US independently of anyone ever holding
this position.44
For Le Bruyn, the determined predicate corresponds to a kind, and kind member-
ship is described in the following terms:
42p. 21
432007, p. 3
44p. 141
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[C ]apacities are culturally defined. Kinds are exactly the opposite: they
form natural classes of individuals. The term natural is opposed to cul-
tural and reflects the intuition that kinds are different from capacities
in two respects. The first is that kind membership is based on inherent
properties: a wolf belongs to the kind wolf not by accident but because
it has inherent properties that make it into a wolf. The second respect
in which kinds are natural and capacities cultural is that kinds cannot
be established by virtue of a cultural decision but exist by virtue of there
being individuals that share the same inherent properties.45
Two things are important in Le Bruyn’s discussion of the difference between kinds
and capacities. First of all, he points out that capacities do not depend on any
“inherent” property, whereas kind membership “is based on inherent properties”.
Second, we find the concept of “inherence” baked in the meaning representation
of the predicate appearing with a determiner. The intuition behind the concept of
“inherence” of a property is very clearly a way of describing what we defined as
“intrinsicality”, but in Le Bruyn, such notion is not discussed. Secondly, inherence is
formalized as “the property of being inherent” that a property can have. Let us see
how this is done.
The (bare, MC) predicate [...] denotes the set of individuals that work
as managers whereas the (determined, MC) predicate in [..] denotes the
set of individuals that have the inherent properties we typically associate
with managers: being organized, being able to delegate, ...46
The contrast between the semantics of the bare predicate and that of the determined
predicate emerges from the two meaning representations below. The first meaning
representation corresponds to the meaning of the bare predicate manager, and the
second to the meaning of the the determined predicate een manager ’a manager’.
1) x (professional manager (x))
2) x8P (8y (professional manager (y) > P (y))& Inherent (P )! P (x))
The set in (1) only contains professional managers. The set in (2) con-
tains those individuals that have all the inherent properties we typically
associate with professional managers. Note that “>” stands for “if... then
45p. 142, emphasis mine.
46p. 150, emphasis mine.
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normally” and is borrowed from the literature on non-monotonic infer-
encing [...]. What kind seems to do then is to take a capacity and return
the kind consisting of all the individuals that have the inherent properties
that are typically associated with the individuals that have this capacity.47
However, in order to interpret a predicate in an inherent way, we need to know
what “inherent” means, just in the same way in which we need to know what “red”
means to know which objects are red objects. There are two consequences: first
of all, if the interpretation of a predicate, e.g. “inherent P” is dependent on the
interpretation of the predicate “inherent”, then it means that we, as speakers, need
to know the principle of application of “inherent”, otherwise we do not know the
meaning of this adjective. Secondly, the fact that a predicate is inherent or not
has zero consequences on the predicate’s nature and behavior. This is a strong
conviction, because, as we have noticed from the observations emerged in the other
analyses, bare and determined predicates generate an array of semantic effects, that
are underrepresented, given a meaning representation as (2). In a sense, what we can
conclude from the discussion about the other analyses, is that the realization of the
meaning difference between bare and determined predicates should be a consequence
of their semantic structures.
2.11.3 The role of the article
For Matushansky and Spector, the article is simply the signal of an operation,
namely, the saturation of an argument slot.
[T ]he indefinite article contributes no meaning (i.e. un(e) is vacuous),
but is only a reflex of a syntactic operation.48
Such vacuity is clearly (and explicitly) entailed by their rule for predicate marking:
(14) French predicate marking
The indefinite article in the post-copular position in French signals the
saturation of one of the argument slots of an unmodified [+SENTIENT ]
noun.49
47ibid.
48p. 245
49ibid.
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As we mentioned in the specification of this lexical class, the presence of the article
signals the saturation of an argument slot of a [+SENTIENT ] noun.
We have argued that post-copular xNP 50-marking in French (presence
vs. absence of the indefinite article) reflects the saturation of an xNP -
internal argument of the post-copular [+SENTIENT ] xNP .
A. when the xNP is scalar, the article is obligatory
B. when the xNP is not scalar, the indefinite article results in ungram-
maticality unless
C. the identity be is used with indefinite xNP s
As a result, we can now formally deal with the indefinite/bare alternation
in unmodified post-copular xNP s in French.51
For Munn and Schmitt, the indefinite article is simply the spell-out of a singular
Num.
[...] Romance generally should have bare singulars [includes bare pred-
icates, MC] in many places where English does not, i.e., English must
always lexicalise Num with either Plural or the indefinite article a, while
Romance need not lexicalise it where it is not required for independent
reasons.52
The authors, however, specify that every quantificational use of determiners entails
the necessary spell-out of Num:
Crucially we take quantificational uses of determiners to require Num,
on the assumption that quantification requires a counter of some sort.
This rules out structures of the sort [DPD [AgrPNP ]] even in a Free Agr
language. The null determiner is not quantificational, as evidenced by
the scopelessness of bare nominals generally.53
The fact that no particular consideration is elaborated about the meaning alterna-
tion between bare and determiner predicates is compatible with such view of the
article.
50Extended Noun Phrases
51p. 252
52p. 829
53p. 829, footnote 10
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Zamparelli builds his analysis on Heycock and Zamparelli (2005), and crucially,
according to them, the article has the role to assign nouns value for a semantic
feature:
[S ]ingular count nouns need articles at least because they need to receive
from them a value for a semantic feature (called LATT, for lattice deno-
tation) which would otherwise remain unvalued on N.54
[T ]he need for an overt determiner can be derived from the necessity
for N to obtain a value for its unvalued feature LATT when the opera-
tion of semantic pluralization does not take place, as it is the case with
syntactically singular count nouns.55
The presence and absence of the article can thus be dependent on different factors.
[T ]he account points to the existence of three fundamental ways in which
nouns can avoid taking articles: a noun can be licensed by a semantic
operator (when mass or plural), by movement to D or [Spec, DP] (proper
names, coordinated Ns, maybe kind-denoting bare plurals in Germanic),
and by coindexation with a DP which is independently licensed (in bare
predicate nominals and probably in appositions).56
For De Swart, Winter, and Zwarts, the article is understood as the spell-out of
a type-shifting operation:
We take Num to involve Carlsons realization operator REL [...]. In [a]
predicative construction [...], NumP coerces the capacity denotation of
[an] NP into a kind denotation, without which the realization operator
originating from the Num cannot apply to the NP denotation.57
The main difference between Le Bruyn’s account and the one of De Swart et al.
is that Le Bruyn links the REL type-shifting to the article, instead of Num. For
him, the indefinite article in predicative position shifted its meaning from marking
“non-uniqueness” to marking REL:
[T]he indefinite article used to mark non-uniqueness [which] is closely
linked to the application of REL because of the non-uniqueness constraint
on the elements of kind-sets.
54p. 3
55p. 13
56p. 23
572007, p. 19
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2.11.4 Cross-linguistic variation
and the treatment of English
ForMatushansky and Spector, cross-linguistic variation should be accounted for
in terms of the different ways in which nominal argument slots are treated by the
various languages (but no explicit claim is made about English).
We [...] show how this saturation [of a nominal’s argument slot, MC]
is reflected in the interpretation of the post-copular xNP and [...]
argue that various languages treat different nominal argument slots
slight differently: while in Dutch (de Swart, et al. (2004)[)] and in
German xNP -marking behaves as in French, Instrumental vs. Nom-
inative Case-marking on Russian post-copular xNP s is different in
an interestingly predictable way. This leads us to conclude that the
indefinite article is not (necessarily) interpretable.58
Munn and Schmitt, propose a parametric analysis of the distribution of bare
singulars (both in argumental and in predicative position) in a cross-linguistic per-
spective. Specifically, the parameter that is involved in the behavior of bare singu-
lars in predicative position is one which regulates the surface of two different heads
(Agreement and Number).
[There is] a significant distinction between English and the Romance lan-
guages in terms of the realisation of Number within the noun phrase.
[W ]e proposed that Romance realises separate heads for (semantic) num-
ber and agreement, while English “fuses” the two into a single head. This
is the so-called “Free-Agr” hypothesis. A consequence of this analysis is
that bare count singular nominals [...] should be allowed in many more
places in the Romance languages compared to English.59
On the other hand, Zamparelli, does not make specific claims about how to ac-
count for the observable cross-linguistic variation among European languages. He
mainly focuses on the contrast between English and the other (European) languages
discussed is captured by a very immediate observation. Zamparelli’s account works
on gender agreement, but English, unlike the other languages, has no grammatical
gender, and the contrast between the “professions” and the other nouns is neutral-
ized.
58p. 241-2
59p. 822
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Why does English, unlike its continental Germanic cousins, have no gen-
eralized bare predicates with role nouns? The key is that English has no
grammatical gender [...]. If [...] nouns cannot appear in syntax within the
AGREE domain of another noun unless one of them needs to transmit
feature values via AGREE, the lack of gender features in English auto-
matically entails that the subject of the predication must start out in an
external position even with predicative role nouns.60
In De Swart, Winter, and Zwarts, especially 2007, the focus is on the common-
alities of the interpretation of bare nominals. The analysis is built on Dutch and
the cross-linguistic considerations aim at highlighting the similarities among vari-
ous languages. English is mentioned with respect to the uniqueness condition of the
predicates.
We also find capacity qualifiers in English[...] [h]owever, the fact that
they occur with a marked nominal indicates that they do not have the
same properties as their Dutch counterparts. English lacks the general
use of capacity nouns in bare predicative constructions [...]. [P ]redicative
BN constructions are not impossible in English, but [...] the capacity
needs to have a uniqueness condition attached to it [...]. 61
It is also mentioned that English shows a similar effect with adjectives.
[T ]he semantic contrast between BNs and MNs we found in predicative
constructions in Germanic and Romance can be mirrored in English in
the adjectival versus the nominal predicative constructions [...]. [The ad-
jective] is quite neutral [...]. In addition to this neutral interpretation,
[the determined predicate] allows a reading that calls up (positive or
negative) stereotypes that can be associated with [the noun/predicate].62
The generalization, that is however only suggested, is that the similarity between
bare predicates and adjectives lies in the fact that they both lack the Number layer.
A tentative explanation we would like to propose for the similarity be-
tween bare nominals and adjectives is that adjectives do not present the
layered structure of DPs. In particular, Dutch and English adjectives do
60p. 17
612007, p. 23
62ibid.
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not involve a ’number’ layer, the level at which the standard realization
operator REL applies.63
For Le Bruyn, the behavior of English can be accounted for as a pragmatic/historic
effect, consequence of its not having lost the original function of marking “non-
uniqueness”.
Suppose now that in English the indefinite article got linked to REL in
the same way as in Dutch but that it did not lose its original function of
marking non-uniqueness. [...] Suppose now that speakers have the desire
to mark the distinction between unique and standard capacities and [...]
the definite and the indefinite article compete. The definite article would
then go with unique capacities whereas the indefinite article would go
with standard capacities. [A]ccording to [Zeevat (2005),] a form can only
acquire a new function if the new function is applied more frequently
than the old function. For the indefinite article however it is plausible
to assume that the transition from explicitly marking non-uniqueness in
[...] capacity predication[,] to obligatorily marking all standard capacities
would lead to a widening of its application domain. What the application
domain constraint tells us then is that the only process that might have
taken place to mark the distinction between standard and unique capaci-
ties is the one leading the indefinite article to mark standard capacities.64
In this section we have seen how different lexical approaches to the phenomenon of
bare predicates approach the various components of the analysis. In the next and
final section we will summarize the discussion emerged so far and expand it with
some considerations about the pros and cons of a lexical analysis as opposed to a
non-lexical one to account for bare predicates.
2.12 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we first reviewed the general discussion on bare arguments and
kinds reference, started by Carlson (1977). Then we moved onto the discussion
of two different types of accounts; first the one by Chierchia (1998) in which an
analysis based on a semantics parametrization is presented. Next, we discussed a
632007, p. 24
64p. 162-3
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syntactic account, namely the one presented in Longobardi (2001), according to
which the whole class of the phenomena related to bare nouns can be traced back to
an independently-motivated syntactic phenomenon. These accounts, for clear scope
limitations, are not explicit with respect to bare nominals in predicative position,
and for this reason, we subsequently focused on accounts on bare predication. All
these accounts provide interesting insights that are useful to focus on the various
problematic junctures of the issue of bare predicates. We commented the problematic
aspects of each account at the end of each section, while the useful aspects, as well
as the data put forward by these authors, will be further integrated in our discussion
in the following chapters.
Overall, the crucial passages are three: first of all, what is variation and how to
encode it; secondly, if it exists, what is the relation between bareness in argument
position and in predicate position; and thirdly, must the fact that some nouns tend
to occur as bare predicates more easily be lexically encoded, or can it relatable to
some knowledge of the world?
While we will return to the first two questions in the next chapters, one thing can
be said about the third. The position defended in this thesis is against the lexical
encoding of the nouns that refer to professions, social roles, play/theater parts, game
roles, sometimes nationalities or religions. We defend this view because, first of all
because, once this distinction is made lexical, all the times that the nominals that
do not belong to the lexical class (e.g. of roles, professions, etc.) occur bare, some
type-shifting operation or coercion must be assumed. Secondly, once these nominals
are set in the lexicon as a subset of whatever type element (say, e) two new problems
arise. The first is that subset-specific operations will apply to one or the other “twin”
sets, unless further stipulations are made. In other words, in order to prevent the
system from over-generating, there are truly theoretical and ontological questions
to be answered, for instance “How is the domain and range of coercion defined” and
“To which part of our cognition does this mechanism belong, or does it belong to the
model of language, only supposed to work computationally?” If that is the case, then
many technical aspects becomes crucial. The second problem concerns the rationale
behind a (new) lexical class; in other words, why should these nouns be different
from the others. The most common idea is to say that professions and similia are
different from other nouns exactly in that they denote role-like properties. But this
leaves out all cases of relational nouns (briefly introduced in the summary of Section
[2.9], but present in some languages under scrutiny). Finally, it is hard to see how
these nouns should be different, formally. The problem with trying to identify a
“natural class” is that it should be possible to set apart the elements of that natural
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class in several different ways, and not merely by the fact they mean something
similar. In other words, there do not seem to be enough syntactic differences to
call for any lexical distinction/natural class. In fact, we can prove that true natural
classes behave, even under some coercive “stress”, very differently from “role nouns”.
Let us have a quick look at “grooming verbs”.
Lexicon and natural classes Grooming verbs are notably recognized to form
a natural class, in many languages. The peculiarity of these verbs is that they are
said to be inherently reflexive. This inherent property - the property that, in the
end, motivates their setting apart as as natural class - shows in the fact that, in
some languages they have the option not to require overt syntactic reflexivization.
In other languages, they do not allow certain types of reflexive marking.
(2.82) (a) John washes / dresses / shaves himself
(b) John washes / dresses / shaves
Notice that in both cases, the sentences in (2.82 a) have the same meaning of the
sentences in (2.82 b). However, the same does not happen with any transitive verb,
and the sentences in (2.83 a) cannot be reduced to (2.83 b).
(2.83) (a) John kisses / touches himself
(b) *John kisses / touches
In Italian, for instance, grooming verbs are impossible to reflexivize by auto-prefixation:65
(2.84) (a) Gianni
Gianni
si
SE
autoaccusa
autoaccuses
/
/
autoincorona
autocrowns
"Gianni accuses / crowns himself"
(b) *Gianni
Gianni
si
SE
autolava
autowashes
/
/
autopettina
autobrushes
"[intended] Gianni washes / brushes himself"
Setting aside the reasons underlying these different behaviors, and focusing on what
is at stake for us, there is an issue of productivity: no “normal” transitive verb can be
“turned” into a grooming verb by employing it as a grooming verb. Quite unlike this
clear-cut situation, any noun that is “forced” to occurs as a bare predicate assumes
65See Castella (2010) for a discussion on Italian reflexive marking and its restrictions.
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a meaning that is role-like, profession-like, simply temporally defined, etc. In sum,
such a word assumes a non-kind meaning.
To sum up, given that there is no straightforward way of unifying the category of
nouns that “can easily be bare predicates”, and there is no strict syntactic distinction,
unlike what can be observed for other natural classes, an account that is based on
a lexical distinction seems rather unattractive.

CHAPTER 3
Predication and meaning patterns
3.1 Introduction
The most important observation that emerged from the discussion of the literature
is that, before addressing the question of the syntax and the semantics of bare
predicates, it is necessary to fully understand what the meaning variation between
the determined and the bare predicate is. The most direct way of doing it is by
starting from the discussion of some English examples. We mentioned several times
that English bare predicates are only allowed if they denote one, contextually-unique,
referent (see Stowell 1989, 1991). This can be shown by the example below.
(3.1) He is (the/a) team captain, and she is *(a) team member
Once we choose a noun that respects this uniqueness condition, we can notice an
interesting meaning alternation between the bare and the determined predicate.
Consider the following pair.
(3.2) (a) He has been president without (ever) having been a president
(b) He has been a president without (ever) having been president
As many authors pointed out (see Section [2.11] and [2.11.2]), we can informally say
that what (3.2 a) means is that the person referred to by the pronoun he was officially
elected as president, but did not have the qualities that are normally expected from
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someone occupying that role. Conversely, (3.2 b) means exactly the opposite. The
interesting aspect of this pre-formal intuition is that it corresponds precisely to
an existing philosophical dichotomic distinction, introduced by Lewis (1983, 2001),
between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. A working criterion to distinguish an
intrinsic property from an extrinsic property is spelled out in (3.3).
(3.3) A property P is intrinsic iff the instantiation of P by an individual x is
independent of the features of the environment of x;
otherwise P is extrinsic.
So, in these terms, we can understand being president as a property that depends
on the environment of the subject, for instance because there has been an election
and a contract has been signed. In other words, it is a property that is recognized
by subject-external agents. On the other hand, being a president, when interpreted
as a moral/characteristic/qualitative property, is a property that the subject holds
independently of the surrounding environment. Being a president, in this sense, is an
intrinsic property because no contract, nor official external recognition is necessary.
The speakers seem to be able to understand and express this distinction, and the
European languages that we will discuss have it lexicalized with the bare/determined
predication. Nonetheless, other languages might encode it with different structures,
if at all. For instance, case languages like Czech and Russian reflect it with different
case assignment, Koine Greek supposedly with the distinction between nouns and
adjectives.
Note that there is an important difference between what language can express in a
lexicalized way, and what we can suppose belongs to the world’s ontological reality.
In other words, it should not surprise the reader that a president reflects an intrinsic
property even though, in order to be able to conceptualize the concept “president”
there have to exist certain institutions, hence some subject-external entities. Also,
a fact that will emerge more and more clearly is that our world’s (naïve) ontology
influences which concepts surface as default-extrinsic and default-intrinsic. For this
reason, the languages that we analyzed in this study, and most importantly their
speakers, show a preference in expressing “truly” intrinsic properties (e.g. “man”,
“woman”, and so on) as determined predicates and “truly” extrinsic properties (e.g.
roles and professions) as bare predicates. We will discuss this at a later stage. In what
follows, we will see how the “president pattern” extends to other languages as well.
We will see, furthermore, how the meaning alternation that emerges from the “pres-
ident pattern” extends, in languages other than English, to all human predicates.
Then, we will discuss the “metaphorical” readings of the determined predicates.
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3.2 Other languages
Other (European) languages display the same meaning contrasts between bare and
determined predicate observed in (3.2 a-3.2 b), given the same type of construction.
(3.4) (a) E’
he is
stato
been
un
a
presidente
president
senza
without
mai
never
essere
to be
presidente
president
(ita)
"He has been a president without being president"
(b) E’
he is
stato
been
presidente
president
senza
without
mai
never
essere
to be
un
a
presidente
president
"He has been president without being a president"
(3.5) (a) Hij
he
is
is
een
a
koning
king
geweest
been
zonder
without
koning
king
te
to
zijn
be
(nld)
"He has been a king without being king"
(b) Hij
he
is
is
koning
king
geweest
been
zonder
without
een
a
koning
king
te
to
zijn
be
"He has been king without being a king"
(3.6) (a) Er
he
war
was
ein
a
Präsident
president
ohne
without
Präsident
president
zu
to
sein
be
(deu)
"He has been a president without being president"
(b) Er
he
war
was
Präsident
president
ohne
without
ein
a
Präsident
president
zu
to
sein
be
"He has been president without being a president"
(3.7) (a) Ha
he has
sido
been
un
a
presidente
president
sin
without
llegar
reaching
nunca
ever
a
to
ser
be
presidente
president
(spa)
"He has been a president without being president"
(b) Ha
he has
sido
been
presidente
president
sin
without
llegar
reaching
nunca
ever
a
to
ser
be
un
a
presidente
president
"He has been president without being a president"
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(3.8) (a) Han
he
har
has
vært
been
en
a
president
president
uten
without
å
to
være
be
president
president
(nor)
"He has been a president without being president"
(b) Han
he
har
has
vært
been
president
president
uten
without
å
to
være
be
en
a
president
president
"He has been president without being a president"
Once we assume the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, the con-
trast between (a) and (b) sentences is clearly captured. Of course, there is more to
the meaning of these sentences, and most importantly, to their pragmatics. In other
words, their use could be further clarified by saying that there are certain aspects
that are associated with being a president, such as moral height, courage, honesty,
knowledge, etc. We will not focus on this particular aspect of the characterization,
because the idiosyncratic behavior and vagueness of any characterization of this type
do not add insightful content to the contrast we are interested in. Our understanding
of the contrast, expressed by all of the examples above, is that predicating a presi-
dent of someone equals predicating “presidenthood” as an intrinsic property, which
makes the subject a specific spatio-temporal individual instance of a kind. On the
other hand, predicating president of someone equals predicating “presidenthood” as
an extrinsic property, and bare predicate president simply denotes a set. For now,
we will understand the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic as bearing on the
role of the environment of the subject of the predication. In other words, a property
is intrinsic when a subject instantiates it independently of the environment.
3.3 Other predicates
Earlier we mentioned that languages other than English show the same meaning al-
ternation emerging from the “president pattern” to all predicates ascribing properties
to humans. The Italian example below shows the same meaning contrast discussed
in the previous section. The difference holding between a sentence like (3.9 a) and
a sentence like (3.9 b) is that (3.9 a) contains a predicate that is interpreted as an
extrinsic property and (3.9 b) contains a predicate that is interpreted as an intrinsic
property.
(3.9) (a) Niccolò
Niccolò
è
is
(stato)
(been)
avvocato
lawyer
(ita)
"Niccolò is a lawyer / has been a lawyer"
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(b) Niccolò
Niccolò
è
is
(stato)
(been)
un
a
avvocato
lawyer
"Niccolò is a lawyer / has been a lawyer"
An interesting informal test to highlight the contrast is provided by the following
context.
(3.10) (a) What did you expect? Niccolò è avvocato!
(b) What did you expect? Niccolò è un avvocato!
The right context for (3.10 a) is discussing something that Niccolò did, while doing
his job. The sentence equals saying “Of course he did thing x, it’s (a part of) his
job!”.1 On the other hand, the right context for (3.10 b) is one where the person did
something that is not necessarily “prescribed” by his profession or role, but rather
something that one could have expected because of the way he is. The sentence
equals saying “Of course he did thing x, it’s in his nature!”, or “he’s that kind of
person”.
The contrast is replicated also in Dutch, German, Spanish and Norwegian. All of
these languages allow human predicates to alternate between the same two meanings.
3.3.1 Bare Predication
(3.11) (a) Nick
Nick
is
is
advocaat
lawyer
(geweest)
(been)
(nld)
"Nick is a lawyer / has been a lawyer"
(b) Nikolas
Nikolas
ist
is
Anwalt
lawyer
(gewesen)
(been)
(deu)
"Nikolas is a lawyer / has been a lawyer"
(3.12) (a) Nicolás
Nicolás
es
is
abogado
lawyer
/
/
ha
has
sido
been
abogado
lawyer
(spa)
"Nicolás is a lawyer / has been a lawyer"
(b) Nikolai
Nikolai
er
is
/
/
var
was
advokat
lawyer
(nor)
"Nikolai is / was a lawyer"
1It is easier to create realistic minimal pairs of predicates which have a socio-cultural stereotypes
associated to them (e.g. politicians, salesmen, etc).
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3.3.2 Determined Predication
(3.13) (a) Nick
Nick
is
is
een
a
advocaat
lawyer
(geweest)
(been)
(nld)
"Nick is a lawyer / has been a lawyer"
(b) Nikolas
Nikolas
ist
is
ein
ein
Anwalt
lawyer
(gewesen)
(been)
(deu)
"Nikolas is a lawyer / has been a lawyer"
(3.14) (a) Nicolás
Nicolás
es
is
un
a
abogado
lawyer
/
/
ha
has
sido
been
un
a
abogado
lawyer
(spa)
"Nicolás is a lawyer / has been a lawyer"
(b) Nikolai
Nikolai
er
is
/
/
var
was
en
a
advokat
lawyer
(nor)
"Nikolai is / was a lawyer"
3.4 Extended and metaphorical readings
Another context in which we can identify a meaning contrast between a bare and a
determined predicate is one in which the determined predicate appears to allow for
an extended or metaphorical reading. Consider the following scenario.
3.4.1 The “dentist” scenario
Apparently, in each minimal pair, the bare predicates contained in the (a) sentences
are interpreted “literally” and the determined predicates contained in the (b) sen-
tences can be interpreted “metaphorically”.
(3.15) (a) Il
the
mio
my
dentista
dentist
è
is
artista
artist
(ita)
"My dentist is (literally) an artist"
(b) Il
the
mio
my
dentista
dentist
è
is
un
an
artista
artist
"My dentist is an artist (of dentistry)"
(3.16) (a) Mijn
my
tandarts
dentist
is
is
kunstenaar
artist
(nld)
"My dentist is an artist"
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(b) Mijn
my
tandarts
dentist
is
is
een
an
kunstenaar
artist
"My dentist is an artist"
(3.17) (a) Mein
my
Zahnarzt
dentist
ist
is
Künstler
artist
(deu)
"My dentist is an artist"
(b) Mein
my
Zahnarzt
dentist
ist
is
ein
an
Künstler
artist
"My dentist is an artist"
(3.18) (a) Mi
my
dentista
dentist
es
is
artista
artist
(spa)
"My dentist is an artist"
(b) Mi
my
dentista
dentist
es
is
un
an
artista
artist
"My dentist is an artist"
(3.19) (a) Min
my
tannelege
dentist
er
is
kunstner
artist
(nor)
"My dentist is an artist"
(b) Min
my
tannelege
dentist
er
is
en
an
kunstner
artist
"My dentist is an artist"
There are several problems to be considered. First of all, when uttered with un-
marked prosody, (b) sentences can give rise to different readings.
1. The equative reading, which corresponds to the interpretation “there is an
artist such that my dentist is that artist”.
2. The predicational reading. The sentence states that, in addition to being a
dentist, the dentist can be e.g. a painter, a photographer, etc.
3. The “metaphorical” reading. The sentence states that the dentist is a dentistry
artist.
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The equative interpretation described in (1), semantically, involves the equation of
two entities of the same type, and syntactically, it involves a referential argument as
the argument of the identificational be (see Section [2.7]). A parallel phenomenon is
reported by Stowell (1991), where it is pointed out that numerals and non-specific
quantifiers are allowed only in equative/identificational sentences.
(3.20) ?John and Bill are two doctors (who live next door to me)
So in (3.20), the expression two doctors is acceptable when referential (i.e. when it
introduces the subject) but it cannot be interpreted as a predicate. For this reason,
equative readings do not concern us, and will be briefly discussed in Section [5.4].
The readings in (2) and (3), on the other hand, are always treated as two different
readings, but in fact the predicational reading and the metaphorical reading emerge
only given certain contextual characteristics, and are simply two possible interpre-
tations of an intrinsic property. In what follows we will consider some data that will
help clarify this point.
3.4.2 Metaphorical interpretations
Recall that in the account proposed by De Swart et al. (2007), it is stated that, in
(3.21), the predicate a manager can be interpreted either literally or metaphorically.
According to that account, every “metaphorical” reading of a predicate is derived by
an operation of “kind coercion” that shifts an element from capacities to kinds. It is
because of this coercion that the resulting predicates acquire that slightly marked
flavor.
(3.21) Lui
he
è
is
un
a
manager
manager
(ita)
"He is a manager"
Le Bruyn (2010) introduced the opposite coercion operation, the “cap coercion”,
shifting elements from kinds to capacities, and that accounts for cases like (3.22):
(3.22) Lei
she
è
is
volpe
fox
"She is a fox"
When a noun like fox refers to a kind/animal, it does not occur bare. However, if
it occurs bare is interpreted as a role; one way in which (3.22) can be interpreted is
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within the scenario of a school recital, where the kids are dressed like some animals.
One unattractive detail of this account, however, is the following: let us consider
once again (3.21). In order to obtain the “metaphorical” reading of manager, we
need to “feed” the kind-coercion mechanism with some lexical item originally stored
as a capacity.2 However, every noun can be interpreted “metaphorically”, and it does
not seem to be an effect that is specific to capacity nominals.
(3.23) (a) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
un
a
armadio
cupboard
"Gianni is a cupboard = a strapping fellow"
(b) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
un
a
maiale
pig
"Gianni is a pig = a disgusting person "
Natural languages seem to allow metaphorical readings in a very prompt and pro-
ductive way, although the meaning of such expressions is entirely dependent on
social/cultural factors that are not relevant for us.3
2This requirement is not made explicit, but I assume it must exist, otherwise there is no possible
way in which the “kind-coercion” (and the “cap-coercion”) would know what nouns it can coerce.
3It could be claimed that, in Italian, as well as in English and many other languages, the word
maiale ’pig’ has a lexicalized meaning (see http://www.locuta.com/anim_meta.html)). This is rea-
sonably true but it certainly does not affect the argument. If, on the one hand, some lexicalizations
are indubitable, on the other hand any noun can be interpreted with the same margin of doubt
of any profession, with absolutely predictable effects. For instance, non-complex professions (e.g.
chef) and animals that are well-known for one striking detail (e.g. giraffe) are easier to interpret
“metaphorically”, as shown by the following examples.
(3.24) (a) He is a giraffe / a rabbit
(b) #He is a crane / a ferret
(c) He is a chef / a dictator
(d) #He is an associate professor / a paralegal
Also, the properties can be further negotiated, just as it can happen with a profession/role noun
or an animal, as shown by the following examples (I’m adopting Laurence Horn’s practice, so the
examples marked with a ’’ are actual Google examples).
(3.25) - What do you mean he’s a dictator? Is it because of his strong leadership and stern
manners?
- Also / No, because he doesn’t like when people disagree with him.
(3.26) - What do you mean he’s a beaver? Is it because of  his buck-toothed smile?
- Also /No, because  of his hardworking, tenacious attitude.
(3.27) - What do you mean she’s a Paris Hilton? Is it because she’s so rich and spoiled?
- Also / No, because she is a fashion-victim socialite.
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The controversial juncture is the following: if, on the one hand, De Swart et al.
provide a mechanism to derive “metaphorical” readings from a certain type of nomi-
nals, on the other hand, the similarities between interpretation of “dictator” and the
metaphorical interpretation of “cupboard” or “pig” is lost, even though, obviously,
the coercion mechanism they designed was not intended or expected to account
for the metaphorical interpretation of any nominal. At this point, which position is
preferable depends on a number of other factors, that we will not discuss here, for
scope constraints, but it is still important to mention that there is another class of
examples that is relevant to this discussion, and that we will briefly discuss in what
follows. Consider the pair below.
(3.28) (a) Quella
that
ragazza
girl
è
is
Paris
Paris
Hilton
Hilton
"That girl is Paris Hilton"
(b) Quella
that
ragazza
girl
è
is
una
a
Paris
Paris
Hilton
Hilton
"That girl is a Paris Hilton"
(3.28 a) is true when uttered when pointing, for instance, at a picture representing
Paris Hilton. Conversely (3.28 b), in the same context, results somehow odd, but it
is perfectly acceptable if uttered when pointing at some young woman with certain
characteristics. The determined predicate una Paris Hilton in (3.28 b) seems to be
interpreted exactly with the same mechanism that allows the interpretation of all of
the above determined predicates. It could be claimed that the interpretation of the
proper name in a “metaphorical” way depends on some other property relatable to
proper names. Luca Ducceschi (p.c.) pointed out that, in some cases, a proper name
seems to be interpretable in a metaphorical way, even without the occurrence of the
determiner. This is illustrated in (3.29).
(3.29) [John is playing the guitar].
Yes, he’s Jimi Hendrix!
There are two things that it is important to point out. First of all, (3.29) is an
identificational sentence and Jimi Hendrix is a referential argument of the equative
be. Secondly, there is a contrast in terms of truth values, because (3.29) is a false
proposition. In other words, in this case, the “metaphorical” interpretation of the
proper name might be a pragmatic effect, and the “metaphorical” effect can be
explained by resorting to e.g. Grice’s Maxim of Quality.4 The same cannot be said
for (3.28 b) or (3.31).
4This effect is even more clear in cases like (3.30):
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(3.31) He is a Jimi Hendrix
The fact that the interpretation of (3.31) cannot be derived in the same ways in
which we derive (3.29) can be shown by observing that (3.29) can be ambiguous
because it is compatible with the scenario in which John is a really good musician,
as well as one in which John is a very bad musician. On the other hand, (3.31) is
only compatible with a scenario in which John is “Jimi Hendrix-like” (unless again,
the sentence is uttered with an ironic prosody).
Summing up, all predicates, independently on whether they are human, non-human,
or inanimate are in principle interpretable in a “metaphorical” way. The fact that the
“metaphoric” predicates pattern together in many respects can be seen as the hall-
mark of their having something in common, and the fact that other “metaphorical”
readings can arise in other cases, can be explainable resorting to other mechanisms.
The stand taken in this thesis is that understanding the “metaphorical” reading as
derivable - given certain contextual settings - by the interpretation of the predicate
as an intrinsic property is ultimately more convenient.
(3.30) Marko is the master of the Universe

CHAPTER 4
Restrictions and the shape of the world
In this chapter we will be concerned mainly with the interaction between the al-
ternation of bare and determined predicates and the most typical realization of
properties as intrinsic or extrinsic depending what the languages we are concerned
with seem to reflect of the world’s ontology. So, we will begin the discussion seeing
how the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction predicts which predicates surface (mainly)
bare or determined. Then, we will discuss why this pattern is more common with
human predicates, and the issue of the existence of non-human extrinsic proper-
ties, encoded in language. In doing that, we will expand the discussion on the types
of predicates that, from a cross-linguistic perspective, can or cannot productively
lexicalise the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction and discuss the behavior of relational
nouns. Finally we will conclude with some observation on the relation between hu-
man bare/determined predicates and the mass/count distinction.
4.1 Introduction
Let us now move onto a more in-depth discussion of the extrinsic/intrinsic distinc-
tion. We already said that some properties of any individual depend purely on the
beholder, and other properties depend on the environment surrounding that indi-
vidual. Lewis (1983) expressed the distinction in the following way.
A sentence or statement or proposition that ascribes intrinsic prop-
erties to something is entirely about that thing; whereas an ascription of
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extrinsic properties to something is not entirely about that thing, though
it may well be about some larger whole which includes that thing as part.
A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself,
and nothing else, is. Not so for extrinsic properties, though a thing may
well have these in virtue of the way some larger whole is. [...]
If something has an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect duplicate
of that thing; whereas duplicates situated in different surroundings will
differ in their extrinsic properties.1
Even if, philosophically, this is not an uncontroversial claim, we can see how, even
at a basic level, intuitions of this type can help the understanding of the common
occurrences of certain predicates as bare or determined. For instance, there is a clear
contrast between relations and natural objects. Being a natural object or, arguably,
a mathematical object (e.g. a shape) is an intrinsic property. Conversely, relations
are properties that necessarily involve some other object (i.e. the other argument of
the relation). So, from a philosophical standpoint, relations trivially correspond to
extrinsic properties.2 If we wonder why nouns like uomo ’man’ donna ’woman’ bam-
bino ’child’ etc. show (also cross-linguistically) some stability in occurring mainly
as determined predicates, we should not be surprised, since these nouns are most
frequently used to realize “man”, “woman”, “child” as intrinsic properties (of indi-
viduals). In other words, we express that the way in which a “circle”, a “man” or a
“woman” etc. is is independent of anything else in the environment in which they
are placed, but dependent only on their internal structure. In any case, the nature
of the internal structure of these objects determines the way in which the corre-
sponding nouns surface, but only in terms of frequency, not in terms of possibilities.
There is no complementary distribution between bare predicates and the nouns that
occur most frequently in a determined predicate, because there is a division of la-
bor between bare and determined predicates (as structures), which trivially follows
from the fact that they have different meanings. In section [4.2], we will see the
corresponding cross-linguistic data involving these types of nouns.
We said that the nouns that usually refer to natural or mathematical objects get
more typically realized as intrinsic properties, surfacing as determined predicates.
An example is, for instance, the concept of shape. We said that, linguistically, these
concepts are typically realized as intrinsic properties, and this seems to capture the
contrast shown in the examples below.
1Lewis (1983) “Extrinsic Properties”, Philosophical Studies, 44. 197-200. p. 111-2
2There are certain controversies, both in the case of natural object being intrinsic and relations
being necessarily extrinsic. We will discuss them briefly later.
Restrictions and the shape of the world 99
(4.1) (a) ??Questo
this
è
is
cerchio
circle
"This is circle"
(b) Questo
this
è
is
un
a
cerchio
circle
"This is a circle"
A claim that there can be an extrinsic concept of shape which is linguistically en-
coded would be hard to defend. On an intuitive level, shape is one unproblematic
intrinsic property that objects have. Philosophically, however, whether shapes are
intrinsic or extrinsic properties is debatable. When discussing the world’s ontology,
it is reasonable to wonder if the shape of a body depends entirely on the body itself
or not. We are aware that there are object-external factors influencing the shape
of an object, for isntance the curvature of the space. From a linguistic perspective,
however, these types of observations seem completely irrelevant, and these factors
seem to not be encoded in language.
Let us now discuss the nouns that, philosophically, are more typically seen as encod-
ing extrinsic properties. These nouns are, for instance, the nouns encoding relations.
If our generalization is on the right track, relational nouns should occur - in some
language - as bare predicates. These nouns are also expected to alternate between
the bare and the determined form, if they occur without the second argument. The
reason why this variation is expected to exist is that, when one of the arguments
of the relational noun (the one occurring in the the of -phrase) can be omitted, we
expect - by assumption - the noun to shift its meaning from explicitly extrinsic, to
a condition where both the extrinsic and the intrinsic readings are possible. When
this happens, then the regular variation should occur.3
3Note that not necessarily for every language the intrinsic/extrinsic realization of the property
must be lexicalized with the presence of the determiner, or its absence. In English, for instance,
relational nouns (with both arguments realized) cannot occur bare, even if the denote contextually
unique positions.
(4.2) *John is father of Mary
This could also depend on the fact that some languages have alternative constructions to express
such relations, for instance the Saxon genitive, shown in (4.3).
(4.3) John is Mary’s father
The absence, in various degrees, of bare relational nouns is not surprising in languages that can
resort to the Saxon genitive (typically, the Germanic languages), but would be surprising in lan-
guages that do not have the Saxon genitive option (typically, the Romance languages). We are not
going to discuss the intrinsic/extrinsic alternation including these type of constructions, because
this topic is tangent to the one of this thesis. However, it is definitely intersting to see if the insights
that we discuss can be used to capture some contrasts involving also possessive constructions and
Saxon genitive.
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From a philosophical perspective, even in (4.4), what is expressed by the predicate
father is an extrinsic property, since the possibility of ascribing it to some man
depends on the existence of at least one child of the man it is predicated of.
(4.4) John is a father
From a linguistic perspective, however, “fatherhood” is neither intrinsic nor extrinsic,
until it is realized because, potentially, the concept can be realized as an intrinsic
or an extrinsic property. Consider the following pair, in Italian.
(4.5) (a) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
padre
father
"Gianni is (extrinsically) a father"
(b) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
un
a
padre
father
"Gianni is (intrinsically) a father"
For (4.5 a) to be true, Gianni simply has to have at least one child. Indeed, (4.5 a)
is true even in a scenario where Gianni does not know that he has children, because
(4.5 a) refers to a situation in which the environment around Gianni has changed, and
that affects him but only in terms of his extrinsic properties. So, an environmental
change does not necessarily modify Gianni’s internal structure (e.g. his morals, or his
psychological attitude). On the other hand, (4.5 b) is true when Gianni is intrinsically
father-like. Crucially, we can say that Gianni is a father even without having children.
In other words, here the distinction between (4.5 a) and (4.5 b) can be understood
also in terms of entailment. While (4.5 a) entails that Gianni has at least one child,
(4.5 b) does not.
Interestingly the same pattern can be found also with nominals that are not in the
class of the kinship nouns. In (4.6 a-4.6 b) is presented another instance in which we
can identify the extrinsic/intrinsic contrast, expressed with the bare or determined
predicate.
(4.6) (a) Lei
she
è
is
vedova
widow
"She is (extrinsically) a widow"
(b) Lei
she
è
is
una
a
vedova
widow
"She is (intrinsically) a widow"
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The simple fact that a woman’s husband dies extrinsically makes her a widow.
However, if she starts wearing the prescribed colors and behaving in some widow-
like way, then it is possible to understand those as signs that she underwent some
internal/psychological change, and became “a widow”.
Summing up, the fact that the properties in (4.5 a) and (4.6 a) are extrinsic can
be understood as being informative about the world around the subject. The fact
that the properties in (4.5 b) and (4.6 b) are intrinsic can be understood as being
informative about the subject.4
The difference between (4.7 a) and (4.7 b) is that (4.7 a) expresses what is called
“mere Cambridge change” (see. Geach, 1969), and (4.7 b) expresses what is called
“intrinsic change”.
(4.7) (a) Diventare
to become
padre
father
(di
(of
Gianni)
Gianni)
/
/
vedova
widow
(di
(of
Gianni)
Gianni)
/
/
amico
friend
di
of
Gianni
Gianni
(b) Diventare
to become
un
a
padre
father
/
/
una
a
vedova
widow
/
/
un
a
amico
friend
In Section [4.3] we will present the cross-linguistic dataset on relational nouns, as
well as a more detailed discussion of the readings.
4.2 “Man”, “woman”, etc.
Earlier, we mentioned that nouns like uomo ’man’ donna ’woman’ etc. show some
stability in occurring mainly as determined predicates. We also said that, when
4Gateano Fiorin (p.c.) pointed out that another relevant distinction is the one between Primary
and Secondary properites. This is a distinction discussed by Galileo, Descartes, Locke among many
others. This observation deserves more space to be discussed in detail, however we can highlight
some aspects.
The distinction between primary and secondary property is a distinction conceptualized in terms
of the presence of an experiencer / observer in the broad sense. A secondary property is a property
that depends, conceptually, on an experience of some kind (e.g. to be visible, to be disgusting,
etc.). A primary property does not depend on any experience. In this sense, the distinction does
not seem applicable in this context, because even if the experiece-related property seems to share
some aspects of an extrinsic property, it is immediately clear that it is not enough to generalize over
the phenomenon we have been observing. Consider being (extrinsically) a father, and the following
scenario: Gianni has a son, and suppose that Gianni is not aware of that. Suppose furthermore that
the son has never met Gianni. This is the case in which the bare predicate would be preferred over
the determined predicate. However, the experience of Gianni’s son or anyone else seems completely
irrelevant to grasp the meaning of the predicate.
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occurring as determined predicates, they express that the property they encode
is independent of the environment. For this reason, if these nouns occur as bare
predicates, they are odd or harder to interpret.
(4.8) (a) ??Lui
he
è
is
uomo
man
/
/
bambino
boy
(ita)
"He is a man / a boy"
(b) ??Lei
she
è
is
donna
woman
/
/
bambina
girl
"She is a woman / girl"
(4.9) (a) ??Hij
he
is
is
man
man
/
/
jongen
boy
(nld)
"He is a man / a boy"
(b) ??Zij
she
is
is
vrouw
woman
/
/
meisje
girl
"She is a woman / girl"
(4.10) (a) ??Er
he
ist
is
Mann
man
/
/
Junge
boy
(deu)
"He is a man / a boy"
(b) ??Sie
she
ist
is
Frau
woman
/
/
Mädchen
girl
"She is a woman / girl"
(4.11) (a) ??El
he
es
is
hombre
man
/
/
niño
boy
(spa)
"He is a man / a boy"
(b) ??Ella
she
es
is
mujer
woman
/
/
niña
girl
"She is a woman / girl"
(4.12) (a) ??Han
he
er
is
mann
man
/
/
gutt
boy
(nor)
"He is a man / a boy"
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(b) ??Hun
she
er
is
kvinne
woman
/
/
jente
girl
"She is a woman / girl"
It is crucial that all the sentences above are not ungrammatical. The problem, clearly
is that most speakers tend to reject them because, pragmatically, the speakers will
assume that such sentences should mean that of the subject it is predicated some
type of human subkind. The (sub)-kind meaning however corresponds to the intrinsic
meaning, that is associated with the determined predicate, and not to the bare
predicate. Note how the bare predicates are perfectly acceptable when the right
meaning is associated with them. Compare (4.13 a) to (4.13 b).
(4.13) (a) Gianni,
Gianni,
dopo
after
aver
haveinf
cambiato
changed
sesso,
sex,
è
he is
diventato
become
donna.
woman
(ita)
"Gianni, after having changed sex, he has become a woman"
(b) Gianni,
Gianni,
(...),
(...),
è
he is
diventato
become
una
a
donna.
woman
"Gianni, (...), he has become a woman"
So, (4.13 a) means that Gianni underwent a sex changing operation, and interest-
ingly, (4.13 b) means something different. The second sentence means that, after
the sex-changing operation, Gianni intrinsically changed, and became a woman. So,
the sentence containing the determined predicate conveys the meaning of a deeper,
intrinsic, change in Gianni, which is not necessarily related to the operation per
se, whereas the sentence with the bare predicate simply states that a change has
affected Gianni.
Consider another case.
(4.14) Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
estratto
extracted
il
the
rosso
red,
e
and
quindi
hence
è
he is
donna
woman
"Gianni picked red, hence is a woman"
Similarly, (4.14) is easy to interpret imagining a scenario where there is a game with
two teams (the team of the men, and the team of the women) and some contestants
are sorted out randomly by picking a card of the associated color. If, in the same
context, we replace the bare with the determined predicate, as shown in (4.15), the
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meaning of the sentence would be something else. 4.15 means that, as a consequence
of his picking the red card, Gianni is magically transformed into a woman.5
(4.15) #Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
estratto
extracted
il
the
rosso
red,
e
and
quindi
hence
è
is
una
a
donna
woman
"Gianni picked red, hence is a woman"
Concluding, both types of predicates realize different types of properties. The fre-
quency of the occurrence of certain predicates bare or determined is just informative
about the shape of the world as we perceive it. Given the right context, it is easy
to show how the bare predicate is necessary to convey a certain meaning, even if it
rarely occurs in that way.
4.2.1 Coerced Adjectives
There are occurrences of nouns like uomo or donna in predicative position and
without a determiner that could be used against our analysis, because they do not
seem to be interpreted as extrinsic properties. Consider the cases below, presented
in Italian and Spanish.
(4.16) (a) Rispetto
in front
ai
at the
suoi
his
compagni,
mates,
che
that
sono
are
più
more
maturi,
mature,
"Compared to his friends, who are more mature,
%è
is
proprio
really
/
/
molto
very
bambino
child
(ita)
he’s very child(ish) "
(b) Respecto
in front
a
at
sus
his
amigos,
friends
que
who
son
are
más
more
maduros,
mature,
"Compared to his friends, who are more mature,
%
is
el
very
es
child
muy niño (spa)
he’s very child(ish)"
These sentences are slightly colloquial and, arguably, dispreferred in formal or writ-
ten registers (hence the grammaticality judgement “%”). The fact that these exam-
ples are sensible to register variation seem to indicate that the bare nouns thereby
5Or alternatively, if the cause-effect relation is inverted, the sentence means that “the cause of
Gianni’s picking red is that Gianni is a woman”.
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contained are somewhat different from the other bare predicates that we have seen
in the previous examples. And indeed, the presence of molto ’very’ indicates that
these nouns have been coerced into scalar predicates (see also Matushansky, 2002).
Furthermore, in these contexts, the nouns become arguably adjectives, since they
cannot be modified by other adjectives, but only by adverbs, as (4.17 a-4.17 b) show.
(4.17) (a) %Lui
he
è
is
molto
much/very
uomo
man
(ita)
"He is very man(ly)"
(b) ??/*Lui
he
è
is
vero
real
uomo
man
It is also impossible to argue that uomo, bambino etc. could be stored twice in the
lexicon because, next to being sensitive to registers, they also fail the coordination
test with other adjectives. Since it is normally harder to coordinate two elements of
different categories, if these predicates existed as separate entries, the coordination
with an unambiguous adjective would be successful, but it is not the case.
(4.18) (a) ...
...
*è
he is
proprio
really
bambino
kid
e
and
simpatico
funny
(ita)
"[intended] ... he’s really childish and funny"
(b) ...
...
*el
he
es
is
muy
very
niño
child
y
and
gracioso
funny
(spa)
"[intended]... he’s very childish and funny"
Finally there is one last piece of evidence that viewing these cases as coerced adjec-
tives comes from Norwegian. Compare the pattern discussed so far to the Norwegian
counterparts in (4.19 a - 4.19 b). Here too, it is crucial to note that the grammati-
cality judgements are of a different nature.
(4.19) (a) %Han
he
er
is
veldig
very
mann
man
"He is very man(ly)"
(b) ??Han
he
er
is
ekte
real
mann
man
Essentially, what we observe is that the unacceptability of (4.19 b) depends on the
fact that ekte (unlike veldig) does not trigger the coercion into an adjective of
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mann.6 Since the noun is not coerced, the predicate is interpretable only as a well-
established property. But the ekte mann, in Norwegian, is not a well-established
property. Note that, evidence of the fact that the predicate would be interpretable
if it was a well-established property comes from the fact that, in Norwegian, there
exists a well-established property involving the noun mann, in (4.21).
(4.21) Han
he
er
is
skikkelig
proper
mann
man
"He is a proper man"
4.3 Relational nouns
In this section we will discuss relational nouns and their behavior in the following
order: first we will look at two languages that show very similar phenomena, i.e.
Italian and Spanish, and understand what this phenomenon is all about; then we
will consider German, where the phenomenon is non-existing as opposed to Dutch,
a language where very strong restrictions apply. After having extensively discussed
Dutch, we will discuss the data from Norwegian. It will become clear that the be-
havior and the asymmetries among nouns and languages do not deviate from the
generalization discussed in the previous section.
4.3.1 Introduction
In this group we can find nouns that refer to work-related relations, as well as other
types of relations. These are, for instance colleague of, roommate, neighbor of, and
all the nouns derived by co-prefixation.7 Consider the contrast in (4.22 a - 4.22 b):.
(4.22) (a) ?Gianni
Gianni
è
is
subaffittuario
subtenant
"[intended] Gianni is a subtenant"
6Øystein Nilsen (p.c.) pointed out that, also in Norwegian, coerced adjectives fail the coordina-
tion test.
(4.20) Når han oppfører seg sånn, er han *(veldig barn og morsom)
when he behaves self such, is he (very child and funny)
7The group of nominals reported here is the same appeared in Zamparelli (2005). It should
be noticed that some of these nouns can appear as bare predicates without the co-prefix. This
is accidental, since co- often applies to professions (e.g. co-autore ’co-author’, co-produttore ’co-
producer’, co-pilota ’co-pilot’, etc.). The argument is based on the presence of many exceptions.
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(b) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
subaffittuario
subtenant
di
of
Marco
Marco
"[intended] Gianni is a subtenant of Marco"
Recall that Zamparelli (2005) is the only study where relational nouns are discussed
together with the rest of the bare predicates. Zamparelli provides a tentative explana-
tion of the behavior of the entire class of bare predicates in terms of an impoverished
set of features. Specifically, the nouns in this class lack a gender feature (because
these nouns refer to properties that can in principle belong to men or women). Since
these nominals need the gender feature, but the articles cannot provide it, they have
to enter an agreement relation with the subjects of the predication. The distinction
between the literal and the metaphorical reading is derived in the lexicon, and the
impossibility of bare predicates in English is connected to the fact that English does
not have grammatical gender.
In agreement with Zamparelli, we consider important treating bare relational nouns
on a par with standard bare predicates. Differently from Zamparelli, we avoid the
concept of lexical class to account for this phenomenon. However, the great simi-
larities, pointed out by Zamparelli, with respect to the behavior and distribution of
all the bare predicates in languages like Italian (be they nouns of professions, kin-
ship nouns or general relational nouns) seems to point at a common interpretative
mechanism. In what follows we will overview data from several different languages,
point out the similarities, and discuss the differences. The general goal is to try to
encompass a larger set of data that shows identical interpretative properties, on the
basis of a common generalization.
4.3.2 Kith
Let us move to this group of nouns referring to relations, keeping in mind what we
said about the expectations that the insight about the intrinsic/extrinsic alternation
suggest with respect to relational nouns. Recall that the difference between the
denotation of a predicate like “lawyer”, that can be modeled as a set of individuals,
and a relational noun is that relational nouns denote a relation holding between a set
of pairs. As a consequence of the existence of some subject-external object to which
the noun refers, these noun surface easily as extrinsic properties. Unless a language
is endowed with a different type of structure dedicated to these types of cases (e.g.
the Saxon genitive), explicit relational nouns are expected to surface bare. This is
the pattern that we can observe in Italian and Spanish, below.
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Italian and Spanish
In Italian and Spanish these nouns behave in an identical way. What we see in the
next two sets is that most relational nous behave like the following examples:8
(4.23) (a) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
amico
friend
di
of
Marco
Marco
(ita)
"Gianni is Marco’s friend"
(b) Juan
Juan
es
is
amigo
friend
de
of
Marcos
Marcos
(spa)
"Juan is Marcos’ friend"
As the reader can notice there is no difference between those relational nouns that
already without the PP refer to professions or positions, and nouns that do not have
that type of meaning.
(4.24) (a) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
vicino
neighbor
/
/
dirimpettaio
next door neighbor
/
/
subaffitturario
subtenant
di
of
Marco
Marco
(ita)
"Gianni is Marco’s neighbor / next-door neighbor / subtenant"
(b) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
collega9
colleague
/
/
coinquilino
roommate
di
of
Marco
Marco
"Gianni is Marco’s colleague / roommate"
(c) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
cointestatario
co-holder
del
of the
conto
account
/
/
coautore
co-author
del
of the
saggio
essay
/
/
coproduttore
co-producer
del
of the
film
movie
con
with
Marco
Marco
"Gianni is the co-holder of the account / co-author of the essay /
co-producer of the movie with Marco"
(4.25) (a) Juan
Juan
es
is
vecino
neighbor
(de
(of
al
the
lado)
side)
/
/
subarrendatario
subtenant
de
of
Marcos
Marcos
(spa)
"Juan is Marcos’ (next-door) neighbor / subtenant"
(b) Juan
Juan
es
is
colega
colleauge
/
/
compañero
mate
de
of
cuarto
room
de
of
Marcos
Marcos
"Gianni is Marcos’ colleague / roommate"
8This list is not comprehensive.
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(c) Juan
Gianni
es
is
cotitular
co-holder
de
of
la
the
cuenta
account
/
/
coautor
co-author
del
of the
libro
essay
/
/
coproductor
co-producer
de
of the
la
movie
pelicula
with
con
Marcos
Marcos
"Gianni is the co-holder of the account / co-author of the essay /
co-producer of the movie with Marcos"
Two facts are important to notice. First of all, there exists an alternation with the
determined form, and that goes along the lines of what we have been discussing so
far. Secondly, the meaning of the predicates is comparable to what we have observed
with professional nouns. As we said, being in some relation with someone can be
defined as an extrinsic property (of an individual), similarly to the way in which we
can understand having a job. The interpretation of any bare relational predicate is
that of an extrinsic property.
We will see that some languages disallow the structure (e.g. German), or allow
it only in some specific case (e.g. Dutch) or more broadly (e.g. Norwegian). Most
importantly, when present, the meaning alternation pattern is consistent with our
predictions.
Dutch and German
Throughout this study, we have noticed that Dutch and German have a very closely-
related behavior. In both languages relational nouns in bare predicative position are
essentially not accepted. In German the ungrammaticality seems a little stronger
than in Dutch. In Dutch the tolerance can vary to some degree among speakers.
The examples in (4.26 b) are ungrammatical and so their German counterparts in
(4.26 a).
(4.26) (a) *Martin
Jan
ist
is
Freund
friend
von
of
Mark
Mark
(deu)
"[intended] Jan is Mark’s friend"
(b) Jan
Jan
is
is
*vriend
friend
/
/
*(over)buurman
(next-door) neighbor
/
/
??huurder
tenant
/
/
??huisgenoot
roommate
van
of
Mark
Mark
(nld)
"[intended] Jan is Mark’s friend / (next-door) neighbor / tenant /
roommate"
9It is also possible to say "Gianni è collega d’ufficio di Marco", Gianni is office colleauge of
Marco.
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Furthermore, it appears that in this predicative structures the grammaticality is
more easily achieved when the predicate belongs to the set of professional nouns;
otherwise they remain very marginal. The same applies below, where co-pilot can
only be read as the actual profession (for instance, not in a scenario of a family
driving the car on holidays).
(4.27) (a) Jan
Jan
is
is
??collega
colleague
/
/
?copiloot
co-pilot
van
of
Mark
Mark
"[intended] Jan is Mark’s colleague / co-pilot"
(b) Jan
Jan
is
is
mede-eigenaar
co-owner
van
of
de
the
rekening
account
/
/
co-auteur
co-author
van
of
dit
this
essay
essay
/
/
co-producent
co-producer
van
of
de
the
film
movie
met
with
Mark
Mark
"Jan is the co-holder of the account / co-author of this essay /
co-producer of the movie with Mark"
From this last set of examples (4.27 b), it seems that co-prefixation does not intro-
duce another argument (realized in the met-PP or mede-PP); on the contrary the
met-PP seems to behave like an adjunct. If the prefix co- is dropped the sentence is
even more acceptable.
(4.28) (a) ??Jan
Jan
is
is
mede-eigenaar
co-owner
van
of
de
the
auto
car
met
with
zijn
his
vrouw
wife
"[intended] Jan is the co-owner of the car with his wife"
(b) ?Jan
Jan
is
is
eigenaar
owner
van
of
de
the
auto
car
met
with
zijn
his
vrouw
wife
"Jan is the owner of the car with his wife"
Enrico Boone (p.c.) pointed out that fronting makes the judgements clearer, per-
haps because the met-PP can only be an adjunct to the VP and not to the DP.
So, it appears that the prefix and the adjunct cover identical roles, their simultane-
ous presence causes a strong marginality to the sentence that, on the other hand,
improves when the prefix is omitted.
(4.29) (a) ??Met
with
zijn
his
vrouw,
wife,
is
is
Jan
Jan
mede-eigenaar
co-owner
van
of
de
the
auto
car
"With his wife, Jan is the co-owner of the car"
(b) ?Met
with
zijn
his
vrouw,
wife,
is
is
Jan
Jan
eigenaar
owner
van
of
de
the
auto
car
"With his wife, Jan is the owner of the car"
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The reading of (4.29 a) implies that there is another owner, next to Jan and his wife
(both of them are co-owners, but that is not exclusive).10 But the overall oddity of
the set of sentences containing co- and mede- and a met-PP is relatable to the lexi-
cal semantics of such prefixes (possibly slightly changing across languages, or even
passible of some intra-linguistic variation). We can roughly say that the semantics
of co- and mede- in Dutch turns a property (such as the “property of owning a cafe”)
into a symmetric relation between the subject of the predication and some other
entity of the same type (there exists at least another owner). The crucial part, for
Dutch, is that a met-PP cannot bind a variable inside the co-relation.
The met-PP and the co- have the same reading, and this is witnessed by the fact
that (4.31 a) is grammatical only under the reading that there is at least one third
author. It is ungrammatical under the reading that they are the only two authors.
(4.31) (a) Jan
Jan
en
en
Mark
Mark
zijn
are
de
the
co-auteurs
co-authors
van
of
dit
this
boek
book
"Jan and Mark are the co-authors of this book"
The need to express explicitly the other argument of the co-relation is fulfilled with
adjuncts (e.g.a met-PP ) but this is a context where Dutch native speakers report
different levels of acceptability. A better case is (4.32 a), where the adjunct also has
an unambiguous adjunct intonation, although still not fully grammatical.
(4.32) (a) ?Jan
Jan
is
is
co-auteur
co-author
van
of
dit
this
boek,
book,
samen
together
met
with
Mark
Mark
"?Jan is the co-author of this book, together with Mark"
Statuses and Relations
One apparently surprising piece of data from Dutch is the following contrast.
(4.33) (a) *Jan is vriend van Marc
(b) ?Jan
Jan
is
is
vriend
friend
van
of
de
the
Franse
French
Koning
King
"Jan is a friend of the French King"
10In these sentences there appears to be an intonational break, probably indicating an adjunct
(or a parenthetical). It is independent of the presence of the co- or mede- prefix, because the same
intonation can be found in sentences like (4.30).
(4.30) Jan is, met Mark, eigenaar van het café
Jan is, with Mark, owner of the cafe
112 4.3. Relational nouns
(c) Jan
Jan
is
is
vriend
friend
van
of
het
the
Concertgebouw
Concert Hall
Recall that explicit relations (relational nouns with the of -phrase, or “pure rela-
tional” in the terminology of Zamparelli) are expected to occur bare, given that the
language allows bare predicates to instantiate extrinsic relations. However, we hinted
that if another structure, for instance the Saxon genitive, is dedicated to these types
of relations, then it blocks the realization of these extrinsic properties/relations with
a bare predicate. Italian and Spanish do not have a competing structure, and we
have seen that their equivalents of (4.33 a) are grammatical. This explanation is not
enough to account for the grammaticality contrast presented in (4.33 a-4.33 b-4.33 c).
One interpretative detail is crucial: in the case of (4.33 c), this “apparent” relation
is interpreted as a social “status” of some sort, and the sentence is understood as
stating that Jan owns some supporter card of the Concertgebouw, and makes dona-
tion to this institution. In this sense, relational nouns of this type do not denote a
relation holding between a set of pairs, instead they can be modeled as a set of indi-
viduals. In other words, Jan is vriend van het Concertgebouw is not interpreted as
hj; CGi 2 kfriendk , but as j 2 kfriend vanhetConcertgebouwk. So, if the nominal
is not interpreted as a relation between individuals, but as a property, and it defines
an extrinsic property, then it shows the usual behavior of extrinsic properties, which
in Dutch are expressed with bare predicates. In the same way we can understand
the grammaticality judgement “?” assigned to (4.33 b). This sentence is acceptable
only under the “status” reading and it is ungrammatical under the interpretation of
friendship with the King. Note, furthermore, that the Saxon genitive can only be
used in (4.34 a), and the interpretation is that Jan is a friend of the King, but it
cannot have the “status” reading. And unsurprisingly, (4.34 b) is ungrammatical.
(4.34) (a) Jan
Jan
is
is
de
the
Franse
French
Koning
King
’s
’s
vriend
friend
"Jan is the French King’s friend"
(b) *Jan
Jan
is
is
het
the
Concertgebouw
Concert Hall
’s
’s
vriend
friend
Norwegian
In Norwegian, bare relational nouns in predicative position are allowed, but There
are more complications related to restrictions that operate on the choice of the
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preposition, as shown by, for instance, (4.35 a) to (4.35 b).11
(4.35) (a) *Han
he
er
is
sjef
boss
til
to
Kari
Kari
(b) Han
he
er
is
sjef
boss
over
over
Kari
Kari
(4.36) (a) ??Jens
Jens
er
is
venn
friend
/
/
nabo
neighbor
/
/
kollega
colleague
av
of
Nikolai
Nikolai
"Jens is Nikolai’s friend / neighbor / colleague"
(b) Jens
Jens
er
is
leieboer
tenant
hos
at place of / by
Nikolai
Nikolai
"Jens is Nikolai’s tenant"
4.3.3 Kins
Let us now move to another family of nouns that has something in common with
relational nouns and, in some respects, it is very different: kinship nouns. These
nouns refer to family relations and show, in some languages, behaviors that are
homogenous among them, and different from other nouns. For instance, in some
southern Italian languages (e.g. Neapolitan), only kinship nouns allow the possessive
pronouns of first and second person singular to appear cliticized on the noun itself,
as shown in (4.37).
(4.37) [0frat] brother (nap)
[0fratm] my brother
Also in this study, kinship nouns behave in a similar and identifiable way. Let us
begin by saying that, in English, even these bare predicates are forbidden.
(4.38) (a) *John is father / dad / son / brother of Mark
(b) *Mary is mother / mom / daughter / sister of Mark
11Note that, in Norwegian too, there exist a structure comparable to Saxon genitive which
seems to be interacting with the possibility of expressing extrinsic relations with bare predicates.
We will not be discussing be discussing the relation between Saxon genitive and the realization
of relational nouns here, but we leave it open further research. Investigating the relation between
these two structure, in the light of the insight presented in this study can lead to interesting results.
114 4.3. Relational nouns
Note that these last two examples show that the particular behavior of English that
allows nouns with an (even contextually) unique referent to appear bare cannot be
described solely in terms of reference to a singleton set. If that was the case, nominals
like “mother of Mark” would be allowed, but as we have seen in example (4.2), it is
not the case. If bare, the form without the genitive argument is ungrammatical.
(4.39) (a) *John is father / dad / son / brother
(b) *Mary is mother / mom / daughter / sister
In Italian, and Spanish, bare predication with kinship noun is essentially possible.
Some cases are slightly marginal, but the overall pattern is consistent. The marginal
cases will be discussed again in paragraph [4.3.3].
(4.40) (a) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
?padre
father
/
/
?papà
dad
/
/
figlio
son
/
/
fratello
brother
di
of
Marco
Marco
"Gianni is Marco’s father / dad / son / brother"
(b) Claudia
Claudia
è
is
?madre
mother
/
/
?mamma
mom
/
/
figlia
daughter
/
/
sorella
sister
di
of
Marco
Marco
"Claudia is Marco’s mother / mom / daughter / sister"
(4.41) (a) Juan
Gianni
es
is
??padre
father
/
/
??papa
dad
/
/
hijo
son
/
/
hermano
brother
de
of
Marcos
Marco
"Gianni is Marco’s father / dad / son / brother"
(b) Claudia
Claudia
es
is
??madre
mother
/
/
??mamá
mom
/
/
hija
daughter
/
/
hermana
sister
de
of
Marcos
Marcos
"Claudia is Marcos’ mother / mom / daughter / sister"
We will discuss the difficultly of dropping of the of -phrase in some cases (e.g.
“son/daughter” and “brother/sister”). Nevertheless, in the right scenarios these cases
can be brought to a level of interpretability that justifies the judgement “?(?)” in-
stead of “*”.
(4.42) (a) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
padre
father
/
/
papà
dad
/
/
??figlio
son
/
/
??fratello
brother
"Gianni is father / dad / son / brother "
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(b) Claudia
Claudia
è
is
madre
mother
/
/
mamma
mom
/
/
??figlia
daughter
/
/
??sorella
sister
"Claudia is mother / mom / daughter / sister"
(4.43) (a) Gianni
Gianni
é
is
padre
father
/
/
papá
dad
/
/
??hijo
son
/
/
??hermano
brother
"Gianni is father / dad / son / brother "
(b) Claudia
Claudia
é
is
madre
mother
/
/
mamá
mom
/
/
??hija
daughter
/
/
??hermana
sister
"Claudia is mother / mom / daughter / sister"
In Dutch, kinship nouns can appear bare. They do so in a way that is very similar
to the behavior we already observed for Italian and Spanish.
(4.44) (a) Jan
Jan
is
is
vader
father
/
/
pa
dad
/
/
zoon
son
/
/
broer
brother
van
of
Jan
Jan
"Jan is Mark’s father / dad / son / brother"
(b) Sophia
Sophia
is
is
moeder
mother
/
/
mama
mom
/
/
dochter
daughter
/
/
zus
sister
van
of
Jan
Jan
"Sophia is Jan’s mother / mom / daughter / sister"
Again, it is harder to omitt the of-phrase with “son/daughter” and “brother/sister”.
In Dutch there seems to be a stronger dispreference for these forms, compared to
other languages.
(4.45) (a) Jan
Jan
is
is
vader
father
/
/
pa
dad
/
/
*zoon
son
/
/
*broer
brother
"Jan is father / dad / son / brother "
(b) Sophia
Sophia
is
is
moeder
mother
/
/
mama
mom
/
/
*dochter
daughter
/
/
*zus
sister
"Sophia is mother / mom / daughter / sister"
German, on the other hand, is stricter on the (im)possibility of allowing bare rela-
tional nous. We can observe that the relational kin nominal, in (4.46), is ungram-
matical, while its variant without the PP in (4.47), is grammatical.
(4.46) *Martin
Martin
ist
is
Vater
father
/
/
Dad
dad
von
of
Susanne
Susanne
"[intended] Martin is Susanne’s father / dad"
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*Susanne
Susanne
ist
is
Mutter
mother
/
/
Mom
mom
von
of
Martin
Martin
"[intended] Susanne is Martin’s mother / mom "
(4.47) Martin
Martin
ist
is
Vater
father
/
/
Vati
dad
"Martin is a father / dad"
Susanne
Susanne
ist
is
Mutter
mother
/
/
Mama
mom
"Susanne is a mother / mom "
Note two interesting facts: first of all, in German these examples work only with
nouns that refer to a hierarchically higher position in the family, with respect to the
person they relate to. In other words, one is a father when he has at least one child.
When the relation is symmetric or from a lower position (“brothers” as opposed to
“sons”, etc) they are either impossible (as it is for German) or they need a lot of
context to be acceptable, and still they sound very marked (as it is for Italian).
This constraint seems to be related to pragmatics. In what follows, we will compare
the behavior of the languages discussed so far to Norwegian, in order to understand
something more about this asymmetry between the behavior of father and mother,
on the one hand, and the other kinship nouns, on the other hand.
Norwegian
In Norwegian, predicates with unique referents can appear with or without the
definite inflection -en. However, between the two forms there is a clear difference.
So, in a scenario where someone is explaining how are all the people in a picture
related to some known individual (we all know Nikolai, but not his family members),
only (4.48 a) is the form that expresses that Kari is Nikolai’s sister, but not (4.48 b).
Of course the same applies to the other kinship nouns.
(4.48) (a) Kari
Kari
er
is
søstra
sisterdef
/
/
søsteren
sisterdef
"Kari is the sister"
(b) #Kari
Kari
er
is
søster
sister
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On the other hand, if we have the property of being a father, as in the “status”
of having at least one child, that property is consistently expressed with the bare
predicate far, in (4.49 a). The same reasoning holds for the statuses of bror ’brother’,
mor ’mother’ and søster ’sister’, as shown by the following examples.
(4.49) (a) Jens
Jens
er
is
far
father
/
/
bror
brother
(nor)
"Jens is a father / brother"
(b) Kari
Kari
er
is
mor
mother
/
/
søster
sister
"Kari is a mother / sister"
In the discussion about the necessity of the definite inflection we will use the two
kinship nouns that (traditionally speaking) comply with the uniqueness condition
on the referent: mor ’mother’ and far ’father’:
(4.50) (a) Jens
Jens
er
is
far(en)
father(def)
til
to
Nikolai
Nikolai
"Jens is Nikolai’s father"
(b) Kari
Kari
er
is
mor(en)
mother(def)
til
to
Nikolai
Nikolai
"Kari is Nikolai’s mother"
The different meaning relate to the topic structure. Assume the following scenario:
if Nikolai is the known person and the intent is to say that Jens is his father, then
the definite form is obligatory. If instead Jens is the topic of our conversation and
the communicative intent is to express one of his properties, then the bare predicate
is necessary.
Quite clearly, the discussion over relational nouns is much more complicated than
we can cover here, but it is interesting to notice that, once again, the pattern that
distinguishes the interpretation of bare predicates contra that of the determined
predicates is coherent and, across the board what we could have expected, given the
insight discussed in the general introduction.
“Brothers”
When we were discussing the other languages in the set (Italian, Spanish, Dutch,
German), we pointed out that omitting the PP argument of relational nouns like
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brother and sister results in (at least) odd sentences. As we said, whereas in the other
languages there seems to be a restriction on symmetric relations, in Norwegian these
cases are totally acceptable. So, this is an example in which the reason underlying
a grammatical behavior depends on the minor lexical details.
4.4 Non-human predicates, symbols and mass
Throughout our discussion we have mentioned many times how bare predicates are
productive if they are used to ascribe (extrinsic) properties to humans. Many pointed
out (i.a. Zamparelli, 2005, De Swart et al., 2007) that some nominals can occur as
bare predicates even if their subject is not human. This is the case of the examples
reported below.
(4.51) (a) Questo
this
fiore
flower
è
is
simbolo
symbol
di
of
libertà
freedom
"This flower is the symbol of freedom"
(b) Tutto
everything
può
can
essere
be
metafora
metaphor
di
of
qualcos’
something
altro
else
"Everything can be a metaphor for something else"
Essentially if the nominal (the symbol-like element) is interpreted abstractly it can
be used bare. The nouns that can appear in symbolic-relations are listed in (4.52).12
(4.52) allegoria ’allegory’, cifra ’figure’, concessione ’grant’, dono ’gift’, emblema
’emblem’, esempio ’example’, espressione ’expression’, evidenza ’evidence’,
figura ’figure’, immagine ’image’, incarnazione ’incarnation’, indice ’index’,
indizio ’indication’, insegna ’sign’, marchio ’mark’, metafora ’metaphor’,
modello ’model’, motivo ’reason’, omaggio ’gift’, prova ’proof, evidence’,
proiezione ’projection’, ragione ’reason’, rappresentazione ’representation’,
segno ’sign’, segnale ’signal’, simbolo ’symbol’, simulacro ’simulacre’, sintomo
’symptom’, spia ’indicator’ (e.g. di malessere ’of a disease’), stendardo ’flag’,
suggello ’seal’, termometro ’thermometer’ (as an indicator, not the object),
testimonianza ’witness’, traccia ’trace’
There is an interpretative similarity between the sentences in (4.51 a-4.51 b) and
(4.53) which involve mass and abstract nouns.
12The list is not exhaustive.
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(4.53) Questa
this
è
is
acqua
water
/
/
felicità
happiness
"This is water / happiness
If the nouns in (4.52) were interpreted abstractly, their occurrence as bare predi-
cates would not be surprising. In other words, if these nouns are abstract, they are
expected to have mass-like semantics and therefore their ability to occur also as bare
predicates is expected.
If the ability of the nouns in (4.52) to occur bare was not dependent on their ab-
stract/mass semantics, then, in a context in which the abstract meaning is (prag-
matically) blocked, they would be interpretable with their literal meaning without
problems. But this is not what happens.
(4.54) (a) Questo
this
comportamento
behavior
è
is
segno
sign
di
of
malessere
malaise
"This behavior is a sign of malaise"
(b) ??Questo
This
graffio
scratch
è
is
segno
sign
del
of the
becco
beack
di
of
qell’
that
uccello
bird
"[intended] This scratch is a sign of that bird’s beack"
The contrast in grammaticality judgements between (4.54 a) and (4.54 b) depends
on the fact that the abstract reading of segno in (4.54 b) is blocked by the context.
The question that arises at this point is “What is the relation between an ab-
stract/mass reading and the (im)possibility of a predicate to ascribe properties to
humans?” In other words, why is it the case that most (if not all) non-human bare
predicates receive a mass or abstract reading? Before addressing this question, let us
take a necessary step back, and focus on the relation between the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction and non human subjects.
4.5 Restricting extrinsic
Many properties can generally be understood as being extrinsic.13 We discussed ex-
amples like the ones in (4.55 a-4.55 b), where extrinsicality depends on the existence
of another individual or object.
13Besides the properties encoded by nouns, which we directly deal with, also many adjectives,
such as “wet” or “multicolor” are extrinsic, and logical properties, such as “knowing that a man was
walking to the station”, and so on, are extrinsic.
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(4.55) (a) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
amico
friend
di
of
Marco
Marco
"Gianni is a friend of Mark’s"
(b) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
proprietario
owner
di
of
casa
house
"Gianni is a house owner"
For most of the languages we have observed, a connection between bare predicates
and a [+human] feature is an incontestable fact. The question is actually two-fold:
on the one hand, why is it the case that extrinsic properties can more easily be
generated if they are [+human], and on the other hand, what does it mean for a
non-human property to be extrinsic? In other words, what is the context in which we
can understand the difference between non-human intrinsic and extrinsic property?
The reason why a non-human extrinsic property is harder to achieve seems to be,
intuitively, that there is less space for variation in what inanimate things can be with
respect to other entities. “Rocks” and “leaves” are intrinsically “rocks” and “leaves”,
and it is also hard to conceptualize a “rock” as an extrinsic property. This is a crucial
passage: the meaning of the extrinsic properties as we understand them as expressed
by bare predicates is not the simply environment-related extrinsicality. Or better,
unlike what we have seen with relational nouns above, if extrinsicality is not inherent
to the property, then language still encodes the fact that extrinsic properties system-
atically supervene on some human volition/agency. Note that, once we understand
this, it is also clear why most bare predicates are “social constructions”, in Searle’s
terms. For example, someone is president if he has been elected and he signed some
official documents. In Italian, someone is dottore if he has gone through a whole
educational and training procedure and he has been hired by a hospital or a clinic,
someone is artista if he is “recognized” as such by critics and the art establishment,
and so on. Usually, we do not see inanimate objects in these terms, because no hu-
man volition or agency is necessary to acknowledge a “rock” as a rock or a “leaf” as
a leaf, so the alternation between intrinsic and extrinsic is simply not expected.14
At this point, it is interesting to see what happens with artifacts and institutions
because, unlike natural or mathematical objects, the fact that some human agency
is involved in the creation of artifacts and institutions is what ultimately causes
them to have a function, and that is somehow parallel to humans having “roles”.
Crucially, when we discuss “the functional aspect/role” of some object or person,
14Denis Delfitto (p.c.) points out that there could be a relation with the qualia structure as
described in Pustejovsky’s (1991) Generative Lexicon. Essentially predicating of an artifact (e.g.
a table) its the extrinsic property (e.g the function that a table has) is not expected because the
function of the artifacts is their intrinsic property.
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what we are really reffering to is the following: a certain object (or person) has an
extrinsic property, and if that extrinsic property (if it is not inherently extrinsic, i.e.
relational) then it is extrinsic by virtue of a set of properties or events opon which it
supervenes, and these necessarily involve human volition/agency. If this is the case,
then we expect that, at least in some language, the intrinsic/extrinsic alternation
should be productively lexicalized.
Indeed, we find as very interesting pattern in Norwegian. In standard situations, it
is not possible to point at a hospital and utter (4.56 a). However, in the context of
a refugee camp, where one tent is used as a hospital, it is possible to utter (4.56 b).
(4.56) (a) *Dette
this
er
is
sykehus
hospital
(b) Dette
this
teltet
tentdef
er
is
sykehus
hospital
"This tent is a hospital"
This pattern is productive and the same can be done with other predicates, e.g. kino
’cinema’ or lab.
(4.57) (a) *Dette
this
er
is
kino
cinema
/
/
lab
lab
(b) Dette
this
rommet
roomdef
er
is
kino
cinema
/
/
lab
lab
"This room is a cinema"
The meaning of this type of bare predicates is parallel to the meaning alternation
between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Observe how, in all the grammatical sen-
tences, the tent and the room are not intrinsically hospitals, cinemas and labs, in
other words they did not come into being as hospitals, cinemas and labs (see. Telic
Role, in Pustejovsky 1991) but they are used as such (Agentive Role, ibidem), so
they are extrinsically hospitals, cinemas and labs.
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4.6 Concluding remarks and open questions
4.6.1 Intrinsic/extrinsic properties
and the mass/count symmetry
Something that emerges from the discussion of the data presented thus far is that the
presence or absence of the article causes +human predicates to alternate between
two types of readings: on the one hand, what is normally referred to as “role” reading
(e.g. the “capacity” reading of De Swart et al., 2007) and which we understand as the
realization of an extrinsic property. On the other hand, a reading that reflects non-
role properties (e.g. the “kind” reading of De Swart et al., 2007), which is said to allow
for various extended interpretations, and which we understand as the realization of
an intrinsic property.
The question that emerges at this point is what the contribution of +human portion
of meaning is, and how it is encoded. To answer this question, two aspects are
relevant. First of all, the Norwegian data shows that some non-human predicates
(meaning e.g. “hospital”, “cinema”, etc.) can have the same meaning variation only
when, at some level, human volition is involved. Secondly, the answer to the question
“If a +human bare predicate is interpreted as a role (e.g. an extrinsic property),
how is a  human bare predicate interpreted?” This is crucial because, in the same
languages that show the phenomenon of bare predicates, the presence or absence
of the article causes  human predicates to alternate between a mass and a count
reading. In other words, there appears to be a symmetric effect affecting nominals in
predicative positions and the article. This is represented in the scheme below, where
the contrasts is presented in Italian, for simplicity.
In the upper part of the table, to the +human subject Gianni are predicated the
+human predicates eroe ’hero’ and dottore ’doctor’. In the bottom part of the table,
to the  human subject questo ’this’ are predicated the  human predicates tavolo
’table’ and vino ’wine’. The rightmost column lists the type of interpretation that
the predicates receive.
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The question to be asked is “What happens if subject and predicate clash in terms
of animacy?”
This is represented in the table below. In the upper part of the table, to the  human
subject questo ’this’ are predicated the +human predicates eroe ’hero’ and dottore
’doctor’. In the bottom part of the table, to the +human subject Gianni are predi-
cated the  human predicates tavolo ’table’ and vino ’wine’. The rightmost column
shows that, when a bare predicate is interpreted as a  human predicate, its inter-
pretation shifts to mass.
Consider the two examples reported below, extracted from the table above.
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(4.58) (a) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
tavolo
table
(b) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
un
a
tavolo
table
Note that, even in (4.58 a), tavolo is interpreted as a humanized predicate in that
“table” has to be interpreted as a role of some sort. In other words if “table” has to
be an extrinsic property of Gianni, the only way in which this predicate becomes
interpretable is if we read it as some role of some sort. So, tavolo is extrinsic (because
Gianni is a person and not a table), but in any given context that allows the sentence
to be interpreted, Gianni is (also) a table, and can be used as one.15 This trivially
contrasts with (4.58 a) which, on the other hand, means exactly that “Gianni is a
table”. If we compare the couple above with two examples where the subject of
the predication (questo16, ’this’) is compatible with a non-human reading, but the
predicate is expected to be interpreted as +human, we find that, symmetrically, the
interpretation of the predicate follows the mass/count pattern that is observed in
the default cases (i.e. there is no clash between human features and of the subject
and of the predicate). The examples are reported below.
(4.60) (a) Questo
this
è
is
dottore
doctor
(b) Questo
this
è
is
un
a
dottore
doctor
15We are not claiming that Gianni è tavolo is an unmarked sentence of Italian. We are only
claiming that it is very clearly interpretable. In real-life circumstances, most speakers would choose
the locution fare il P ’act as the P’ because that is the way to express the intentional embodiment
of an intrinsic property. In other words, Gianni “does/acts as the table” means that he consciously
stages something/someone else.
(4.59) (a) Gianni è tavolo (in that play)
(b) Gianni fa il tavolo (in that play)
There are many differences that it is not important to discuss here (e.g. the expression is tavolo
contains a definite determiner and it is kind referring, it is argumental, etc.) but, regardless, there
is one crucial difference in the truth conditions of (4.59 a) and (4.59 b): in the sentence containing
the bare predicate, the volition of Gianni is not taken into consideration (which follows directly
form the argument structure difference between “to do / to act” and “to be” (cf. Reinhart 2002). So
it would be irrelevant if most speakers would prefer (4.59 b) over (4.59 a), since the two sentences
have different meanings.
16In Italian, questo/quello ’this/that” can be used as pronouns to refer to humans, but this fact
is irrelevant here, because a very specific context or prosody would be required.
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The massified reading of dottore in (4.60 b) is strikingly clear, especially given that
the sentence is only interpretable in a scenario such as one where the speaker wears
a blindfold and tries to identify the objects and surfaces surrounding him.
The actual question, that we posed at the beginning of this section is the following:
why the +human feature of these predicates is what makes the difference between an
extrinsic property reading and a mass reading? And, in this light, how do we explain
the Norwegian data where, some non-human predicates allow for an extrinsic reading
but only when some human volition is involved, in either the constructions or the
fruition of said objects. In all the other cases, also Norwegian non-human predicates
are interpreted as mass, if the article is missing.
Other accounts of bare predicates do not explicitly mention this effect. Clearly, the
fact that, in the languages discussed here, mass nouns do not require the article
is known and acknowledged. For instance Munn and Schmitt make an indirect
reference to mass nouns being allowed as bare nouns:
[T]he generalization that argumental bare NPs are disallowed in French
and are restricted to plurals and mass terms in Spanish.17
Similarly,De Swart, Winter, and Zwarts mention a connection to number mark-
ing:
We do not address in this paper the question of mass terms, which are
notable for their cross-linguistic variance, especially in connection to
number marking. In line with this restriction, we also do not address the
use of abstract BNs, like motivo ’reason’ in (4.61 a) below. As pointed
out by an anonymous reviewer, such abstract BNs may actually be mass
terms, analogous to (4.61 b), which are not discussed in this paper.18
(4.61) (a) Questo
this
fu
was
motivo
reason
di
for
aspre
lively
discussioni
discussions
(ita)
(b) Questa
this
è
is
felicità
happiness
Some connection between bare predicates and mass/count is discussed by Zampar-
elli. To explain the omission of the determiner with certain predicates, he builds an
17p. 832, emphasis mine.
182007, pg. 2, footnote 1, emphasis mine.
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account using a semantic tool, originally developed to provide a different represen-
tation for the divisive/cumulative reference in the mass/count distinction.
[T ]he common distributional properties of plural count and singular mass/
abstract nouns can only be explained by appealing to a common semantic
property, cumulative/divisive reference (Quine 1960, Cheng 1973). In the
semantic literature, this property has usually been captured by adopting
a common denotational structure, i.e. a semilattice (see e.g. Link 1983).
Rather than assuming that this denotational structure is associated with
the lexical entry of plural and mass/abstract nouns, H&Z (Heycock and
Zamparelli, 2005. MC) propose that the semilattice is generated only at
a certain point in the DP structure, by the application of two seman-
tic operators (one for mass, one for count nouns) to the nouns original
denotations (sets of atomic objects).19
Even if Zamparelli (building on Heycock and Zamparelli, 2005) uses the same mech-
anism used to derive the different behavior of the mass/count nouns, modulo some
assumptions specific to the lexical class of nouns that forms bare predicates, this
similarity is not exploited further, and the immediate shift of the interpretation of
a bare predicate from role/extrinsic to mass, when there is no human feature, is
not discussed. However, since Zamparelli treats the nouns that can occur as bare
predicates as a lexical class, this type of discussion was not necessary.
19p. 12
CHAPTER 5
Intrinsic and extrinsic properties in language
5.1 Ontological questions
In what will follow, we will try to understand how to analyze the meaning of the
bare vs. determined predicative nominals. We are also going to discuss the linguistic
concept of “kind” from a philosophical perspective. We will not be discussing ontol-
ogy per se, owing to reasons of scope and competence, but we will make use of some
ontological considerations (for instance Lewis’ (1983) discussion on “intrinsicality”),
because they reveal to be very useful to clarify the linguistic intuitions, and help
understand the generalizations that emerge from the discussion of the data in this
study. Importantly, I am not trying to argue that natural languages indicate which
philosophical doctrine to follow, nor are we saying that we should look at languages
to “unveil” the “shape of the world”, but it is not unreasonable to imagine that nat-
ural languages encode certain distinctions in a way that can influence the way their
speakers’ conceptualizations. Studying a semantic phenomenon, some philosophical
discussions can provide a background about some problems and distinctions.
Before starting the actual discussion, it needs to be stated clearly that we are not
suggesting that we should look at what languages do in order to understand what
the shape of the world is, or that we should look at what languages do in order to
understand what their speakers think the shape of the world is. Also we are not
suggesting that we should look at what languages do in order to decide what the
best ontology is, or that we should use the best ontology in order to understand
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what languages do. Finally, we are also not suggesting to force languages into re-
flecting better what (we think) the shape of the world is, nor that we should try to
manipulate natural languages to modify the conception that speakers have of the
shape of the world.1
5.2 Finding the right dichotomy
Having discussed the possibility of understanding some the bare/determined predica-
tion patterns in these terms, we will now proceed with the discussion about why the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is to be preferred to other existing distinctions. Partic-
ular attention will be given to the comparison between Intrinsic/Extrinsic properties
and Individual/Stage-level properties. Finally, we will reprise the characterization of
the intrinsic/extrinsic properties and briefly discuss how bare predicates can either
be inherently extrinsic or extrinsic as supervening upon human volition/agency.
As we said, the intuitive characterization of this distinction is the following: some
properties of an individual depend purely on that individual, whereas some proper-
ties of an individual depend on the interaction of that individual with the environ-
ment. The classic way to exemplify the distinction (cf. Weatherson and Marshall,
2012) is to compare the concept of the “mass” of a body to its “weight”: the mass
depends on the body itself, the weight depends, for instance, on the atmosphere of
the planet on which the said body is located. We can expand the understanding of
the distinction by repeating three aspects of the distinction, as presented by Lewis.
The three aspects of the notion of intrinsicality can help better define the concept,
and are presented in (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3).2
1This last point is actually inherent to policies of political correctness. I remain agnostic as
to wether these are meaningful or even useful. I’ve heard many arguments in favor and as many
against. Consider this: Italian female politicians or Italian businesswomen complain regularly about
the fact that, when one calls a woman by her last name in Italian, one (has to) add the feminine
definite article. So, if somebody was talking about the author of these lines, in an Italian formal
setting, the name used would be “La Castella”. The same does not happen when men are called by
their family name, and this is supposedly a manifestation of a “masculinist” or “male-dominated”
society. A consequence of this kind of complaints is that journalists and other public speakers
are (periodically) forced into a routine of self-correction. In the best-case scenario, if the speaker
uses the last name of a woman according to the requirements of political correctness, the result
is pragmatically odd: even when we know that this person is a woman, the name “says” that it’s
a man. Understandably, many women (among which the author) would rather be called by using
the marked (feminine) last name than with what just sounds like their father’s name. Besides, it is
not clear why the habit promoted by this policy should be less “masculinist” than the spontaneous
one, in which the names have distinguishable genders.
2See Weatherson and Marshall (2012) for a discussion, and references therein.
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(5.1) F is an intrinsic property iff, necessarily, anything that is F is F in virtue of
the way it itself, and nothing wholly distinct from it, is.
(5.2) F is an intrinsic property iff, necessarily, for any x, an ascription of F to x is
entirely about how that thing and its parts are, and not at all about how
things wholly distinct from it are.
(5.3) F is intrinsic iff F never differs between duplicates.
However, before accepting the intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy, let us compare it to
other possible approaches, each of which seems to be able to capture some aspect of
the linguistic alternation under examination, and finally draw some conclusions.
There are several distinctions that divide predicates in ways that reveal some deep
semantic contrast. These distinctions can be functionally comparable to the extrin-
sic/intrinsic and, for this reason, we will discuss how suitable each of them is, as
a tool for analyzing the bare/determined predication alternation. Some of the dis-
tinctions that we will discuss can regard any type of predicate: verbs, adjectives,
nouns.
5.2.1 Possible distinctions
Essential / Accidental
A relevant distinction is the division of predicates into those denoting “essential
properties” and those denoting “accidental properties” (distinction that roots back
to Aristotle’s Metaphysics). In short, the distinction corresponds to the distinction
between the notions of “necessity” and “possibility”: An “essential property” is a
property an entity necessarily has, whereas an “accidental property” is a property
that an entity might have.3
There are many ways in which essential and accidental properties can be captured:4
Generally, when a notion is expressed in terms of possibility and necessity, we call
this characterization “a modal understanding (of a notion)”. Specifically, the one
3A property of these concepts is that they can be interdefined (Cf. Robertson and Atkins, 2013):
 something is necessary when its negation is not possible
 something is possible when its negation is not necessary
4Some aspects are still a matter of debate, but from a linguistic perspective, the points of
disagreement are not relevant.
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that we just mentioned is referred to as “basic modal characterization”, and it can
be phrased as in (5.4).
(5.4) P is an essential property of an object o just in case o has P in all possible
worlds;
P is an accidental property of an object o just in case o has P , but there is a
possible world in which o lacks P .
A variant that calls into play the role of existence is called “existence-conditioned
modal characterization”. This is expressed in (5.5).
(5.5) P is an essential property of an object o just in case it is necessary that o has
P if o exists;
P is an accidental property of an object o just in case o has P , but it is
possible that o lacks P and yet exists.
This distinction is relevant because it appears that predicating kind membership (a
human, a man, a woman, etc.) patterns with essential properties, whereas (bare)
professions and roles pattern with accidental properties.
Scalarity
A third distinction, comparable to the ones we discussed so far, is the one that focuses
on “scalarity” (used for instance by Matushansky and Spector, 2005). Essentially a
predicate is scalar if it can be “sliced” into degrees, and non-scalar if such slicing
is not possible. In principle, scalarity has many linguistic applications, but in this
context what matters is the gradability or non-gradability of a property. Part of
the assumption put forth by Matushansky and Spector is that every nominal that
appears in bare predicative position bears the feature [ scalar]. This should prevent
scalar nouns to appear as bare predicates and predict that the interpretation of a bare
predicate is always non scalar. In the next paragraphs, we will discuss why we believe
that such characterization is not sufficient to account for either the bare/determined
predicates meaning alternation.
Stage-/Individual-level
One of the most classic distinctions, in linguistics, is the one between “individual-level
(I-level) and “stage-level” (S-level) predicates. We know that the predicate “brave”
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(an i-level predicate) denotes a class of entities of which “brave” can be predicated
without any time limitations. The predicate “tired” (an S-level predicate) is true of
a class of entities only within a certain time span. So, the entities of which “brave”
is true are stable members of the set denoted by “brave”, whereas the entities of
which “tired” is true are not members of the set denoted by the predicate “tired” in
a stable way. The application of an I-level predicate to a subject generates a different
a semantic interpretation than when we use an S-level predicate, in the same context
(c.f. Carlson, 1977).
Compare (2.10), repeated as (5.6 a), to (5.6 b):
(5.6) (a) Firemen are brave
(b) Firemen are tired
What we know about the meaning of the predicate determines the reading of these
sentences, it is therefore easy to see that (5.6 a) has a generic reading, i.e. the sentence
is interpreted as a generic statement about all the firemen, and in contrast, (5.6 b)
has (also) an episodic reading, i.e. it states that there are some firemen who are
tired (at the moment).
All of these distinctions, including the one that we advocate as crucial for the phe-
nomena involving bare vs. determined predication, are ways of looking at concepts
and properties from different perspectives. For instance, it is true that some prop-
erties are scalar (e.g. “intelligent”) and some other are not (e.g. “alive”). But it is
also true that language can make them surface in ways that seem to contradict
this generalization. In discussing English, it seems that nouns are very resistant to
comparative constructions, and in that, they seem to not allow for gradable inter-
pretation.5
Each distinction captures a criterion to distinguish predicates, however, the question
that remains is is which distinction captures insightfully, and more adequately, the
bare/determined contrast.
It is possible to make a correlation between stage- and individual-level properties,
on the one hand, and accidental an essential properties on the other, because to be
a necessary property of an entity encodes the intuition that such entity could not
5Robert van Rooy (p.c.) pointed out that saying that “an object is more table than another
object” is marginal (or restricted to an informal style), just as well as saying that “someone is more
genius than someone else” is not acceptable. Furthermore, the latter is unacceptable independently
of the fact that there can be degrees of geniality. One way of looking at those examples is that
table, and genius are actually (used as) adjectives. But even if that is correct, the question “Why
cannot nouns be used in comparatives?” still remain.
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lack that property. Stage-level properties are comparable to accidental properties
because the fact that they can change over time seems to entail that they are non
essential. However, even if an essential property is also an individual-level property,
the opposite does not hold. A property that is accidental (e.g. disliking tea) needs
not necessarily be restricted to being also a stage-level property.
We might try to correlate extrinsicality (as something that does not (entirely) depend
on the way an individual is) to an accidental property or to a stage level property,
but even there counterexamples abound (e.g. being meditative).
To express it with a metaphor, what we have are different ways of shedding light
on a tridimensional object. Depending on the positioning of the light, the object
(can) cast different shadows. But the categorical classifications that languages have
(e.g. nouns, verbs, adjectives), and the distinctions we are discussing do not have
a one-to-one match. Sometimes, even the borders of said categories are difficult to
establish (e.g. is table in “more table than” an adjective?). Until we have an ideal
and abstract dichotomy able generate all the alternations, we have to find for every
linguistic phenomenon we want to investigate the right dichotomy.
5.2.2 Comparison
It is logically possible that two of the different dichotomies that we mentioned work
equally well in predicting the meaning alternation of bare vs. determined predicates.
Let us consider Gianni è professore as opposed to Gianni è un professore.
One could claim that the bare predicate is a non-scalar property (and it is indeed
difficult to imagine degrees in the concept of working as a professor”, whereas ar-
guably there can be degrees to the level in which one is “a professor”. One could
claim that the professorhood of Gianni described by the bare predicate is an acci-
dental property that he has. On the other hand, being “a professor” expressed by
the determined predicate is essential to Gianni for being “truly” himself.
One could claim that the bare predicate refers to a stage-level property because
Gianni has that property probably for a limited time in his life (he has not always
worked as a professor), and can lose it at any time (he could retire or get fired). On
the other hand it seems that the determined predicate means that professorhood is
a real property of Gianni’s, because it is definitely unrelated to him being fired or
retiring.
Let us see practically if some of these distinctions can provide us with a way to
account for the true generalization to capture the meaning alternation between bare
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and determined predicates.
When it comes to scalarity, it is important to say that it probably needs to be un-
derstood more as a grammatical feature, because it is hard to see in which sense
“non-scalarity” is informative about the meaning of the predicate alternation. How-
ever, if that is the case, then the actual meaning contrast is left unexplained
First of all, productively employing the essential/accidental distinction is not im-
mediate because, depending on the definition of an essential property, it might be
counterintuitive to attribute essential properties for instance to humans (other than
that of “being humans”). Secondly, it is hard to employ the essential/accidental dis-
tinction in this specific case. Consider the following difference between “Gianni is
father” (which in proper English simply means that “Gianni has at least one kid”)
and “Gianni is a father” (whose meaning could be emphasized by saying “Gianni is
truly a father”). However Gianni can be truly “a father”, and yet this property could
not be essential to him.
Finally, let us consider the S-/I-level distinction. Recall that kinds-level properties
are properties of kinds, individual-level properties are properties of individuals (that
belong to a kind) and stage-level properties are properties that these individuals
(and, transitively, the kinds to which these individuals belong) have at given stages.
In other words, any property that can be ascribed to kinds is a kind-level property,
any property that can be ascribed to individuals is an individual-level property, and
any property that can be ascribed to stages is a stage-level property. We are arguing
that determined predicates denote intrinsic properties, and what we are trying to
understand is if intrinsic properties can be replaced by individual-level properties
(i.e. if there is no distinction between the two). If that was the case, then we would
not expect determined predicates to be used to ascribe properties to kinds nor to
stages. Conversely, we are arguing that bare predicates denote extrinsic properties,
but if extrinsic properties equated stage-level properties, then bare predicates would
not be expected to be used at a kind-level or at individual-level.
It appears impossible to use a kind-level bare predicate, because (5.7) only means
that there is a definite lawyer who is a law P.hD.
(5.7) L’
the
avvocato
lawyer
è
is
dottore
doctor
(in
(in
legge)
law)
Only meaning: "The (specific/definite) lawyer is a law Ph.D"
We might want to ask, if an intrinsic property can be a property of stages, and if an
extrinsic property can be a property of individuals. Let us see some tests. First of
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all, Zamparelli (2005) points out that bare predicates seem to be able to give rise to
individual-level like readings, as shown by Zamprelli’s examples, reported below.6
(5.8) Un
a
Norvegese
Norwegian
è
is
spesso
often
disponibile
available
/
/
presente
present
/
/
ubriaco
drunk
(S-level)
Possible meaning: "A Norwegian is available / present / drunk many times"
(5.9) Un
a
Norvegese
Norwegian
è
is
spesso
often
alto
tall
/
/
poliglotta
polyglott
/
/
biondo
blond
(I-level)
Only meaning: "Many Norwegians are tall / polyglott / blond"
(5.10) Un
a
Norvegese
Norwegian
è
is
spesso
often
pescatore
fisherman
/
/
operaio petrolifero
petrol worker
Hard-to-get meaning: "A Norwegian is a fisherman / pertrol worker many
times"
At this point, consider the following examples. What is expressed by (5.11 a) has
two readings, one is the clear I-level reading, and the other is the K-level reading,
comparable to (5.11 b).
(5.11) (a) L’
the
avvocato
lawyer
è
is
un
a
dottore
doctor
(in
(in
legge)
law)
(K- or I-level & Intrinsic)
"The lawyer is a law Ph.D"
(b) Anche
also
il
the
pinguino
penguin
è
is
una
a
specie
specie
(K-level & Intrinsic)
"Also the penguin is a specie"
These sentences have a generic reading (the subject of the predication is kind-
referring) so the determined predicate is kind-level but nonetheless intrinsic.
Now consider the following examples.7
(5.12) (a) Gianni
Gianni
è
has
stato
been
un
a
cadavere
corpse
per
for
due
two
ore
hours
(S-level & Intrinsic)
(b) Gianni
Gianni
è
has
stato
been
cadavere
corpse
per
for
due
two
ore
hours
(S-level & Extrinsic)
6Original example numbers (51a-51b) and (52), p.17
7I’m grateful to Alexis Dimitriadis for having pointed out these examples to me.
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In (5.12 a), the predicate un cadavere ’a corpse’ is interpreted “metaphorically” mean-
ing “tired”. Note that the it is possible to license per due ore ’for two hours’ which
is only allowed with stage-level properties. Furthermore note that the predicate “un
cadavere” retains the intrinsic meaning that “tired” also has. Conversely, (5.12 b)
is interpretable in a context of a theater play in which, for two hours Gianni was
impersonating a corpse on stage. In both sentences the predicates are stage-level,
yet the first is interpreted as an intrinsic (S-level) property and the second one as
an extrinsic (S-level) property.
What we have shown in this section is that, even though many existing dichotomies
can account for some aspect of the bare/determined contrast, the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction appears to be, across the boar, more adequate.
In the next section we will see an interesting set of data in which it is possible
to observe the behavior of determined predicates and how they generally trigger
slightly different effects from the predicates that are standardly recognized as I-level
properties.
5.3 Lifetime effect
This section is dedicated to a particular semantic effect, which normally emerges
clearly predicating I-level properties. We will see that the behavior of determined
predicates deviates from that of I-level predicates, in that determined predicates
trigger also an alternative reading that is missing with I-level predicates. Consider
the following examples.
(5.13) (a) Gianni
Gianni
esiste
exist
"Gianni exists"
(b) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
biondo
blond
"Gianni is blond"
(c) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
nato
born
in
in
Italia
Italy
"Gianni is born in Italy"
The property in (5.13 a) is an essential property, the property in (5.13 b) is a typical
I-level property, and the property in (5.13 c) is also an I-level property (in that it is
an accidental property that is impossible to lose).
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Since Kratzer (1989), we know that modifying the tense from present to past trigger,
in certain properties, a particular interpretation with respect to the life of their
subjects (See also Musan, 1995, 1997). So, while the presupposition in (5.13 a-5.13 b-
5.13 c) is that Gianni is still alive, in (5.14 a-5.14 b-5.14 c) the same presupposition
is false.
(5.14) (a) Gianni
Gianni
esisteva
existed
"Gianni existed"
(b) Gianni
Gianni
era
was
biondo
blond
"Gianni was blond"
(c) Gianni
Gianni
era
was
nato
born
in
in
Italia
Italy
"Gianni was born in Italy"
Such effect is called “lifetime effect”. The interesting twist is that, if we try the same
test with determined predicates, we can see that the lifetime effect can emerge, but
it is not the only possible presupposition. Consider the sentences already presented
as (3.9 b), and here adapted in (5.15).
(5.15) Niccolò
Niccolò
è
is
stato
been
un
a
avvocato
lawyer
/
/
professore
professor
/
/
artista
artist
"Niccolò has been a lawyer / professor / artist"
Next to the “lifetime effect” reading, in which Niccolò is no longer a lawyer/ profes-
sor/ artist because he is no longer alive, there is a possible interpretation in which
something changed in Niccolò’s nature. As we mentioned already several times, this
“deep” change is called “intrinsic change”. Notice that, if we interpret determined
predicates as intrinsic properties, we can explain the second reading - let’s call it
“extrinsic change effect” - as an alternative reading to the lifetime effect. Also, notice
that the “intrinsic change” is not readily available with the standard I-level predi-
cates. Finally, note that bare predicates do not trigger any of the aforementioned
effects.
(5.16) Niccolò
Niccolò
è
is
stato
been
avvocato
lawyer
/
/
professore
professor
/
/
artista
artist
"Niccolò has been a lawyer / professor / artist"
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There is a number of ways to motivate why Niccolò is no longer a lawyer/ professor/
artist, for instance, he changed job or that he lost his license, or he stopped making
a living out his profession. There is no presupposition with respect to Niccolò’s
existence.
5.4 Distinguishing predication from equation
In this section we summarize how to distinguish equative/identificational reading or
context, from the ones in which the determined nominal is actually a predicate.
When a determiner is present, there are two scenarios that are superficially identical.
We can distinguish them with some additional context. The sentence (5.17) has two
meanings, because it has two different possible structures.
(5.17) Gianni è un professore
One case is is compatible with the continuation:
(5.18) Gianni è un professore
(that we met yesterday at the dinner party)
In (5.18) the DP un professore can head of a relative clause, which means that the
sentence is an equative sentence and hence, we are not concerned with these cases.
The other possibility is easy to disambiguate using the context provided in (5.19).
(5.19) (of course he did that, what did you expect?)
Gianni è un professore!
What this second sentence means is that Gianni cannot really help his behavior,
because it is a consequence of “his nature”. In other words, “being a professor”, or
“professorhood” is a property of which Gianni can only lose by changing his nature.
It is a property that is intrinsic to Gianni.
In this section we summarize how to distinguish equative/identificational reading
or context, from the ones in which the determined nominal is actually a predicate.
Furthermore, suppose that all instances of sentence like (5.20) were equative.
(5.20) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
un
a
professore
professor
"Gianni is a professor"
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If that was true it would also mean that (5.21) should be interpreted as an equative.
(5.21) Gianni
Gianni
non
not
è
is
un
a
professore
professor
"Gianni is not a professor"
The equative/identificational reading of (5.21) would mean that “there is a professor
that Gianni is not”, but this is not the only meaning that the sentence has. So, let
us see in which cases, distinguishing between equatives and predicative sentences is
useful to reach a comprehend better our data.
5.4.1 Who vs. What
Matushansky and Spector (2005) point out that, as an answer to who or what
questions, the possibilities of the use of the bare predicates are more limited than
the possibilities of the determined predicate.
(5.22) (a) Qui
who
est
is
Cyntia?
Cynthia?
Une
a
physicienne
physicist
/
/
*Physicienne
physicist
(fra)
"Who is Cyntia? A physicist"
(b) Qu’
who
est
is
Cyntia?
Cynthia?
Une
a
physicienne
physicist
/
/
Physicienne
physicist
"What is Cyntia? A physicist "
In other words, who-questions require equative sentences as answers and bare predi-
cate (or a sentence with containing a bare predicate) is perceived as a non-pertinent
/ infelicitous answer. On the other hand, a what-question requires for a trait of the
identity of the subject. The same holds for Italian and the other languages in our
data set as well.
(5.23) (a) Chi
who
è
is
Niccolò?
Niccolò?
Niccolò
Niccolò
è
is
un
a
avvocato
lawyer
/
/
??Avvocato
lawyer
(ita)
"Who’s Niccolò? A lawyer"
(b) Cos’
what
è
is
Niccolò?
Niccolò?
Niccolò
Niccolò
è
is
un
a
avvocato
lawyer
/
/
Avvocato
lawyer
"What is Niccolò? A lawyer"
(5.24) (a) Wie
who
is
is
Nick?
Nick?
Een
A
advocaat
lawyer
/
/
??Advocaat
lawyer
(nld)
"Who is Nick? A lawyer / lawyer"
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(b) Wat
what
is
is
Nick?
Nick?
Een
A
advocaat
lawyer
/
/
Advocaat
lawyer
"What is Nick? A lawyer / lawyer"
(5.25) (a) Wer
who
ist
is
Nikolas?
Nick?
Ein
A
Anwalt
lawyer
/
/
??Anwalt
lawyer
(deu)
"Who is Nick? A lawyer / lawyer"
(b) Was
what
ist
is
Nikolas?
Nick?
Ein
A
Anwalt
lawyer
/
/
Anwalt
lawyer
"What is Nick? A lawyer / lawyer"
(5.26) (a) £Quién
who
es
is
Nicolás?
Nicolás?
Un
A
abogado
lawyer
/
/
??Abogado
lawyer
(spa)
"Who is Nicolás? A lawyer / lawyer"
(b) £Qué
what
es
is
Nicolás?
Nicolás?
Un
A
abogado
lawyer
/
/
Abogado
lawyer
"What is Nicolás? A lawyer / lawyer"
(5.27) (a) Hva
what
er
is
Nikolai?
Nikolai?
En
a
advokat
lawyer
/
/
Advokat
lawyer
(nor)
"What is Nikolai? A lawyer / lawyer"
(b) Hvem
who
er
is
Nikolai?
Nikolai?
En
a
advokat
lawyer
/
/
??Advokat
lawyer
"Who is Nikolai? A lawyer / ??lawyer"
We agree with Matushansky and Spector for what concerns the analysis of French.
As they show, in French every time that a predicate occurs with a determiner, the
sentence is an equative sentence. It is reasonable to believe that, in French, the
contrast between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is not lexicalized in a productive
way, unlike what we have seen with the other languages in our data set. There are
some exceptions, and some determined predicates cane be successfully used with the
intrinsic interpretation, but they are very few and lexicalized. It is the case of un
chef, with the interpretation of “a bossy person”, un artiste “an artsy person” or in
the metaphorical sense, une pute “a prostitute” in the offensive sense of the term,
which contrast with the actual profession that needs to occur bare (prostituée), and
few others. Note that, in French, it is impossible to express intrinsic “metaphorical”
interpretation of proper names, as shown by the ungrammaticality of (5.28).
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(5.28) *Cette
This
fille
girl
est
is
une
a
Paris
Paris
Hilton
Hilton
However there are some lexicalized “metaphorical” properties, such as un cochon ’a
pig = a disgusting person’ or un armoire à glace ’a vitrina = a strapping fellow’.
The fact that there are some lexicalized intrinsic properties that occur with a de-
terminer might be evidence that in the history of French the option of expressing
both intrinsic and extrinsic properties like in the other languages was possible, and
that subsequently disappeared. Which properties has French lost and why is an
interesting line of research that we will leave open to further research.
There are other context in which a different behavior of bare and determined predi-
cates can be highlighted. Keeping in mind what we said about the possible ambigu-
ity of the sentences containing a determined predicate, let us now consider the final
contexts.
5.5 Possible worlds
As noted by Matushansky and Spector (2005) there are scenarios in which a the
sentence containing the post-copular bare noun is false, whereas the sentence con-
taining a determined post-copular noun is true. According to their analysis, this is
proof of the fact that the argument slot of a bare predicate cannot be bound by the
main verb (cf. Matushansky and Spector, 2005) and Section [2.7] of this thesis). An
identical contrast to the one discussed by Matushansky and Spector is replicated in
(5.29 a). We will add add a different ways of obtaining truth values asymmetries, in
(5.29 b). In both cases, (in 2013) the versions of the sentences containing the predi-
cate with the determiner are true, but the ones containing the bare predicate are
false.
(5.29) (a) Clinton
Clinton
è
is
un
a
presidente
president
/
/
#presidente
president
(b) Elvis
Elvis
Presley
Presley
è
is
un
a
musicista
musician
/
/
#musicista
musician
These two example look similar but are very different. Let us begin with the analysis
of the first one.
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(5.30) (a) Clinton
Clinton
è
is
un
a
presidente
president
"Clinton is a president"
(b) #Clinton
Clinton
è
is
presidente
president
"Clinton is a president"
Note that both (5.30 a) and (5.30 b) are grammatical. However, given the actual
world, only (5.30 a) is true.
What do examples (5.29 a) and (5.30 a-5.30 b) show:
These sentences exemplify the cases in which we predicate of a living person (e.g.
Clinton) some property that he might no longer have (e.g. “being a president”).
The sentence involving Clinton and the determined predicate un presidente, is am-
biguous between the reading in which we are ascribing to Clinton intrinsic president-
hood, and the identificational reading which is compatible with a partitive reading:
i.e. the sentence in interpreted as meaning “Clinton is one of the several people who
have ever had the role of president”.
On the other hand, the bare presidente only refers to the extrinsic property/social
object “president”. Therefore, its interpretation has defined limits that follow from
the officiality of the status. Defining bare predicates temporally is only partially
correct, because there are social objects that do not have temporal limits (i.e. they
never decay), for instance Nobel Prize or senatore a vita ’senator for life’.8
Now consider the second case.
(5.31) (a) Elvis
Elvis
Presley
Presley
è
is
un
a
musicista
musician
"Elvis Presley is a musician"
(b) #Elvis
Elvis
Presley
Presley
è
is
musicista
musician
"Elvis Presley is a musician"
Also the two sentences below are perfectly grammatical, but again, given the actual
world, only (5.31 a) is true.
8Clearly, the temporal perception of certain roles is strong, and at some level well-founded.
After all, even social objects have a temporal dimension, like any other object. However, I am not
convinced that an analysis or a modeling which is based uniquely on a temporal characterization
is sufficient to capture their meaning.
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It seems that for the parts of the identity of Elvis that “survive” his death, but not
the ones which the bare predicate predicates about.9 Across-the-board, we already
said that bare predicates seem to select different “aspects” of their subjects, so what
persists of Elvis’ identity can be can be en rockstar, but not rockstar. To put it
differently “What is the interpretation assigned to Elvis Presley in sentences (a)
contra (b) sentences?”
What do examples (5.29 b) and (5.31 a-5.31 b) show:
These sentences exemplify the cases in which we predicate, of a deceased person (e.g.
Elvis), some property that he had for his entire life (e.g. “being a musician”).
First of all, in the case in which Elvis is dead, it is impossible predicate extrinsic
properties of a non-existent entity, if extrinsic properties are extensional properties,
thus sets interpreted with respect to this world, because there cannot be member
holding between such a set and an entity which does not exist in this world.
On the other hand, setting aside the equative reading of sentence containing the
determined predicate, how can we explain the interpretation of (5.29 b)? If intrinsic
properties are intensional properties, then when they are true, they are true every
world in which the subject exist. We can understand the referent of the proper
name Elvis Presley as referring to a proxy of Elvis, namely his author-proxy (cf.
Jackendoff (1992)). In the sense of an author, Elvis Presley keeps existing in the
same way Shakespeare does. Of that proxy, we can predicate the intrinsic property
“a musician”.
In the following sections, we will see how the data discussed far can be further
explained. We will start by discussing the principle of identity and the role of the
count feature. Then then we will discuss what is relation between the two structures
and how the two meanings that we have discussed so far match the structures. Then,
we will discuss what is the minimal machinery to derive said syntactic structures,
and see what must be different in English to derive its different behavior, and why.
9Øystein Nilsen (p.c.) pointed out that a similar phenomenon happens with some adjectives.
For instance in (5.32 a - 5.32 c).
(5.32) (a) Elvis Presley is famous / #tall (eng)
(b) Elvis Presley er kjent / #høy (nor)
(c) Elvis Presley è famoso / #alto (ita)
In these examples as well, it appears that the part of Elvis’ identity that survives can be famous
but not tall (clearly, independently of Elvis’ height when he was alive).
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5.6 About Nouns
Traditionally, common nouns, (intransitive) verbs, and adjectives denoted sets which
are elements of type he; ti. These elements can combine with elements of type e to
yield truth values. For example, the sentences in (5.33) all state that the entity
referred to by the name John, is a member of the set denoted by the verb, or the
adjective, or the noun.
(5.33)
John runs runhe;ti(je)
John is red redhe;ti(je)
John is a man manhe;ti(je)
So, in the first case, the set collects all entities that run; in the second case the sets
collects all entities that are red, in the third case the set collects all entities that are
men.
From the logic literature, and particularly from Gupta (1980), we can understand
something interesting on the linguistic category of nouns. The intuition that Gupta
works out can be illustrated in two points. First, elements belonging to the three
abovementioned categories (verbs, adjectives, nouns) have something in common:
they are either true of false of objects. This ability of yielding a truth value means
that verbs, adjectives, and nouns all provide a “principle of application”. The prin-
ciple of application of, say, an adjective is what divides all entities/objects into two
groups: those of which the adjective is true, and those of which the adjective is false.
Knowing the “principle of application of red ” equals to knowing “what an entity
should be like to be red” (See. i.a. Geach, 1962 and Dummett, 1973). The second
point is the following: Geach and Gupta point out that there is one crucial difference
that sets nouns apart from verbs and adjectives: only nouns provide the informa-
tion to be able to say whether an object x is the same as object y. In other words,
only nouns provide the “principle of identity”. Geach points out that only nouns are
acceptable in contexts of “sameness”.10
(5.34) (a) He is the same professor
Noun
that was teaching yesterday
(b) *He is the same tall
Adj
as the other guy
(c) *I heard him the same sing
V erb
again
Gupta uses an insightful example to show that nouns can differ in the way their
principle of identity is. Consider the paralogism in (5.35):
10The examples in (5.34 a-5.34 b-5.34 c) are adapted from Baker (2003).
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(5.35)
National Airlines served at least two million passengers in 1975
Every passenger is a person
National Airlines served at least two million persons in 1975
It is easy to see that the argument in (5.35) is invalid, and Gupta points out that
the problem is related to the way in which the noun passenger and the noun person
identify objects. Not only do passenger and person vary in their principle of appli-
cation, since not every object which is a person is also a passenger, but they also
vary in the way their principles of identity pick out referents. 11 We can borrow this
insight, and use it to suppose that, in predicative position, the principle of identity,
with which nouns are endowed, translates into the fact that only nouns bear the
feature [COUNT ]. This is compatible with the intuition that the principle of iden-
tity is that part of the meaning of nouns that enables us to track objects through
possible worlds. Adjectives do not instantiate the principle of identity and are do not
bear this feature. The absence of the feature explains why adjectives do not show
different behaviors when they are interpreted as mass-adjectives or count-adjectives,
as shown by (5.36 a - 5.36 b).12
(5.36) (a) Sand is red
(b) The chair is red
Suppose further that in Italian, Spanish, German, Dutch and Norwegian, nouns can
enter the derivation with a valued or unvalued count feature. Clearly, the use of
an unvalued feature is a more marked choice, as it requires more structure, namely
(at least) the projection of the Number layer that hosts the article, whose [+sing]
11It is possible to argue that the difference between “passengers” a “persons” is ontological i.e.
that they are simply different types of objects. (See. Gupta for a further discussion, and Loewe
(1989, 2009) for a different perspective).
12Even though we will be concerned with the nouns/terms in generally marked [COUNT ]
(with the syntactic feature being interpretable or uninterpretable), we use the distinction between
+countterm and a  countterm as it appears in Gabbay and Moravcsik, 1973.
 A +countterm F is such that
– there are some F ’s, e.g. F 0 and F 00, such that their union is itself not an F , or
– there are no F 0 and F 00 such that one does not contain the other (with F 0 6=F 00), or
there is only one F .
 A  countterm F is such that
– the union of any two F ’s, e.g. F 0 and F 00, is also an an F , or
– there are some F 0 and F 00 such that neither contains the other.
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feature can value [uCount] on the noun, while the use of a valued feature results
in less structure. So, the bare predicate corresponds to an element of type he; ti, an
extensional property, that denotes a set. Whereas a noun that bears an unvalued
[uCount] feature realizes as an intensional property, of type hs; he; tii that holds in
every possible world in which the subject exist.13 So that would result in that the
matching between form and meaning is intrinsic/intensional property - determined
predicate, and extrinsic/extensional property - bare predicate.14 The crucial aspect
of this generalization is, however, that the bare predicate has no intensional level
encoded in syntax.
In order to start discussing how this generalization accommodates the data that
we discussed, let us take a step back and ask the following question: “How can we
explain the behavior of English, in which what appears the less marked option is
systematically almost prohibited?”.
5.7 English and uniqueness
Recall the way we started our discussion in Section [1.1]. We discussed the fact
that English bare predicates are only allowed if they denote a contextually-unique
referent. We illustrated the contrast with (3.1), here repeated in (5.37).
(5.37) He is (the/a) team captain, and she is *(a) team member
We have shown that, whenever the uniqueness condition is respected, English bare
predicates and determined predicates show a meaning alternation that is similar to
what the other European languages discussed in this study show. The two sentences
below are not contradictions because there is a meaning difference between the bare
and the determined predicates.
(5.38) (a) He has been president without (ever) having been a president
(b) He has been a president without (ever) having been president
13The modal bare needs to be further restricted, in order to avoid the risk of a de jure overlap
between an intrinsic property and an essential one, which does not correspond to the meaning
that intrinsic properties have. The worlds in which the property holds could be the worlds that
are coherent with the nature of the subject, but as Alexis Dimitriadis (p.c.) pointed out, this is a
circular definition. In any case, we leave the restriction of the modal bare open to further research.
14This could follow, for instance, by Dalrymple et al.’s “Strong Meaning Hypothesis”.
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Informally, we said that (5.38 a) means that the person referred to by the pronoun
he was officially elected as president, but did not have the qualities that are nor-
mally expected from someone occupying that role, while (5.38 b) means exactly the
opposite.
The puzzle with English is clearly about the uniqueness restriction. In accounting
for this restriction, we will make use of another crucial difference between English
and Italian (and the other languages that we discussed). In Italian (and the other
languages), the agreement between the subject and the predicate is robustly present
in both adjectival and nominal predication.
(5.39) (a) Gianni è simpatico / professore
(b) Gianna è simpatica / professoressa
In English, however, this is not the case (cf. Zamparelli, 2005).15
(5.40) (a) John is smart / a professor / director
(b) Mary is smart / a professor / director
Suppose that in English, unlike the other languages we discussed, the Number feature
(on n) of these lexical items can only be an unvalued [uCount]. If this is the case,
we can understand why most nouns in English need to surface with an article: it
is required for the valuation of the [uCount] feature on the noun. One solution to
the uniqueness restriction puzzle could be what Delfitto (2011) proposed, modulo a
small modification of the account. When the noun has a valued feature for count,
it must be specified for singular or plural. This can happen through a determiner
or, in some languages (Italian, etc.), via the subject-predicate agreement. In other
words, in these languages, the subject-predicate agreement is an alternative to the
creation of additional structure caused by the projection of NumP. However, as we
have seen, in English, the subject-predicate agreement is not a viable option. The
only viable option for English is then the projection of NumP.
As it happens, contextually unique nouns, such as president or CEO are always (i.e.
in every language, so also English) lexically specified as [+sing]. Our claim is then
that this small subset of the English nouns is different from the rest of the English
15Of course, there are some exceptions. In Italian the adjectives in -e do not show agreement,
e.g. intelligente smart. In Dutch, mainly adjectives, and some nouns, show agreement inflection,
etc. The point really lies in how robust the phenomenon is, in a given language. To my knowledge,
there is only one adjective that shows agreement in English and that is blond/blonde. Next to
that, there are the nouns in tor, ter / tress and trix.
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lexicon, by being inherently (i.e. lexically) specified for [+sing]. Because they are
inherently specified as [+sing], these nouns are marked as [iCount]. In other words,
while being different from the rest of the English lexicon, they are similar to the
nouns of the other languages that we are discussing.
In contextually unique English nouns, just like the nouns in the other languages,
there are two possible predicative structures, only one of which involves the projec-
tion of the Number phrase. Predictably, there is a specialization of the more elab-
orate structure for expressing a more complex meaning, and of the less elaborate
structure (the one without NumP) for expressing a less complex meaning.
5.8 Meaning and Kinds
In this section we will discuss how intrinsicality relates to linguistic kinds and hence
to the determined predicative structure. So, we will first discuss how intrinsicality
relates to kinds and then, complementarily, we will discuss the meaning that is
associated to the bare predicative structure.
5.8.1 Relation to kinds
With Le Bruyn (2010), our understanding of kinds is that of pluralities that emerge
from the grouping of entities which all share one (and the same) intrinsic property.
It is unsurprising that kinds are often described as “regularities occurring in nature”
or “regularities occurring in the world”16 because, being structured collections of
entities that share the same intrinsic property, kinds are the natural candidates to
be very strongly perceived as real linguistic entities.17
16Even though one might (philosophically) incline towards a disagreement with realist ontological
positions, that does not mean that they are committed to believing that languages must embody,
or even justify, an anti-realist view. What I argue is happening in the languages considered in this
study is, in fact, quite the opposite. We might even say that the very concept of “kind” is, in its
essence, realist: natural languages group, and therefore mark, those objects that are seen as being
as “a real discontinuity in the structure of the world”. So, the acknowledgement of the existence of a
kind  is the expression of the conviction that “being ” is part of the shape of the world, and that
is understood as existing independently of our minds. In other words, believing in the existence of
“kinds” and “properties” in the linguistic realm does not commit to the belief that these universals
are also part of the real, nor that they should feature in nothing more than the linguistic ontology.
17Note that, for entities to “blend” into a kind, they need to share at least one intrinsic property.
Therefore, also the question of “how many” properties are shared by the entities collected in a kind
(or if they are “relevant”, or “prominent” properties, etc.) might be a philosophical issue, but it is
hardly going to be a linguistic issue.
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The phenomena that we have been observing indicate that natural languages mark
with different grammatical structures the belonging of an entity to a kind, when
the entity is part of the kind. Also, being a member of a kind, can be seen as
something that can hardly, if ever, change (we might say that entities belong to
kinds “unwillingly”).
It is not problematic that, in every language, there are some nouns which look like
having default intrinsic meaning i.e. they primarily surface as members of a kind. In
the languages we have considered, we can notice that the “extremes” of the gamut
vary little or not at all. For example, it is unsurprising that nouns that refer to human
sub-kinds (and arguably, animals, together with most inanimate objects) tend to
surface more often as kind members: they are so hardly ever needed in their extrinsic
sense, that they are probably even perceived are “truly” intrinsic. Speakers hardly
ever need to convey the meaning of, say, “womanhood” as an extrinsic property, but
as we have seen in cases like (5.41 a) and (5.41 b), here repeated as (5.41 a - 5.41 b),
if the required meaning is the extrinsic meaning of “woman”, the bare-extrinsic form
is necessarily used (recall (5.41 b) refers to a game context).
(5.41) (a) Gianni,
Gianni,
dopo
after
aver
haveinf
cambiato
changed
sesso,
sex,
è
he is
diventato
become
donna.
woman
"Gianni, after having changed sex, he has become a woman"
(b) Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
estratto
extracted
il
the
rosso
red,
e
and
quindi
hence
è
he is
donna
woman
"Gianni picked red, hence he is a woman"
Intuitively, the distinction that we need to achieve is the following: extrinsic prop-
erties are extensional properties, and they denote elements of type he; ti . Intrinsic
properties, on the other hand are intensional properties, they denote functions from
possible worlds to sets, that is, elements of type hs; he; tii.
Kinds are type e, but how are they derived? The reification of a property (making an
object out of a property) however cannot work with extensional properties because
a kind does not arise from a property that is restricted only to that world in which
the sentence is interpreted (i.e. the actual world). Consider (5.42).
(5.42) The dog is a mammal
The sentence (5.42) is a generic statement that applies (and is true or false) of all
the dogs that exist, that have ever existed and that will ever exist. Essentially, kinds
are trans-world entities. According to Chierchia, kinds are derived from elements of
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type hs; he; tii, via type-shifting, to elements of type e. This coherently predicts that
we argue: if there is a link between the intrinsic property and a member of a kind,
essentially intrinsic properties are intensional properties of individuals. This is why,
if true, they are true in every possible worlds (in which the individual exists), just
like if (5.42) is true, then it is true in all possible worlds.
One might ask what is the relation between kinds in argumental position and kind-
membership that is the intrinsic property denoted by the determined predicate.
Consider the following two pairs.
(5.43) (a) Presidents are powerful
(b) The president is powerful
(5.44) John is a president
(5.45) John is president
Here is a crucial aspect. We said several times that the interpretation of the deter-
mined predicate is an instance of a kind, and the way this must be understood is
the following: first of all, clearly, under the generic reading lawyers and the lawyer
in (5.44) refer to the kind-lawyer. There is a property that, via type-shifting is reifi-
cated, essentially by taking that all the individuals that fall in the extension of that
property in all possible worlds and conceptualizing them as one entity. We under-
stand (5.44), as stating that the individual denoted by the name John is precisely
one of the individuals that fall in the extension of the property lawyer. At this point
we see the difference between (5.44) and (5.45), for the interpretation of (5.44) is
that falls in the extension of lawyers in all possible worlds (in which John exists),
the interpretation of (5.45) is limited to the actual world. So the property in (5.44)
is intensional, and the property in (5.45) is a standard extensional property. We
said earlier, that to obtain a kind, the type-shifting operation must apply to an
intensional property.
In a sentence that contains a kind-referring bare noun in argumental position, the
argument is derived via the reification of intensional property, but when the inten-
sional property is in predicative position there is no need for a mapping onto a type
e, the property remains a predicate. By hypothesis, the article cannot be in D, in-
stead we suppose that it is generated in Num, but the really crucial detail is avoiding
the projection of the D layer to avoid the rising of the expression to a type e. So,
syntax encodes the difference between extensional properties (sets, type he; ti) and
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intensional properties (functions from possible worlds to sets, type hs; he; tii). So, we
can understand the kind “president” as the extension of “president” in all possible
worlds. But when of an individual is ascribed the intesional property a president
then, that property holds for the same individual, in every possible worlds in which
the individual exists. Recall that, as we mentioned in Section [5.5], the fact that
extensional property are evaluated only in the actual world shows why, if a bare
predicate is used to ascribe a property e.g. to someone who is deceased, the sentence
is grammatical but false.
Some final remarks on extrinsic properties and social objects If we con-
sider the observations from the previous section, where we said that there can be
some nouns which look like having default intrinsic meaning, it is not surprising
that nouns that refer to jobs or roles can ascribe intrinsic, as well as extrinsic prop-
erties. One relevant observation, at this point, is that extrinsic properties (unlike
the intrinsic ones) have the possibility to rise to the status of social objects.18 In
Searle’s social ontology, a “social object” is an object that counts as something else,
in a given context. The formula is (5.46).
(5.46) x counts as y in context c
A declarative speech act is an act that modifies the way the world is, introducing a
new state of affairs. In other words, it imposes a function that is socially recognized:
pronouncing vows (in a certain setting, and in front of certain people) makes two
people into husband(s) and/or wife(s). Touching a man’s shoulder with a king’s
sword will make him a knight, etc. The initial observation is that most professions
(and roles) have a cut-off beginning that is established by some type of declarative
speech act, upon which they profession etc (as extrinsic properties) supervene. A
candidate has to be elected and sign some official documents before being able
say of himself that he is president. Now, note that whenever there exist such a
clear-cut point, the meaning of the bare predicate aligns with the “most (socially)
constructed” meaning (e.g. “lawyer” expressed with a bare predicate can be said of
someone who has passed the bar exam, and hardly - if ever - of someone with a law
degree). Earlier we said that “scalarity” was entailed by the meaning of the property
referred to by a bare predicate. It is clear now how this works: every bare predicate
18See. Searle, John R. 1995 “The Construction of Social Reality”, New York Free Press Searle,
John R. 1969 Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Searle, John R. 1975 A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind
and Knowledge. Minnesota
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refers to an extrinsic property. If, as we have seen from the chapter on the literature
background, we start from the assumption that there is a class of nouns (professions,
roles, and so on) that can occur as bare predicates, we are going to argue ourselves
into a dead end, and it will be very difficult to find any counterexample, since any
profession or role (being social objects) have a cut-off starting point determined by
some declarative or other, hence these predicates are necessarily non-scalar.
5.8.2 Conclusions
Summing up, intrinsic properties tend to surface (in the languages discussed in this
study) in a way that is interpretable as a member of a kind. As we can see from the
data of the languages discussed in this study, grammar can distinguish between an
intrinsic property and an extrinsic property. However, it is incorrect to say that in
every language intrinsicality is associated to the “category” Noun. In some languages,
it might be the case, but in other languages that could also depend on the syntactic
environment in which the noun appears. So, it is reasonable to assume that the
noun by itself does not denote an intrinsic property. Instead, intrinsicality - being
associated to an intensional property - emerges through the combination of the noun
with the article. Also a structure like “a N ” denotes a member of a kind, if kinds are
collections of entities grouped by virtue of their intrinsic properties. It is in principle
possible to have a property that is intrinsic to an individual and no one else. In
general, to say that a structure like “a N ” denotes an instance of a kind de facto,
but not de jure, because the case just discussed would not entail the existence of a
kind.

CHAPTER 6
Conclusions
This concludes the present study on bare predicates from the perspective of cross-
linguistic variation at the syntax-semantics interface. “Cross-linguistic variation”
might be misleading here, as only European languages were considered. These lan-
guages share, in most cases, large portions of their lexicon (in terms of cognates)
and do not have particularly dissimilar syntax (Romance, Germanic-Scandinavian).
I presented several different contexts in which bare predicates surface and discussed
all the meaning alternations between sentences containing two types of predicative
constructions: the ones in which a nominal/noun appears determinerless in post-
copular position, and the counterparts of the same sentences, in which the predi-
cate is introduced by a determiner (typically, an indefinite article). The importance
of considering closely related languages, in this case was two-fold: 1) it helped us
identify very robust patterns of meaning alternation (showing very little variation
between languages, modulo some language-specific property that might ultimately
restrict or extend the admissibility of bare predicates); 2) it helped us construct a
generalization that can be further tested, as it is expected in many languages at
some level. I have argued that the interpretation of the bare predicate is that of
an extrinsic property, a property that depends on the external world around the
individual to which that property is ascribed, often understood as involving human
volition/agency. Exactly in the opposite way, the interpretation of the determined
predicate is that of an intrinsic property, hence crucially dependent on the exis-
tence of its subject and its internal qualities. I have claimed that, unlike extrinsic
properties, which simply denote sets, intrinsic properties should be treated as ex-
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istentially conditioned intensional properties that hold in every possible world in
which the entity exists and that such a more complex semantics justifies and re-
quires more structure - the article. There is a number of questions that still need
to be answered. For instance, the present account fails to predict some language-
specific behaviors. It also remains open why in Dutch bare predicates can appear in
the singular form with a plural subject (but not consistently in every construction).
It also remains to future research to establish what the relation between bare predi-
cates and kind-level modification is. Currently I do not have satisfactory answers to
these questions, however, I believe that the type of answers that these questions will
be given by future research can hardly lead to a full rejection of the generalizations
outlined in this thesis. If this analysis is on the right track, and, more importantly,
if the insights of the analysis are correct, meaning alternations such as the ones
we described observed in our data set should appear, one way or another, in every
language. This is due to the fact that the type of contrasts our account is pointing
at are deeply rooted in both our conceptual system and in our perception of the
ontological reality.
Finally, I suggested that we needed to abandon the lexical approaches to bare pred-
icates, not so much because there is no lexical component involved, but simply
because of what restricting a phenomenon to a certain class amounts to, and what
predictions it makes. In sum, I argue that there is no lexical phenomenon of bare
predicates, but that instead, what we observe is just the reflection of a deeper con-
ceptual distinction.
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Appendix A
6.1 Norwegian
The Norwegian data discussed in the thesis might needs some particular explanation.
A brief survey the properties of Norwegian bare singulars precedes what we now
know as the standard dataset for BPs. The reason of this particular choice is two-
fold: if, on the one hand, the semantic contrast of Norwegian BPs Vs. determined
predicates is essentially identical to that of the other languages discussed in this
thesis. On the other hand, the pervasiveness of Norwegian bare singulars in argument
position must be taken into account. This is important especially since we need to
discern what belongs to the bare predication spectrum per se, and what examples
are influenced by the argumental bare singulars. To put it differently, knowing more
about bare singulars in general helps understanding why some examples might seem
deviant from the pattern.
There is another reason why the discussion of the Norwegian data is crucial: it is
possible to use a bare singular with the range of interpretation that an NP intro-
duced by an indefinite would have in Romance or Germanic. That is a phenomenon
that exists in various languages (e.g. Icelandic, Hungarian, Welsh, etc.), but what
differentiates those languages from Norwegian is the fact that Norwegian has the
indefinite article whereas those other languages do not. At the same time, some of
the uses of the bare singulars, as we will see, are compatible with the definite article
in Romance. This makes of Norwegian a peculiar case that is interesting to consider.
What follows is meant to get the reader acquainted with Norwegian bare singu-
lar arguments (cf. Borthen (2003) for an extensive discussion and complete data;
Pereltsvaig (2006), and Kallulli (1999) for different accounts).
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6.1.1 Norwegian Bare Singulars
Norwegian is a language endowed with both definite and indefinite articles, however
only singular indefinites look somehow similar to English-like indefinites. All plurals
and all definites inflect on the noun. In the table below is illustrated the basic
inflection pattern for masculine nouns.1
Singular P lural
Indefinite en hest hester
Definite hesten hestene
As mentioned in the introduction, some Norwegian singular count nouns can appear
bare (BSs henceforth), as in the following:2
(6.1) Alle
all
barna
childrendef
prøvde
tried
jakke
jacket
"All the children tried on a jacket"
The interpretation of the BS in (6.1) is some jacket or other, because, first of all,
Norwegian BSs are not specific: even when interpreted existentially, they always
take narrow scope and, indeed, they can never be combined with adjectives denoting
specificity (e.g. bestemt ’certain’).
The problem with this example is that the wide scope reading of the bare singular
is entailed in the narrow scope. However, it is true that Norwegian bare singulars do
not take wide scope, and a better way of showing it is to make cause interactions with
negation. Indeed, in (6.2), the wide scope reading for jakke ’jacket’ is not allowed. It
is impossible to interpret the sentence as meaning “there is one jacket that nobody
tried”.
(6.2) Ingen
no
barn
child
prøvde
tried
jakke
jacket
"No child tried on a jacket"
Next to being not (specifically) referential, Borthen claims that Norwegian BSs are
also impossible to use as partitives, as shown in (6.3).
1Norwegian also has feminine and neuter genders but, for the purpose of this overview, spelling
out the whole paradigm is pointless.
2Unless otherwise specified, all examples in this subsection are from Borthen (2003)
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(6.3) Det
it
var
was
igjen
left
mange
many
sykler
bikes
etter
after
salget,
saledef,
"There were many bikes left after the sale, ...
??
...
så
so
jeg
I
ga
gave
sykkel
bike
til
to
Kari
Kari
[intended] ... so I gave Kari a(ny) bike"
This example however needs some clarifications. The “??” grammaticality judgement
of (6.3) is restricted to a context where the sentence has no particular focus, so the
natural focus is on the most embedded element til Kari ’to Kari’ (Cinque, 1993).
When sykkel ’bike’ is (contrastively) focused the sentence is perfectly grammatical.
So if a person is wondering what kind of present they should give to Kari, a bicycle or
something else, and they they walked passed a shop where there were many bicycle
left, (6.4) is absolutely perfect:
(6.4) ...
...
så
so
jeg
I
ga
gave
SYKKEL
bike
til
to
Kari
Kari
"... so I gave Kari a bike"
(6.5) ?? Katt
cat
har
has
myk
soft
pels
fur
"[intended] The cat has soft fur"
They can rarely be used as generics, as shown in (6.5) and, ceteris paribus, their
determined counterparts are better antecedents for anaphoric expressions, as shown
in (6.6 a-6.6 b).
(6.6) (a) *Den
the
tredje
third
oppgaven
taskdef
var
was
å
to
sette
put
papegøye
parrot
på
on
pinnen
perchdef
sin
hisrefl, poss
"[intended] The third task was to place a parrot on its perch"
(b) Den
the
tredje
third
oppgaven
taskdef
var
was
å
to
sette
put
en
a
papegøye
parrot
på
on
pinnen
perchdef
sin
hisrefl, poss
"The third task was to place a parrot on its perch"
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BSs cannot be externally-merged subjects (e.g. they are ok in passive sentences
and some unaccusatives). A further restriction concerns the type of nouns that
can be realized as BSs: Borthen observed that descriptively-poor nouns tend to be
unacceptable as BSs, as shown by the examples in (6.7 a - 6.7 b):
(6.7) (a) Det
there
ligger
lies
kniv
knife
på
on
bordet
tabledef
"There is a knife on the table"
(b) */??Det ligger
there
ting
lies
/
thing
object
/
på
object
bordet
on tabledef
"[intended] There is a thing / object on the table"
However, there BSs behave like “focus magnets” in that they seem to always want
focus, and that might explain why, as we have seen, object positions are hardly
problematic. If that is true, and BSs want to be in focus, in this case there seem to
be an issue of focus alternative (Rooth, 1992): what else other than an object could
be lying on the table? If we consider a different context, for instance a context of
imagination, the table turns: what we obtain is a “descriptively-poor noun” such as
object , in the sense of ’object as a category’ to which we can oppose some other
category. In this case, focus is satisfied, and, as expected, the result grammatical.
(6.8) Han
he
diskuterte
discussed
objekt
object
som
as
en
category
kategori
"He discussed the object as a category"
Intuitively, for Borthen’s example (6.7 b), e.g. a glass of wine could never be consid-
ered as an alternative to object in that it is semantically “covered” by it. In a sense
this is similar to what happened in (6.3 - 6.4) with the bicycle case: if the default
focus is on the PP til Kari ’to Kari’ the bare sykkel is cannot be in focus and the
sentence is borderline to ungrammatical; when, instead, sykkel is focused (a bicycle
as opposed to something else), the sentence is perfectly acceptable.
Another straight-forward fact is that BSs are good antecedents for pronouns referring
to non-animate kinds (6.9).3 They suit generic statements well (6.10), and they can
subject higher-order predication (6.11).
(6.9) Ola
Ola
har
has
fin
nice
bil.
carmasc.
Dét
Thatneut
har
has
Kari
Kari
også
too
"Ola has a nice car. That Kari has too"
3In Borthen (2003) it is claimed that, since det has many common properties with BSs, it is
actually their pronominal counterpart.
Appendix A 167
(6.10) Man
one
bør
should
bruke
use
jakke
jacket
om
in
vinteren
winterdef
"One should use a jacket in winter"
(6.11) Datamaskin
computer
er
is
et
a
nyttig
useful
hjelpemiddel
tool
"A / the computer is a useful tool"
One very informative kind of examples is the illustrated in (6.12 a - 6.12 b). Notice
that BS can only be replaced by the neuter form det ’thatneut’:
(6.12) (a) Bil,
carmasc,
dét
thatneut
har
have
jeg
I
sett
seen
før
before
"A car, that I have seen before"
(b) *Bil,
carmasc,
den
thatmasc
har
have
jeg
I
sett
seen
før
before
"[intended] A car, I have seen it (i.e. the car) before"
One interesting fact is that simply replacing the BS with the corresponding DP will
not make the match with the masculine den ’itmasc’ grammatical and still the neuter
form is preferred. This point is particularly interesting, as we will discuss it again,
at a later stage in [].
(6.13) (a) *En
a
bil,
carmasc,
den
thatmasc
har
have
jeg
I
sett
seen
før
before
"[intended] A car, I have seen it (i.e. a car) before"
(b) ?En
a
bil,
carmasc,
dét
thatneut
har
have
jeg
I
sett
seen
før
before
"[intended] A car, I have seen it (i.e. a car) before"
Notice that a similar agreement phenomenon can be shown also with predicates.
Again, the masculine noun bil ’car’ as a BS does not trigger the agreement on the
post-copular adjective kjekt ’handy’ that appears in its neuter form. The contrast is
with the definite DP and the indefinite DP, which in turn, both trigger the gender
agreement.4
(6.14) (a) Bil
carmasc
er
is
kjekt
handyneut
/
/
*kjekk
handymasc
å
to
ha
have
4My informants disagree on the grammaticality judgement of (6.13 b). They assign to it a
judgement of full grammaticality.
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(b) En
a
bil
carmasc
er
is
?kjekt
handyneut
/
/
kjekk
handymasc
å
to
ha
have
"A car is handy to have"
(c) Bilen
carmasc, def
er
is
*kjekt
handyneut
/
/
kjekk
handymasc
å
to
ha
have
"The car is handy to have"
In partial disagreement with Borthen’s grammaticality judgments, and in order to
explain the reason of such disagreement, one aspect needs to be emphasized: the
version of example (6.14 b) where the adjective agrees in gender with en bil ’a car’ is
not odd. What it is interpreted in a different way. If the (basic) non-agreeing version
means “it’s handy to have a car”, the agreed version means “there is a car such that
it is handy to have”. Now, this latter reading might be odd in that it is hard to
figure out what it means, but the sentence itself is grammatical. It is easier to see
it, when we replace the verb is with would be.
(6.15) En
a
sånn
such
bil,
carmasc,
som
that
jeg
I
så
saw
i går,
yesterday
ville
would
være
be
fint
nicemasc
å
to
ha
have
"A car like the one we saw yesterday would be nice to have"
Finally, via some contextual licensing, BSs can be used in eventive sentences:5
(6.16) Sykebil
ambulance
er
is
på
on
vei
way
/
/
er
is
underveis
underway
"The / an ambulance is on its way"
Conclusion To conclude this appendix, let us summarize the properties of Nor-
wegian BSs. We have seen that they are weak and, even when they are interpreted
existentially, they cannot take wide scope. They are not specifically referential, and
they seem to attract or want focus. Furthermore, they are not good antecedents for
anaphoric expressions and they do not trigger agreement on a pronoun that reprises
them nor on a predicate. Norwegian BSs can be used as kind-referring expressions,
but only in constructions of higher-order predication (exemplified by the contrast
between (6.5) and (6.11)), and while they function well in generic statements (e.g.
(6.10)). However, their use is not restricted to generic statements: they can also be
used in eventive sentences as well, as shown by (6.16).
5I am aware that “contextual licensing” is a vague expression, specifying it is a task that lies
outside the scope of this section.
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Note that some differences between Norwegian and the other languages of the data
set will be easier to understand given what we know about what Norwegian bare
singulars can do in argument position. In other words, this appendix is meant to
supply some general information in order to understand how Norwegian is more
similar to the other languages in the set, than it might superficially appear.

Appendix B
6.1 Bare Singulars in as-constructions
Introduction In this appendix we will summarize contexts and observations about
the constructions that involve bare nominals appearing as arguments of as in Italian
and some other languages.
There are two main contexts in which the as-phrase can occur. Either the as an
argument of the main verb, exemplified in (6.1), or as a DP-adjunct, exemplified in
(6.2).
(6.1) Il
the
gruppo
group
ha
has
scelto
chosen
Gianni
Gianni
come
as
rappresentante
representative
"The group chose Gianni as a representative"
(6.2) Come
as
professore,
professor,
Gianni
Gianni
può
can
bocciare
fail
Maria
Maria
"As a professor, Gianni can fail Maria"
We will first discuss discuss the bare singular is the argument of the preposition as.
Then we will discus some cases where the occurrence of the bare and the determined
predicate is determined by two different structures: the determined cases can be
analyzed as instances of comparative/elliptical sentences. Finally we will briefly
present some data about the Italian preposition da, which roughly translates into
as, but that shows a radically different behavior.
6.1.1 As-phrases as arguments
There is a number of verbs that can have an as-phrase as an argument. One example
is the verb in (6.3), and other verbs that pattern together are scegliere ’choose’,
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votare ’vote’, nominare ’nominate’, and a specific sense of usare ’use’ (that we will
discuss in a coming section), eleggere ’elect’, etc.
(6.3) Il
the
gruppo
group
ha
has
scelto
chosen
Gianni
Gianni
come
as
rappresentante
representative
"The group chose Gianni as a representative"
A superficially similar structure
It is important not to confuse the sentences like the one above with some that look
similar and mean something similar. Let us see what they are in (6.4) and (6.5)
(6.4) Il
the
gruppo
group
ha
has
reso
made
Gianni
Gianni
( ?un
(a
/
/
?il)
the)
rappresentante
representative
"The group made Gianni a representative"
(6.5) Il
the
gruppo
group
ha
has
eletto
elected
Gianni
Gianni
( *un
(a
/
/
*il)
the)
rappresentante
representative
"The group elected Gianni as a representative"
These are cases of sentences containing a small clause: the presence of predication
in the absence of tense, as well as the impossibility of having intervening material
(e.g. temporal adverbs), as shown in (6.6 a), are clear clues.
(6.6) (a) Il
the
gruppo
group
ha
has
eletto
elected
Gianni
Gianni
(*ieri)
(*yesterday)
rappresentante
representative
One question could be why is there a difference between the acceptability of the
determiner (between brackets) and, relatedly, why only in (6.4) is it possible to
(contrastively) focus the determiner, but no such option is available for (6.5)?
(6.7) (a) Il
the
gruppo
group
ha
has
reso
made
Gianni
Gianni
UN
A
rappresentante
representative
"The group made Gianni A representative (not the only one)"
(b) *Il
the
gruppo
group
ha
has
eletto
elected
Gianni
Gianni
UN
A
rappresentante
representative
"The group elected Gianni A representative (not the only one)"
Interestingly because some of these verbs, for example eleggere ’elect’, chiamare
’call’, rendere ’make’, nominare ’nominate’, etc., can appear in naming construc-
tions, whereas verbs like rendere ’make’ cannot. We can understand naming con-
structions in the same way in which we understand (6.8 a) and (6.8 b), and (6.8 c).
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(6.8) (a) Hanno
the have
chiamato
called
Gesù
Jesus
Cristo
Christ
’Il
The
Salvatore’
Savior
"They called Jesus Christ ’The Savior’"
(b) Hanno
the have
chiamato
called
loro
their
figlio
son
’Vittorio’
Vittorio
"They called their son Vittorio"
(c) L’
her
hanno
the have
incoronata
crowned
’Miss
Miss
Italia’
Italy
"They crowned her as ’Miss Italy’"
On the other hand, verbs like “rendere” can have as argument a determined predicate
which is semantically the same as what we have been observing in the examples
of the previous sections. This becomes more clear if the force that “modifies the
nature” of Gianni is not a group (of people) - as it is in the example - but rather a
life-experience. Compare (6.4) with (6.9):
(6.9) La
the
fame
hunger
ha
has
reso
made
Gianni
Gianni
un
a
cacciatore
hunter
"Hunger made Gianni a hunter"
Of course it is interesting that the interpretation assigned to the determined pred-
icate un cacciatore ’a hunter’ is someone who is intrinsically a hunter: hunting
is/became his drive, is “nature”. We can contrast (6.9) with (6.10), and in the latter
we can see that the interpretation of the bare predicate cacciatore is simply “someone
who hunts”.
(6.10) La
the
fame
hunger
ha
has
reso
made
Gianni
Gianni
cacciatore
hunter
"Hunger made Gianni a hunter"
Now that we have seen the cases in which as was not present, we have understood
better how the lexical semantics of the verb either allows a bare singular or a de-
terminer singular (because it allows its meaning). This is never possible, as we have
seen, in naming constructions.
6.1.2 Verbs of creation
Some of the considerations that we have made so far will be relevant again, but let
us go back to the original question, namely: what kind of structures are the ones in
which the as-phrase is an argument of the verb?
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(6.11) Il
the
gruppo
group
ha
has
scelto
chosen
Gianni
Gianni
come
as
rappresentante
representative
"The group chose Gianni as a representative"
It is easy to notice, especially comparing (6.11) to (6.12 a) and following, that we
can unify these sentences by looking at them as tokens on sentences in which a verb
of creation is involved. Of course the variables are 1) the animacy of the arguments,
2) if the concept of creation is to be understood in a literal or more abstract way,
and 3) if the verb is extensional or intensional.
Let us start from the beginning, consider (6.12 a), which behaves exactly like the
other languages in our set. Also note the striking similarity between a verb like
choose (as) and a verb like use (as), in (6.11).
(6.12) (a) Voi
youplur
potete
can
usare
use
questi
these
cinque
five
tronchi
trunks
come
as
(un)
(a)
tavolo
table
"You guys can use these five trunks as a table"
(b) Puedes
you canplur
usar
useinf
esto
this
como
as
(una)
(a)
silla
chair
(spa)
"You can use this as a chair"
(c) Du
you
kan
can
bruke
use
denne
this
boksen
boxdef
som
as
(en)
(a)
stol
chair
(nor)
"You can use this box as a chair"
(d) Du
you
kannst
can
diese
these
Schachtel
boxes
als
as
Stuhle
chair
benutzen
use
(deu)
"You can use this as a chair"
(e) Je
you
kunt
can
deze
these
dozen
boxes
als
as
stoelen
chair
gebruiken
use
(nld)
"You can use this as a chair"
Because verbs like use belong to the class of the verbs of creation, it is not surprising
to imagine that anything can be “used as” anything because it is nomologically
possible to use a sweater as a sun screen, a person as a coat stand, and so on;
and at least logically possible to use an elephant as a house, or a bathtub as an
hourglass. These sentences are not ungrammatical, merely hard to interpret, just
like some equative sentences can convey wacky meanings and still be grammatical.
The question is “Is there a contrast between the interpretations of the bare vs. the
determined form (if the latter is allowed)? And what does the version of the sentence
containing the bare singular mean?” Let us begin from this latter question.
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For obvious space constraints the sentences are collapsed together, so consider the
version in which “table” occurs without a determiner. These sentences have two
different readings: they can either mean that the people end up with five tables, or
that they all combine the five trunks to build one table. The reading where there is
only one table cannot be derived by letting the NP tavolo ’table’ take wide scope. If
that was the case, the NP would out-scope the verb and the sentence would mean
that there is a particular table that the trunks are being used as, but it is not the
intended meaning. Instead, on the one-table reading, the DP questi cinque tronchi
’these five trunks’ takes a collective reading (i.e. a single entity-group of the five
trunks combined).1 In the reading where there are five tables, the DP is interpreted
as distributed over the plural subject (voi ’you guys’). This partially answers our
question, because we still do not know how is “table” interpreted, but first there is
another question to be answered, namely, “Why cannot the same effect be obtained
with a human predicate in Italian, whereas and in other languages (Spanish, Dutch)
it is possible?”2 In Italian, the predicate must agree in number and in Spanish there
is a strong preference for the agreeing form.
(6.13) (a) Nadie
nobody
podrá
canfut
usarnos
take usplural
como
as
testigo
witnesssingular
(spa)
"Nobody will be able to use us as witnesses"
(b) Niemand
Nobody
kan
can
ons
us
gebruiken
use
als
as
getuige
witness
(nld)
"Nobody will be able to use us as witnesses"
(c) ??/*Nessuno
nobody
ci
us-plur
potrà
canfut
usare
take
come
as
testimone
witnesssingular
(ita)
"Nobody will be able to use us as witnesses"
Here it seems that is not the distributive vs. collective reading to fail (in the lan-
guages where these sentences are ungrammatical) but the interpretation of “witness”.
As we said earlier, we still need to know how “table” was interpreted, and now we
have a similar problem. The only way to understand it is, as usual, to confront the
sentences with their counterparts where the determined noun is used. So 1) is it
possible to obtain both readings also with the determiner? and 2) how does the
meaning change?
In the collective reading there are some five trunks (already close to one another) and
the speaker can show them to the other people and utter (6.14 a). In the distributive
1Eddy Ruys (p.c.) pointed out that this effect disappears with a distributive DP: usate ciascuno
di questi cinque tronchi come tavolo ’use each of these trunks as a table’.
2The examples are calqued on some examples appeared in Munn and Schmitt (2005).
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reading, the trunks can be already apart from one another, and when the speaker
utters (6.14 a), the distributive would be the favorite interpretation.
(6.14) (a) Usate
useimper
questi
these
cinque
five
tronchi
trunks
come
as
un
a
tavolo
table
"Use these five trunks as a table"
The interpretation of “table” is not some abstract conceptualized notion of a “table”.
What is being conveyed is “use X in the same way as you would use a Y”, and the
fact that it is possible to pronounce the elided part, as shown by (6.15 a), is a sign
that these sentences are elliptical comparatives. Note two things: 1) the meaning
of the sentence with the determined singular is entirely different from the reading
we obtain from the bare singular, and 2) it is not possible to do so in the version
containing the bare form, in (6.15 b).
(6.15) (a) Usate
useimper
questi
these
tronchi
trunks
come
as
(usereste)
(you would use)
un
a
tavolo
table
"Use these trunks as (you would use) a table"
(b) Usate
useimper
questi
these
tronchi
trunks
come
as
(*usereste)
(you would use)
tavolo
table
(6.16) (a) Puedes
you canplur
usar
use
estos
these
cinco
five
troncos
trunks
como
as
(usarias)
(you would useplur)
una
a
mesa
table
(spa)
"You can use these five trunks as (you would use) a table"
(b) Puedes
you canplur
usar
use
estos
these
cinco
five
troncos
trunks
como
as
(*usarias)
(you would useplur)
mesa
table
"You can use these five trunks as (you would use) a table"
(6.17) (a) Du
you
kan
can
bruke
use
denne
this
boksen
boxdef
(slik)
(just)
som
as
(du
(you
ville
would)
bruke)
use
en
a
stol
chair
(nor)
"You can use this box just as you would use a chair"
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(b) Du
you
kan
can
bruke
use
denne
this
boksen
boxdef
(slik)
(just)
som
as
(*du
(you
ville
would
bruke)
use)
stol
chair
As we mentioned, let us discuss in what sense the meanings of the two versions of
the sentence (with and without determiner) are different. The sentences with the
determiner mean: “use the trunks as you would use a table”. The sentences without
determiner can be rephrased as “use the trunks for what a table’s purpose is”. In
other words for the table’s telic role. This sense is entailed by (a) but (a)’s sense
cannot be achieved by (b) sentences, and it can be shown but comparing the oddity
of two possible replies: since “table” in (b) has a “purpose” or “functional” reading,
a proper reply could be: “Ok, I will eat on it.”, but it could never be: “Oh, but it has
no legs” (which is something a real table is expected to have). This latter reply is,
on the other hand, perfect for (a):
table’s telic role real table
a come un tavolo OK I’ll eat on it OKBut it has no legs!
b come tavolo OK I’ll eat on it #But it has no legs!
6.1.3 As-phrases adjuncts or arguments?
What ellipsis does buy us
In the previous subsection, we have seen how the elliptical analysis is a useful way to
capture two different types of sentences containing an as-phrase, and revealing that,
in the “table”-cases had a different structure than it appears superficially. But, the
elliptical analysis is also an interesting way of looking at a related as-construction,
because, as we will see, it can easily account for the following meaning contrasts. We
also need to distinguish the cases in which the as-phrase is an argument and the cases
in which, on the other hand, is an adjunct. Consider the following constructions.
(6.18) (a) Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
agito
acted
come
as
poliziotto
policeman
(ita)
"Gianni acted as a policeman"
(b) Juan
Juan
actuó
acted
como
as
policia
policeman
(spa)
"Juan acted as a policeman"
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(c) Per
Per
handlet
acted
som
as
politimann
policeman
(nor)
"Per acted as a policeman"
(6.19) (a) Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
agito
acted
come
as
un
a
poliziotto
policeman
(ita)
"Gianni acted as a policeman"
(b) Juan
Juan
actuó
acted
como
as
un
a
policia
policeman
(spa)
"Juan acted as a policeman"
(c) Per
Per
handlet
acted
som
as
en
a
politimann
policeman
(nor)
"Per acted as a policeman"
Similarly to what we have seen in the “table”-example (cf. (6.15 a) and (6.15 b)),
we can understand that the cases containing the full DP a policeman are elliptical.
Enrico Boone (p.c.) points out that these sentences also react positively to a classic
test for ellipsis, that is about agreement mismatch, as shown by the Italian example
in (6.20 a).
(6.20) (a) Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
agito
acted
come
as
un
a
poliziotto
policeman
e
and
Sofia
Sofia
anche
too
(ita)
"Gianni acted as a policeman and Sofia too"
Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
agito
acted
come
as
un
a
poliziotto
policeman
e
and
loro
them
anche
too
"Gianni acted as a policeman and them too"
It is clear that, in (6.20 a), it is unproblematic to interpret that Sofia and them
all acted in the same way that Gianni did, as a policeman would have. Note that
there is no gender mismatch with Sofia (that would require a feminine noun, so
poliziotta ’policewoman’) nor number mismatch with them (that would require a
plural, so poliziotti ’policemen’). The fact that the agreement mismatch does not
influences the grammaticality is a classic ellipsis effect. Another test for ellipsis is
the the strict/sloppy reading, that is exemplified below:3
(6.21) (a) Io
I
amo
love
il
the
mio
my
appartamento
appartamento
come
as
un
an
architetto
architect
"I love my appartament as an architect (loves his)" sloppy reading
3Clearly, the interpretation “I love my apartment like I would do if I were an architect” is also
possible.
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(b) Io
I
amo
love
il
the
mio
my
appartamento
appartamento
come
as
un
an
architetto
architect
"I love my appartament as an architect (would love / loves mine)" strict
reading
So, if it is really the case that these two sentences have a dramatically different
syntax, this very fact could appear more explicitly in some language or other. Indeed,
it is exactly what happens in German, where the choice of the preposition changes:
one selects a CP and another one selects an NP.4
(6.22) (a) Er
he
handelte
acted
als
as
Polizist
policeman
(deu)
"He acted as a policeman"(in the capacity of)
(b) Er
he
handelte
acted
wie
as
ein
a
Polizist
policeman
(handeln
(hacted
würde)
would have)
"He acted as a policeman (would have done)"
Only the comparative nature of these structures fails to provide the entailment
that g 2 [[policeman]]. This means that, in every elliptical case, the subject is not
necessarily a member of the set referred to by the noun in the as-phrase.
6.1.4 More “functional” readings
Consider these cases where, as we said, the as-phrase appears as a DP-adjunct
modifying the subject of the sentence.
(6.23) (a) Come
as
professore,
professor,
Gianni
Gianni
può
can
bocciare
fail
Maria
Maria
(ita)
"As a professor, Gianni can fail Maria"
(b) Som
as
professor,
professor,
kan
can
Per
Per
stryke
fail
Kari
Kari
(nor)
"As a professor, Per can fail Kari"
(c) Como
as
jefe,
boss,
Juan
Juan
puede
can
despedir
fire
a
to
Maria
Maria
(spa)
"As boss, Juan can fire Maria"
4Apparently, a similar effect can be found in English between the use of “as” and the use of
“like”. Although it is difficult to determine whether this is still a trait of the living grammar, it
must have been a feature of the language at some point of its history.
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From the examples above, we can understand that there is something that the
subject (e.g. Gianni) can do (e.g. fail Maria) because of his professional role (e.g.
professor) or within its professional role. Stripping away the deontic powers that
professions have associated to them, and we reduce to the bare minimum “what it
means act within one’s position”, we can see that it is not different from what we
can observe in the next set of examples.
(6.24) (a) Come
as
amico,
friend,
ti
to you
dico
I tell
questo...,
this...,
come
as
medico
doctor,
ti
to you
dico
I tell
questo...
this...
(ita)
"As a friend, I’m telling you this..., as a doctor I’m telling you this... "
(b) Als
as
Freund
friend,
sage
tell
ich
I
dir...,
this...,
als
as
Arzt
doctor,
sage
tell
ich
I
dir...
this...
(deu)
"As a friend, I’m saying this..., as a doctor I’m saying this... "
To phrase it differently, the “friendship” relation and the “doctor-patient” relation
have areas of obvious non-overlap. Even when somebody can be at the same time
a friend and a doctor to someone else, the friend -role and the doctor -role might
require different behaviors, in that they select different aspects of the same person.
The generalization is that the as-phrase is interpreted as a restriction applying to
the main clause. Essentially, as we said above, it selects an “aspect” of the subject.
(6.25) Come
as
professore,
professor,
Gianni
Gianni
è
is
molto
very
severo
stern
"As a professor, Gianni is very stern"
In (6.25) the judgement is stern is given to the professor -side of Gianni, not to
the person as-a-whole. A continuation could be “but as a friend he can be very
understanding”. Recall that as in the “policeman”-cases which contained the bare
predicate, the bare singular in the as-phrase was interpreted as “by virtue of /
within his role”. In (6.25) and the examples above too, the part of meaning that
does not depend on the semantic contribution of the preposition is still interpreted
as the extrinsic property of the subject.
The final section of this appendix is dedicated to a type of constructions that deserve
to be mentioned because they shows an interesting ambiguous behavior.
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6.1.5 The strange nature of da
There are many particles and prepositions that can roughly be translated into the
English preposition as. In Italian, we discussed the use of come, but another particle
that can, in some cases, serve a similar function is the preposition da. So far, we
noticed that there is a one-to-one interpretative match between the presence or the
absence of the determiner, in the as-constructions, and the possibility of reading the
as-phrase as a comparative, and the reading of the predication as a restriction on
the “aspects” of the identity of the subject of the main clause. Now, consider the
example illustrated in (6.26).
(6.26) Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
agito
acted
da
as
poliziotto
policeman
"Gianni acted as a policeman"
The complexity of da lies in the fact that sentences like (6.26) are ambiguous between
two readings. Let us first understand which kind of scenarios allow the disambigua-
tion of (6.26).
Reading 1
It is possible to imagine that Gianni acted like a policeman if he arrested his own
wife because she had some marijuana in her purse. He is a real policeman and he
puts the law before everything else. Informally, we can say that this meaning of
(6.26) is “in the possible worlds in which Gianni is a member of the set of policemen,
Gianni acts like one”.
Reading 2
On the other hand, we can imagine that Gianni acted like a policeman, when he
woke up, in the dead of the night, simply for having heard some noises. He is not
a policeman but his instincts or his nature, made him behave in the same way a
policeman would have done. Informally, we can say that this meaning of (6.26) is
“Gianni acts like he would act in the possible worlds in which he is a member of the
set of policemen”.
What is very interesting is that, most clearly here reading 2 cantata derive from a
comparative, since da can only select an bare singular (as shown by the ungram-
maticality of (6.27 a)), and bare singulars, in Italian, cannot head be subjects.
(6.27) (a) *Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
agito
acted
da
as
un
a
poliziotto
policeman
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The problem seems to have shifted and it appears to be related more to the inten-
sional nature of the preposition, than to the phenomena of bareness of the nominals.
Furthermore, this phenomenon is not restricted to human predicates, as shown by
the following examples, in which we can see that the meaning possibilities are the
same as what we observed for (6.26).
(6.28) Ma
but
che
what
ti
you
aspettavi?
expected?
E’
it is
un
a
cane,
dog,
e
and
si
SE
comporta
behaves
da
as
cane.
dog
"What did you expect? It’s a dog, and it behaves like a dog"
(6.29) E’
it is
strano,
strange,
è
it is
un
a
gatto
cat,
ma
but
si
SE
comporta
behaves
da
as
cane.
dog
"That’s strange, it’s a cat, but it behaves like a dog"
A natural question to ask is the following: if such proposition exist in one language,
viz. an (intensional) preposition that selects only NPs, it is technically possible that
there could be something similar in other languages as well?
In English (and to some extent in Dutch) we can find examples like the following:
(6.30) It cannot, qua film, have the scope of a large book
(6.31) This is  an indefensibly bad poem qua poem
(6.32) Bobby was the first pig I had met qua pig, not qua pork
(6.33) Qua lover, he must be condemned for doing what, qua citizen, he would be
condemned for not doing
S.v. qua, Fowler’s Dictionary of Modern English Usage reads:
The real occasion for the use of q. [qua] occurs when a person of
thing spoken of can be regarded from more than one point of view or
as the holder of various coexistent functions, & a statement about him
(or it) is to be limited to him in one of these aspects: Qua lover he must
be condemned for doing what qua citizen he would be condemned for not
doing ; the lover aspect is distinguished from another aspect in which he
may be regarded. The two nouns (or pronouns) must be present, one
denoting the person or thing in all aspects (he), & the other singling out
one of his or its aspects (lover, or citizen).5
5H. W. Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage: The Classic First Edition, Oxford
University Press
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Summing up, we have seen that certain prepositions can license bare singulars,
which are interpreted as extrinsic properties. These cases are, for instance, come
in Italian, comme in French, als in Dutch, and qua in English. The imporance of
discussing English and the qua-construction, is that it shows that there exists an
English bare singular with no uniqueness requirement. This is not a trivial fact, and
it indicates two important things. As Stavroula Alexandropoulou (p.c.) points out,
it is important to consider the fact that the extrinsic meaning is available in English,
and that, furthermore, it is associated with the bare form, as shown by (6.34).
(6.34) Qua teacher, he has to grade the students
However, when the bare singular is licensed by a preposition, the contrast between
[human] nominals is neutralized, so e.g. English and Italian can allow different
types of bare singulars independently on [human] or [animate].
(6.35) Come schermo, questo pannello è perfetto
(6.36) Come professore, Gianni è simpatico
(6.37) The first pig Ive met qua pig and not qua pork
From the observation that (some) prepositions can license bare singulars, we can
understand something more. There is something in common between the bare singu-
lars that are argument of as-like prepositions and the bare singulars in post-copular
(predicative) position. We have shown that all these bare nouns are interpreted
as extrinsic properties. So, crucially, the constraint is not on the availability of the
meaning, but rather on the syntactic appearance of the bare noun. In other words, if
the meaning alternation between intrinsic and extrinsic is available, then the ques-
tion is What are the licensing conditions of bare singulars? Of the two cases in
which we have encountered bare singulars, in one, we can suppose that the licensing
depends on the preposition.6
Also, even if we believe, and we are ultimately arguing, that bare singular in pred-
icative position and in (verbal) argumental position are distinct phenomena, then it
would be unreasonable to assume that the same mechanism regulates the licensing
of bare nouns in argument and predicate position. In the other case, the post-copular
(predicative) position, what allows the bare singular to surface must be relatable to
some formal property of the nominal.
6Note that we are not suggesting that there are no differences among prepositions, for instance
between as-like prepositions an locatives. However, we are not focusing on this topic.
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A fine-grained analysis of these prepositions lies outside the scope of this study, but
the data we identified and discussed throughout this thesis made it necessary to
discuss at least some of the effects, and the interpretative pitfalls, of bare singulars
embedded under as in general, and da, even at such an informal level. We leave this
end open to further research but it is very important to remark how crucial it is to
constructs an analysis of bare predicates that can eventually meet the result of a
more in-depth observation of these prepositions.
Appendix C
6.1 Expressing intrinsicality in the perspective
of political correctness
In what follows, we will discuss the notion of intrinsic property in an informal way.
The reader will get acquainted with familiar and accessible examples, and will see
that this perspective can be illuminating for what concerns the intuitions associated
to the alternations discussed so far. In order to illustrate a general an intuitive
understanding of intrinsicality, we will here discuss contexts of political correctness.
As we will see, determined predicates (or, depending on the language, nouns as
opposed to non-nouns) show a strikingly constant behavior in expressing intrinsic
properties. As it might be difficult to have clear intuitions about the bare/determined
contrast for predicates, e.g. for the speakers of any language lacking articles, the
purpose of this section is meant to present the same contrast in such a way that will
facilitate our intuitions. Let us look at some examples.
6.1.1 Huck Finn, JFK, and the cleaning lady
Two centuries ago, and until roughly sixty years ago, in the United States, it was
considered from “acceptable” to “normal” to refer to a black person as a nigger.1
The derogatory use of the word caused the need to abandon its use, especially with
the rise of the African-American Civil Rights Movement, in the mid-fifties of last
century. Famous nineteenth-century American author Mark Twain has written one
of the most controversial books, from the perspective (modern) linguistic political
1I am grateful to Achille C. Varzi for discussing this topic with me.
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correctness: Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. The book contains more than two-
hundred tokens of the lexeme nigger :
Jim was monstrous proud about it, and he got so he wouldn’t hardly
notice the other niggers. Niggers would come miles to hear Jim tell about
it, and he was more looked up to than any nigger in that country. Strange
niggers would stand with their mouths open and look him all over, same
as if he was a wonder. Niggers is always talking about witches in the
dark by the kitchen fire; but whenever one was talking and letting on to
know all about such things, Jim would happen in and say, “Hm! What
you know ’bout witches?” and that nigger was corked up and had to take
a back seat.
(Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Ch.2)2
A passage of this type can be so shocking to the American public because this
word is commonly considered very offensive. It is often a matter of debate whether
primary school students should be exposed to a language abounding in instances of
the n-word.3 We can observe how a new word for black american emerged in place
of the previous one. In the historic speech on civil rights that the U.S. president J.
F. Kennedy delivered on June 11, 1963, the lexeme negro is used both as a noun
and as an adjective: the use of the word negro became the new norm of correctness.
That order called for the admission of two clearly qualified young
Alabama residents who happened to have been born Negro.
[...] but are we to say to the world, and much more importantly,
to each other that this is the land of the free except for the Negroes;
that we have no second-class citizens except Negroes; that we have no
class or caste system, no ghettoes, no master race except with respect to
Negroes?
(John F. Kennedy “Civil Rights Address”, 11 June 1963)4
In the late seventies, negro started being generally less and less acceptable. However,
the need of linguistically marking the distinction between the black population and
2The complete online resource can be found on http://www.gutenberg.org/files/76/76-h/
76-h.htm and it is made available by Project Gutenberg.
3The debate was furthermore inflamed when the publisher NewSouth Books completely removed
the word from the 2011 edition of the book. For different perspectives see Neal A. Lester’s personal
essay The N-Word: An Anatomy of A Course: http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/
01/05/does-one-word-change-huckleberry-finn.
4The recording and the full transcription of the speech can be found here: http://www.
americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkcivilrights.htm
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the white one still existed. The form considered more neutral became black, used as
an adjective. 56
The generalization is that adjectives (even individual-level, like black) are perceived
as more politically correct than nouns because speakers associate them to a minor
stability and a softer meaning.
(6.1) (a) Ben is a negro
(b) Ben is a black guy / black
Note that there is no difference in the truth conditions of (6.1 a) and (6.1 b), yet a
negro is interpretatble as an instance of a kind. It encodes the stability linked to the
intrinsicality of negrohood. Such intrinsicality, only expressed by (6.1 a), is that part
of meaning that can be turned into an offense.
Mandarin Chinese and Serbocroatian American English is not the only lan-
guage in which we can show phenomena of this type. There are very distant lan-
guages, in which the rejection of nominal forms for political correctness’ sake take
place. One is Mandarin Chinese. Consider the following.7
(6.2)
(6.3)
The difference between (6.2) and (6.3) is that the former is considered impolite,
whereas the latter is more acceptable.8 Note that even though Chinese is a language
5For a short period, another adjective has been preferred to black : colored. Its life as the neutral
term, however, did not last too long because it almost immediately started to be perceived as
offensive in a different way.
6For a more extensive discussion, see Nguyen, Elizabeth. "Origins of Black History Month,"
San Jose State University (24 February 2004).
7I’m very grateful to Zhang Jingwei and Li Fang for an insightful discussion on politeness in
Chinese and for showing me this contrast.
8Chinese also has the possibility of using a specific classifier, before the noun, to mark respect
or politeness. To some speakers the classifier+noun is the preferred expression of politeness.
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which is very distant from the languages that we have been discussing, the similarity
is striking. The key generalization seems to be the following: with which form is the
intrinsic/kind meaning associated? In this view, the form associated with an intrinsic
meaning can be felt as / become offensive, so that form is avoided.
A pattern that is similar to the Chinese one can be found in SerBoCroatian. Consider
the following:
(6.4) (a) Ova
this
teta
aunt
je
is
čistačica
cleaner
"This aunt is a cleaning lady"
(b) Ova
this
teta
aunt
čisti
cleans
ovde
here
"This aunt cleans here"
In SerBoCroatian, (6.4 b) is perceived as more polite. So, what does it mean that
forms like (6.3) and (6.4 b) are more polite? The intuition, as we already said, is very
elementary: if nouns can instantiate kinds, and kinds are collections of entities that
are grouped according to the intrinsicality of a property P (see also Le Bruyn, 2010),
then saying of some individual a that Pkind(a) is true, means to say that P can never
be false of a. The predication cannot stop holding because the cleaningladiness is
hardwired into a’s identity. On the political correctness side of the story, what these
observations point at is that it is the fact that that property is perceived as intrinsic.
Also, a property perceived as intrinsic can connected to the perception of shame.
In other words, saying to someone that she is “a cleaning lady” means to say that
she is “doomed” to be a cleaning lady forever, because that is “who she (really) is”.
The polite form, on the other hand, suggests that she currently cleans, but it is
not bound to be like that forever. Since across cultures, the job of a cleaning lady
appears to be considered one of the most low-prestige jobs that a person can do,
saying to someone that she can never change, equals to saying that she is not worth
much.9
Loans There seems to be only one exception in which a politically “incorrect” noun
is avoided by replacing it with another noun: if the new noun is a loan word.10 This
is not the place to discuss in which way loanwords are different from native words,
9We might disagree, but this is what speakers do, and what the strategies of political correctness
are predicated on. I am not suggesting to embrace this view of the world, I am simply pointing out
what languages do.
10As Marko Simonović (p.c.) points out, the same mechanism might apply to neologisms as well.
Appendix C 189
but it is the “newness” that they bring in the context that is crucial: loan words can
always introduce a new meaning “nuance” (cf. “semantic specificity” as discussed in
Simonović, forthcoming, and Arsenijević and Simonović, 2013), so when a noun has
only an offensive connotation, a loan can be introduced in the lexicon to supply the
lacking unoffensive nuance. However, if the same loanword can be used both as an
adjective and as a noun, the noun is more easily associated with a stronger, intrinsic
potentially more offensive meaning.11 This is the case of (6.5 a - 6.5 b).
(6.5) (a) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
gay
gayadj?
"Gianni is gay"
(b) Gianni
Gianni
è
is
un
a
gay
gay
"Gianni is a gay"
Offensive or flattering, shame or pride In the previous subsection we reached
the conclusion that a property of those expressions that capture (what speakers
think is) “the way people are” tend to be used in an offensive manner. However,
there is also the other side of the coin: expressions capturing intrinsicality can be
used in a flattering way. With this in mind, consider the following pairs.12
(6.6) (a) Sono
i am
imprenditore
entrepreneur
(b) Sono
i am
un
an
imprenditore
entrepreneur
"I’m an entrepreneur"
(6.7) (a) Sono
i am
operaio
worker
(b) Sono
i am
un
a
operaio
worker
"I’m a (factory) worker"
11I’m not even remotely suggesting that “gay” is an offense, or an offensive concept. I’m merely
pointing out a linguistic use.
12I am grateful to Mirjam Hachem for having pointed out to me this detail, and for an interesting
discussion on this topic.
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6.1. Expressing intrinsicality in the perspective of political
correctness
It is more difficult to show that some forms can be used to define a certain “prestige”,
because there are no changes such as those elicited by political correctness to help
us identify neatly these types of processes. Even if this is only a speculation, imagine
a case in which someone would want to “brag” about his being, or just define their
identity with pride. Probably this person would prefer (b) to (a).
